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This thesis examines the impact of foreign CEOs on the corporate policies of publicly 
traded US companies. Using a sample of S&P 1500 firms from 2000 to 2017, this thesis 
exploits the variation in foreign CEOs’ international experience and national culture to analyse 
their impact on firm risk, capital structure decisions and corporate acquisitions. 
The first study examines the impact of foreign CEOs on the risk taking behaviour of 
their firms and management practices. The results show that, compared with domestic CEOs, 
firms managed by foreign CEOs have higher stock return volatility and idiosyncratic risk. We 
find that firms managed by foreign CEOs invest more in intangible assets and are more likely 
to do mergers and acquisitions. We document that foreign CEOs are not a homogenous group 
and that the legal origin of foreign CEOs matters in their risk taking behaviour. The results 
show that foreign CEOs who come from countries with better creditor rights take fewer risks 
than those from poor creditor rights countries. The results show that foreign CEOs have a 
significant impact on firm risk and corporate policies. 
The second study exploits the variation in the cultural background of foreign CEOs to 
analyse its impact on capital structure decisions. Using the cultural measure of individualism 
versus collectivism, we find that firms managed by foreign CEOs from individualistic cultures 
have higher leverage. We next examine the channels through which individualistic CEOs 
impact a firm’s capital structure and find that individualistic CEOs are more likely to issue debt 
than equity and adjust their target leverage at a faster speed than firms managed by foreign 
CEOs from a collective culture. The empirical evidence shows that firms managed by 
individualistic CEOs tend to have more short debt maturity. The results are robust to 
endogeneity checks using propensity score matching and the instrumental variable approach. 
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The impact of individualism on capital structure decisions is also observed for firms managed 
by American CEOs born in individualistic states.  
Following the literature that international experience impacts manager’s strategic 
choices, the third study examines the impact of foreign CEOs on corporate acquisitions. The 
results show that foreign CEOs are more likely than domestic CEOs to do mergers and 
acquisitions (M&As). We find that firms managed by foreign CEOs are more likely to acquire 
targets in high-tech industries and targets operating in different 2-digit Standard Industry 
Classification (SIC) code industries. The results show that foreign CEOs are more likely to do 
cross border acquisitions. We examine the value implications of M&As undertaken by foreign 
CEOs and find that announcement returns for firms managed by foreign CEOs are lower. 
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1. Motivation and research objectives 
The impact of CEO characteristics on corporate policies has gained tremendous 
attention as recent studies show that a significant portion of the disparity in corporate decisions 
is driven by CEO attributes (Bamber, John & Yanyan, 2010; Bertrand & Schoar, 2003; 
Graham, Harvey & Puri, 2013). Though these studies exist, the impact of foreign CEOs 
remains largely unexplored. Given the significant impact that CEOs have on a firm’s decision 
making, this study investigates the impact of foreign CEOs on firm risk and management 
practices, capital structure decisions, and corporate acquisitions. By exploiting the variation in 
foreign CEOs’ international experience and cultural background, the results provide new 
evidence on the impact of foreign CEOs on the corporate polices of publicly traded firms in 
the US. Further analysis shows which firms benefit from the appointment of foreign CEOs. 
There has been an increase in foreign born labour force participation; the OECD reports 
that, in 2008, foreign born employees comprise 26.5% of the Australian labour force, 12.6% 
of the UK labour force and 16.5% of the US labour force (OECD, 2010). Some of the most 
iconic American corporations in the sample, such as Microsoft, Google, and Pepsi, are 
currently managed by foreign CEOs. Thus, skilled migrants present a significant opportunity 
for host countries as they move their human capital from their home country to other countries, 
which Giannetti, Liao and Yu (2015) describe as a brain gain for firms. Foreign CEOs bring to 
their position institutional knowledge of countries and regions other than the firm’s home 
country. As such, foreign CEOs provide their firms with both social capital (foreign networks) 
and human capital (foreign knowledge of other markets). This experience is valuable because 
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it cannot be substituted or imitated (Barney, 1991; Carpenter, Sanders & Gregersen, 2001; 
Daily, Certo & Dalton, 2000; Sambharya, 1996) and, therefore, their strategic focus and 
orientation may be different from domestic CEOs. Though some domestic CEOs may have 
international experience, Caligiuri and Santo (2001) suggest that such experience is limited in 
time and scope. Caligiuri, Lazarova and Zehetbauer (2004) note that the impact of executives’ 
international behaviour on firms may not be complete if we focus solely on their international 
experience and that top managers’ nationality should be accounted for when considering their 
international experience. In support of this, Shaw (1990) suggests that nationality influences 
the fundamental values and cognitive skills of individuals that shape their decisions and 
strategic choices. Further, independent of the talent and ability management accrues, the values 
in their country of origin have a deep, lasting impact on their orientation (Nielsen & Nielsen, 
2011). This explains what Hunter (1988), Markus and Kitayama (1994) and Schwartz (1999) 
suggest that when people are born and raised in a society, they are exposed to the laws, customs, 
values, and organizational practices through formal and information institutions and this cannot 
be achieved through expatriate assignments. 
Consistent with these theories, Nielsen and Nielsen (2011) document that top 
management teams with international experience and top management teams with foreign 
nationality impact strategic choices differently when entering foreign markets. Giannetti, Liao 
and Yu (2015) document that, in China, firms that hired foreign directors after the introduction 
of policies to attract foreign executives, make cross border acquisitions and increase export 
sales; that foreign directors that come from countries with strong management practices 
improve operational efficiency; and those from countries with strong corporate governance 
structures improve corporate governance in their firms. Li et al. (2011) show that country of 
origin influences leverage choices of foreign joint ventures in China. DeBacker, Heim and Tran 
(2015) find that firms whose owners come from highly corrupt countries evade tax in the US. 
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In a similar vein, corporate misconduct such as earnings management, accounting fraud, option 
backdating, and opportunistic insider trading occurs more in firms whose officers originate 
from highly corrupt countries (Liu, 2016). Thus, foreign CEOs with knowledge of how foreign 
organizations operate, may bring these practices to their firms, which could impact corporate 
policies and firm performance. 
Behavioural economics and the psychology literature suggest that executives’ decision 
making is influenced by their personality and psychology profile (Bono & Judge, 2004; 
Boudreau et al., 2001; Judge & Bono, 2000; Judge et al, 2002; Peterson et al., 2003; Wernimont 
& Campbell, 1968). The upper echelons theory documents that top managers’ perception of 
situations and their interpretation are influenced by their experience, values, and personalities 
(Hambrick, 2007; Hambrick & Mason, 1984). There is also evidence that supports the 
behavioural consistency theories that a manager’s personal and professional lives are consistent 
with their corporate behaviour (Baxamusa & Jalal, 2016; Cain & McKeon, 2016; Chyz, 2013; 
Cronqvist, Makhija & Yonker, 2012). Foreign CEOs have cross-cultural experience, i.e., their 
own culture and that of the foreign country, which could help them develop certain behavioural 
skills to perform across cultures (Benet-Martínez et al., 2002; Hong, 2010; LaFromboise, 
Coleman & Gerton, 1993; Tadmor, Tetlock & Peng, 2009). International and cross-cultural 
experiences increase risk taking behaviour and the confidence of individuals (Carpenter, 
Pollock & Leary, 2003; Herrmann & Datta, 2005; Tihanyi et al., 2000). 
International and cross-cultural experiences have also been shown to be positvely 
correlated with openness to experience (Caligiuri & Tarique, 2012; Leung & Chiu, 2010). 
Openness to experience individuals as those who are intelectually curious, flexible and 
nondogmatic in their attitudes and values (Costa & McCrae, 1985). The psychology literature 
shows that openess to experience relates to innovation and willingness to take risks (Costa & 
McCrae, 1992; Goldberg, 1990; LePine, Colquitt & Erez, 2000; Tetlock, Peterson & Berry, 
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1993). Open to experience indiviudals are creative and their behaviours are less predictable 
and stable (Tetlock, 1983, 1984; Tetlock, Peterson & Berry, 1993). Managers who are open to 
experience pursue exciting strategies, embrace change and take risks (Bono & Judge, 2004; 
Judge et al., 2002). This study predicts that foreign CEOs’ openness to experience, which 
relates to risk taking and creativity, would have a significant impact on firm risk and corporate 
policies.  
Given the background of how foreign CEOs could impact a firm’s strategic choices as 
discussed above, the objectives of this studys are to: 
(1) Investigate how foreign CEOs impact firm risk-taking behaviour. Risk aversion 
could result in agency cost for shareholders if managers give up risky projects that could 
increase firm value (Smith & Stulz, 1985). Prior studies show how CEO attributes such as age, 
gender and pilot certificates impact firm risk. We hypothesize that, the international and cross–
cultural experiences of foreign CEOs that relate to risk taking behaviours and innovation 
increase firm risk taking.  
(2) Examine the impact of foreign CEOs’ cultural background on capital structure 
decisions. CEOs make financing decisions under uncertainty and, as such, the literature shows 
that managerial attitude towards financial risk is an important factor for the capital structure of 
the firms, with a difference in risk attitude ranging from CEO personal leverage, gender, 
religion, and political affiliation (Cronqvist, Makhija & Yonker, 2012; Faccio, Marchica & 
Mura, 2016; Baxamusa & Jalal, 2016; Hutton, Jiang & Kumar, 2014). Unlike many CEOs’ 
attributes that impact capital structure decisions, culture is largely a given to individuals 
throughout their lifetime (Becker, 1996) and, therefore, examining such intrinsic attributes of 
foreign CEOs on capital structure decisions is important. We propose that the distinct values 
and preferences embedded in individualism versus collectivism could provide an explanation 
of a CEO’s attitude towards risk and uncertainties in the financing policies of his/her firm 
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because individualism promotes risk taking behaviours and could influence CEOs’ incentives 
for debt financing as well as their perceptions of the risk associated with debt financing (Breuer, 
Riesener & Salzmann, 2014; Hofstede, Hofstede & Minkov, 2010; Kreiser et al., 2010; Li et 
al., 2013). Individualism could also cause a firm’s capital structure to deviate from its industry 
peers since individualistic CEOs are less likely to mimic the corporate polices of their peers 
(Heine, et al., 1999; Hofstede, Hofstede & Minkov, 2010; Markus & Kitayama, 1991).    
(3) Examine the impact of foreign CEOs on corporate acquisitions. The decision to 
engage in mergers and acquisitions (M&As) requires choices such as whether to acquire, what 
to acquire, when to acquire and for how much to acquire. Since the outcomes of these choices 
are uncertain, a CEO’s personal preferences, experience and personality traits may play a role 
(Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2011; Malhotra, Zhu & Reus, 2015). M&As are important corporate 
investments because they involve huge sums of money and, therefore, have the potential to 
destroy shareholder value (Moeller, Schlingemann & Stulz, 2005). Graham, Harvey and Puri 
(2015) find that compared with other corporate policies, CEOs have a major influence on 
M&As. The upper echelons theory suggests that managerial experience has a significant effect 
on  managers’ strategic choices (Hambrick, 2007; Hambrick & Mason, 1984). In support of 
this theory, the literature shows that international experience impacts executives’ decisions in 
strategic choices (Athanassiou & Nigh, 2002; Carpenter, Sanders & Gregersen, 2001). We 
hypothesize that foreign CEOs’ international experience would significantly impact their 
strategic choices in M&As such as acquisition type, target selection and payment method, 
which will subsequently impact acquirer returns. 
 2. A summary of the major findings   
The sample for this thesis consists of S&P 1500 firms from 2000 to 2017. We hand collect 
data on the CEO’s country of birth, education, and work experience from Marquis Who’s Who 
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biography online database, Notable Names Database (NNDB) as well as corporate websites. 
To be included in the sample, a CEO must have been born and attended school in the home 
country. This allows us to properly assign them their nationality and examine the direct impact 
of their foreign identity on three aspects of corporate policies. The list of CEOs whose 
information we hand collected are from Compustat Execucomp. 
Chapter 2 examines the impact of foreign CEOs on firm risk taking behaviour. The 
main measures of firm risk are stock return volatility, idiosyncratic risk, and beta. We use 
multivariate regressions and control for firm specific characteristics, CEO characteristics, year, 
and industry fixed effects. The results show that firms managed by foreign CEOs have high 
stock return volatility and idiosyncratic risk. There was no significant relationship between 
foreign CEOs and beta. Given that firms may appoint foreign CEOs to take advantage of their 
international skill set to achieve a firm’s strategic purposes, the appointment of foreign CEOs 
presents selection bias in the OLS model for firm risk. We control for endogeneity in this study 
using the number of foreign born in the state in which the firm is headquartered as an 
instrumental variable for foreign CEOs. The results remain robust to the use of instrumental 
variables and propensity score matching.  
Next, foreign CEOs were grouped into two based on their legal origin, assuming that 
foreign CEOs come from different countries and have been shaped by the formal and informal 
institutions of those countries (Hunter, 1988; Markus & Kitayama, 1994; Schwartz, 1999). We 
find that foreign CEOs who come from common law countries (better creditor rights) manage 
less risky firms. This evidence shows that foreign CEOs are not a homogenous group and that 
their legal origin matter for firm risk.  
We next examine the impact of foreign CEOs on corporate policies because the total 
risk and idiosyncratic risk observed for firms managed by foreign CEOs could be because of a 
firm’s corporate polices. The results show that, compared with firms managed by domestic 
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CEOs, firms managed by foreign CEOs invest more in R&D and advertising. These two 
investments are more risky because their outcomes are more uncertain and usually have a zero 
salvage value. The empirical evidence shows that firms managed by foreign CEOs are more 
likely to do M&As. These investment choices could partially explain the higher risk observed 
for firms managed by foreign CEOs. 
Next, we analyse the impact of foreign CEOs on firm value, operating performance, 
and management practices. The results show that firms managed by foreign CEOs have a 
higher valuation (measured by market-to-book and residual income approach) and operating 
performance (measured using ROA and industry adjusted ROA). Thus, the risk taking 
behaviour of foreign CEOs is beneficial to shareholders. Further analysis shows that this higher 
valuation and operating performance benefits only firms that have multiple geographic 
segments. This suggests that not all firms that employ foreign CEOs benefit from their risk 
taking behaviour. We find that firms that hire foreign CEOs who come from good management 
practice countries have higher productivity, and firms that hire foreign CEOs who come from 
good corporate governance countries manage earnings less. Thus, foreign CEOs transfer their 
knowledge of how foreign organizations operate into the firms they manage in the US. This 
chapter therefore provides empirical evidence on the value of foreign CEOs to shareholders. 
Chapter 3 examines the impact of foreign CEOs’ national culture on capital structure 
decisions. As a measure of national culture, variation in the individualism versus collectivism 
cultural dimension of Hofstede, Hofstede & Minkov (2010) is exploited. The two measures of 
leverage used in this study are book leverage and market leverage. The empirical results show 
that firms managed by foreign CEOs from individualistic cultures have higher leverage. 
Several robustness tests using alternative measures of individualism (see, House et al., 2004; 
Schwartz, 1994; Tang & Koveos, 2008) and alternative measures of leverage are conducted 
but the positive relationship between individualism and firm leverage remain the same. 
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Because firms may appoint CEOs based on their cultural background to take advantage of the 
CEO’s specific attributes to achieve a firm’s strategic purposes, there exists potential selection 
bias for the appointment of CEOs from individualistic cultures. We control for endogeneity in 
the study using three instrumental variables (S-allele, G-allele and the prevalence of pathogens) 
that suggest a possible causal relationship from individualism to capital structure. The results 
remain robust to the use of instrumental variables and propensity score matching when taking 
into account the potential self-selection bias of CEOs. We find that the active monitoring role 
of large institutional shareholders reduces the positive impact of individualism on leverage. 
Thus, corporate governance helps reduce individualistic CEOs’ tendency to imprint their 
values and preferences on a firm’s leverage.  
To ensure that the positive relationship between individualism and firm leverage is not 
driven by a reduction in total assets or the market value of assets, we examine the impact of 
individualism on a firm’s propensity to issue debt rather than equity. The results show that 
firms managed by foreign CEOs from individualistic cultures have a higher probability of 
issuing debt than equity. In addition, we find that the speed of leverage adjustment is higher 
for firms managed by individualistic CEOs than for firms managed by foreign CEOs from 
collective cultures. Further analysis shows that individualism does not only impact the debt 
ratio but also the type of debt that firms hold. We find that debt maturity is lower for firms 
managed by individualistic CEOs. Overall, the results suggest that firms managed by 
individualistic CEOs have a risky financing policy. 
Next, to ensure that the impact of individualism on capital structure decisions is robust, 
we examine the variation in individualism versus collectivism at the state level for American-
born CEOs because the literature shows that the state in which American CEOs were born 
impacts their strategic choices (Jiang, Qian & Yonker, 2018; Yonker, 2017). We find that firms 
managed by American CEOs born in individualistic states have higher leverage and shorter 
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debt maturity. Overall, the results show that individualism has a significant impact on capital 
structure decisions made by CEOs. This chapter provides empirical evidence on how the values 
and preferences in the cultural background of CEOs impact the financing policies of their firms. 
Chapter 4 provides empirical evidence of the relationship between foreign CEOs and 
corporate acquisitions. In the analysis, we use logistic regressions and find that firms managed 
by foreign CEOs are more likely to do M&As. We find that foreign CEOs do not only impact 
M&A propensity but also the types of acquisition. Specifically, we find that firms managed by 
foreign CEOs prefer targets operating in high-tech industries, and targets operating in different 
industries. We also find that firms managed by foreign CEOs are more likely to acquire foreign 
targets.  
We next examine the impact of M&As undertaken by foreign CEOs on shareholders’ 
value and find that announcement returns for firms managed by foreign CEOs are negative. 
The results suggest that compared with domestic CEOs, firms managed by foreign CEOs 
generate more negative acquirer returns with the announcement returns being 0.8 percentage 
points lower than domestic CEOs. We next examine the channels through which the negative 
acquirer returns for firms managed by foreign CEOs occur by regressing the acquirer 3-day 
returns by sub-samples of acquisition type (diversified, cross border, high-tech and home bias 
acquisitions). We find that negative acquirer returns for firms managed by foreign CEOs occur 
when foreign CEOs undertake diversified and home biased acquisitions. 
 We also consider the geographic segments of firms and find some evidence that foreign 
CEOs that manage geographically diversified firms generate positive abnormal returns in 
M&As. This result suggests that shareholders of firms that are geographically segmented 
benefit from acquisitions made by foreign CEOs. We control for endogeneity in the study using 
the number of foreign-born in the state in which the firm is headquartered and the distance in 
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kilometres from the foreign CEOs’ country to the US as instrumental variables for foreign 
CEOs. The results remain qualitatively the same when considering the potential selection bias 
of foreign CEOs. Overall, the results show that foreign CEOs have a significant impact on 
M&A outcomes. 
3. Contribution 
This thesis makes several contributions to the corporate finance literature. First, the 
thesis contributes to the growing strand of finance literature that documents the impact of CEO 
characteristics on firm risk. Existing studies document the impact of age (Serfling, 2014), 
gender (Faccio, Marchica & Mura, 2016), overconfidence (Ho et al., 2016) and Pilot CEOs 
(Cain & McKeon, 2016) on firm risk. This study shows that foreign CEOs’ impact on firms’ 
risk is significantly important and that the risk taking behaviour of foreign CEOs is beneficial 
for firms with multiple geographic segments. 
Second, the thesis adds to the literature on capital structure decisions. Prior studies have 
examined the effect of CEO personal leverage (Cronqvist, Makhija & Yonker, 2012) and 
religion (Baxamusa & Jalal, 2016) on capital structure decisions. This study adds to these 
studies by showing that the cultural background of foreign CEOs has important implications 
for a firm’s capital structure decisions. The major contribution of this study is that, unlike most 
CEO attributes that impact capital structure decisions, culture is given to individuals throughout 
their lifetime and therefore is an intrinsic attribute of the CEO. 
Third, this study contributes to the literature on the impact of CEO attributes on M&As. 
Existing studies document the impact of age (Yim, 2013), gender (Huang & Kisgen, 2013), 
overconfidence (Malmendier & Tate, 2008) and CEO political affiliation (Elnahas & Kim, 
2017) on M&A activity. This study shows that foreign CEOs significantly impact M&A 
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outcomes and that the announcement returns for firms managed by foreign CEOs are lower in 
diversified and home biased acquisitions. 
Fourth, this study adds to the literature on the impact of foreign executives on corporate 
policies such as the benefit and cost of foreign independent directors (Masulis, Wang & Xie, 
2012), the brain gain of corporate boards (Giannetti, Liao & Yu, 2015), diverse boards (Estélyi 
& Nisar, 2016), the internationalization of corporate boards (Oxelheim et al., 2013), and stock 
market reaction to announcements of international top executive appointment (Schmid & 
Dauth, 2014). Though these studies focus on foreign executives’ experience, this study shows 
that, in addition to their international experience, foreign CEOs’ cultural background has an 
impact on firms’ capital structure decisions. The study also shows that foreign CEOs are not a 
homogenous group; the legal origin of foreign CEOs matters for firm risk taking behaviour and 
management practices. 
 
Fifth, the study contributes to the literature on the impact of different cultural 
backgrounds on financing decisions. Existing studies focus on the macro level (Chuck & 
Tadesse, 2006; Chui, Lloyd & Kwok, 2002; Chui, Kwok & Zhou, 2016; Zheng et al., 2012); 
this study provides evidence at the micro level by showing that the cultural background of 
individual foreign CEOs determines the financing decisions of their firms. 
Sixth, the study contributes to the literature on the role of country of origin in 
influencing individual outcomes such as  performance under competitive pressure (Nguyen, 
Hagendorff & Eshraghi, 2018), corporate misconduct (Liu, 2016), tax evasion (DeBacker, 
Heim & Tran, 2015), work and fertility (Fernández & Fogli, 2009), Mediterranean youth living 
arrangements (Giuliano, 2007), shirking at work (Ichino & Maggi, 2000), parking behaviour 
of United Nation officials (Fisman & Miguel, 2007), and savings behaviour (Guiso, Sapienza 
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& Zingales, 2006). This study’s contribution is that foreign CEOs’ legal origin and cultural 
background are important determinants of corporate behaviour. 
4. Thesis structure  
The remainder of the thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 examines the impact of 
foreign CEOs on firm risk taking behaviour and management practices. Chapter 3 investigates 
the impact of individualism on capital structure decisions. Chapter 4 analyses the impact of 
foreign CEOs on corporate acquisitions. Chapter 5 concludes the study by summarizing the 
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CHAPTER TWO  
 
FOREIGN CEOS AND FIRM RISK 
 
Abstract 
We examine the impact of foreign CEOs on firm risk and corporate policies. Using hand 
collected biographic data on US CEOs, we find that firms managed by foreign CEOs have 
higher firm-specific risk. These firms have higher firm valuation suggesting the risk taking 
behaviour of foreign CEOs is beneficial to shareholders. Foreign CEOs invest more in R&D 
and advertising and have a propensity to engage in mergers and acquisitions. We document 
that foreign CEOs are not homogenous, and that the legal origin of foreign CEOs matters in 
their risk taking behaviour. Foreign CEOs with experience from countries with better creditor 
rights take less risk than those from poor creditor rights nations. Overall, our results show that 
foreign CEOs have a significant impact on firm risk and corporate policies. 
 
JEL classification: F23, G31, G34. 








The impact of CEO characteristics on corporate policies has gained tremendous 
attention. Previous studies show that a significant portion of the disparity in corporate decisions 
is driven by CEO attributes (Bamber, John & Yanyan, 2010; Bertrand & Schoar, 2003; 
Graham, Harvey & Puri, 2013). For example, Cain and McKeon (2016) find that firms whose 
CEOs hold a private pilot’s licenses (i.e., less risk averse individuals), are riskier. Cronqvist, 
Makhija and Yonker (2012) reach a similar conclusion by analysing the relationship between 
corporate and personal leverage. That is, CEOs’ personal debt preferences carry over to the 
firms they manage. Faccio, Marchica and Mura (2016) find that firms run by female CEOs are 
less risky whereas Ho et al. (2016) find that commercial banks with overconfident CEOs are 
riskier. In this paper, we focus on another, and potentially more important, CEO characteristic 
– the CEO’s identity; i.e., whether the CEO is domestic or a foreigner, and provide a causal 
link between firm risk and a CEO’s identity. 
Understanding how foreign CEOs affect firm performance and corporate policies is 
important for at least two primary reasons. First, there has been an increase in foreign born 
labour force participation and the OECD reports that, in 2008, foreign born employees 
comprised 26.5% of the Australian labour force, 12.6% of the UK labour force and 16.5% of 
the US labour force (OECD 2010)1. Some of the most iconic American corporations in our 
sample, such as Microsoft, Alphabet, and Pepsi, are currently managed by foreign CEOs. 
Skilled migrants present a significant opportunity for host countries because they move their 
human capital from their home country to other countries, which Giannetti, Liao and Yu (2015) 
describe as brain gain for firms. 
 
1 OECD latest update was on 12 May 2010 so foreign born labour force participation for 2008 
is the latest available. See Appendix A for details for other OECD countries. 
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Secondly, foreign CEOs bring to their position institutional knowledge of countries and 
regions other than the firm’s home country and, therefore, their strategic focus and orientation 
may be different from domestic CEOs, which could impact firm risk. Though domestic CEOs 
may have international experience, Caligiuri and Santo (2001) suggest that such experience is 
limited in time and scope. Caligiuri, Lazarova and Zehetbauer (2004) note that the impact of 
an executive’s international behaviour on firms may not be complete if we focus solely on their 
international experience and that top managers’ nationality should be accounted for when 
considering their international experience. Shaw (1990) earlier suggests that nationality 
influences the fundamental values and cognitive skills of individuals, which shapes their 
decisions and strategic choices and that, independent of the talent and ability management 
accrues, the values of their country of origin has a deep, long-lasting impact on their orientation 
(Nielsen & Nielsen, 2011). This is consistent with the idea that when people are born and raised 
in a society, they are exposed to the laws, customs, values and organizational practices through 
formal and informal institutions; this cannot be achieved through expatriate assignments 
(Hunter, 1988; Markus & Kitayama, 1994; Schwartz, 1999).  
We follow Giannetti, Liao and Yu (2015) and define foreign CEOs as CEOs who were 
born and raised outside the US. Specifically, we examine whether foreign CEOs impact a 
firm’s total risk and its components: market and idiosyncratic risks. We then examine the 
investment polices of firms managed by foreign CEOs. We empirically test the impact of 
foreign CEOs on firm risk using S&P 1500 sample of 12,536 firm-year observations from 2000 
to 2017, of which 1,713 are managed by foreign CEOs.  
First, we find that, compared with domestic CEOs, foreign CEOs manage riskier firms 
since the firms they manage have high stock return volatility and idiosyncratic risk. We find a 
positive relationship between foreign CEOs and firm risk using the full sample and a matched 
sample of firms managed by domestic CEOs. We do not find any significant relationship 
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between foreign CEOs and firm beta. We document that foreign CEOs are not a homogenous 
group and that the legal origin of foreign CEOs matters for their risk taking behaviour. Foreign 
CEOs with experience from countries with better creditor rights take less risk than those from 
poor creditor rights nations.  
We further examine the channels through which foreign CEOs increase firm risk. We 
find that foreign CEOs undertake more investment in intangible assets. Foreign CEOs invest 
more in R&D and advertising, which are risky investments because of the uncertainties in their 
payoff. We also find that firms managed by foreign CEOs are more likely to engage in mergers 
and acquisitions (M&As), which are described as risky investment opportunities because of 
the uncertainty in their outcomes and implications for acquiring firm shareholders. We 
document that foreign CEOs are more likely to do cross border acquisitions that are considered 
riskier than domestic acquisitions because of uncertainties in the target country. We also find 
that, though firms managed by foreign CEOs are more likely to do cross border acquisitions, 
they are less likely to target acquisitions in their home country which magnifies their risk taking 
behaviour These investment policies can partially explain the high stock return volatility and 
idiosyncratic risk we observe for firms managed by foreign CEOs.  
Third, we show that the risk taking behaviour of foreign CEOs is beneficial to 
shareholders because firms managed by foreign CEOs have a higher valuation. We measure 
firm valuation using both market valuation and the residual income approach and find that 
firms managed by foreign CEOs have a high market to book and residual income value. We 
also find that firms managed by foreign CEOs have a higher operating performance.  
Our study would have required comparing changes in firm performance and corporate 
polices when a firm changes a CEO from domestic to foreign and vice versa. Unfortunately, 
we do not have enough observations for CEO changes from domestic to foreign and vice versa. 
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Exogenous turnovers retain 14 firm-year observations. Nonetheless, we control for 
endogeneity in our study using the foreign born population in the state in which the firm is 
headquartered as an instrumental variable for the supply of foreign CEOs. We also conduct 
propensity score matching to control for selection bias. Our results remain robust to the use of 
instrumental variables and the matched sample of firms managed by domestic CEOs. We 
acknowledge that the use of instrumental variables and propensity score matching do not 
completely rule out endogenous matching but the preponderance of evidence documented in 
this papers suggests that foreign CEOs matter in corporate risk taking. 
The study makes several contributions to corporate finance literature. First, the study 
contributes to the growing strand of finance literature that documents the impact of CEO 
characteristics on corporate policies. Existing studies document the impact of age (Serfling, 
2014); gender (Faccio, Marchica & Mura, 2016); overconfidence (Ho et al., 2016); Pilot CEOs 
(Cain & McKeon, 2016) and CEO personal leverage (Cronqvist, Makhija & Yonker, 2012) on 
firm risk. We show that a CEO’s identity (domestic or foreign) is an important determinant of 
corporate risk taking. 
Secondly, our study contributes to the literature on the impact of foreign executives on 
corporate policies. Existing studies focus on foreign directors who play a monitoring role in 
the firm. For example, Masulis, Wang and Xie (2012) analyse the benefit and cost of foreign 
independent directors and find that firms with foreign independent directors do better in cross 
border acquisitions when the target country is that of the foreign director. Giannetti, Liao and 
Yu (2015) study the brain gain of corporate boards and document that foreign directors improve 
the operational efficiency and corporate governance of their firms. Estélyi and Nisar (2016) 
show that firms with diverse boards, in terms of nationality, have a higher operating 
performance. Oxelheim et al. (2013) find that the nationality of foreign directors relates to the 
nationality of foreign owners. Schmid and Dauth (2014) show that the market reacts to the 
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appointment of foreign executives only when their foreign experience exceeds certain 
threshold. We show that foreign CEOs’ impact on firm risk and corporate polices is important. 
and that foreign CEOs’ international experience in a particular legal origin has implications for 
their risk taking behaviour. 
Thirdly, the study contributes to the literature on the role of country of origin in 
influencing individual outcomes such as performance under competitive pressure (Nguyen, 
Hagendorff & Eshraghi, 2018), corporate misconduct (Liu, 2016), and tax evasion (DeBacker, 
Heim & Tran, 2015). Our contribution is that foreign CEOs are not a homogenous group; the 
legal origin of foreign CEOs matters in firm risk taking behaviour and management practices. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 develops the testable 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and sample selection method. Section 4 presents the 
empirical results and robustness tests. Section 5 concludes the study. 
2. Hypotheses development  
Our basic proposition is that the foreigner status of CEO impacts firm risk and corporate 
policies. The upper echelons theory documents that top managers’ perception of situations and 
their interpretations is influenced by their experience, values, and personalities (Hambrick & 
Mason, 1984). Foreign CEOs have international experience that, based on previous studies, 
increases confidence and the risk taking behaviour. For example, Carpenter, Pollock and Leary 
(2003) find that high tech firms that have top management teams with international experience 
take more risks than those without international experience. Herrmann and Datta (2005) and 
Tihanyi et al. (2000) document that the foreign experience of top management teams relates to 
risk taking strategies such as international expansion. International experience impacts 
executives risk taking propensity in strategic choices and enhances executives’ ability to 
process complex information in a dynamic environment (Athanassiou & Nigh, 2002; 
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Carpenter, Sanders & Gregersen, 2001). It is worth noting that even though managers have 
significant impact on firm risk taking behaviour, there could be an optimal risk taking level 
that is acceptable in specific industries. Our hypotheses are based on the fact that foreign CEOs 
have certain characteristics, and these are reflected in their management style. 
There are at least two reasons for the higher risk appetite of foreign CEOs. First, foreign 
CEOs’ cross-cultural experience can help them develop certain behavioural skills to perform 
across cultures and risky situations. For example, Brannen and Peterson (2009) note that cross-
cultural experience increases tolerance for uncertainty and such individuals are can deal with 
complex situations. Second, cross-cultural experience has been shown to be positively 
correlated with openness to experience2 (Caligiuri & Tarique, 2012; Leung & Chiu, 2010). 
Openness to experience relates to innovation and willingness to take risks (Costa & McCrae, 
1992; Goldberg, 1990; LePine, Colquitt & Erez, 2000) and such individuals are creative and 
their behaviours are less predictable and unstable (Tetlock, 1983, 1984; Tetlock, Peterson & 
Berry, 1993). Less predictability is related to risk taking as the actions of such individuals 
cannot be easily determined which results in a lot of uncertainties around their behaviours. For 
competitive advantage point of view, less predictability is a good trait for manager as their 
competitors cannot easily copy what they do.  Managers who are open to experience pursue 
exciting strategies, embrace change, and take risks (Bono & Judge, 2004; Judge et al., 2002). 
Our first hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): The impact of foreign CEOs on firm risk is positive. 
Foreign CEOs’ country of origin matters for corporate risk taking because foreign 
CEOs might have been shaped by the formal and informal institutions of their country of origin 
(Hunter, 1988; Markus & Kitayama, 1994; Schwartz, 1999). Consistent with this view, Li et 
 
2  Openness to experience individuals as those who are intellectually curious, flexible and non-
dogmatic in their attitudes and values (Costa & McCrae, 1985). 
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al. (2011) show that country of origin influences leverage choices of foreign joint ventures in 
China. DeBacker, Heim and Tran (2015) find that firms whose owners come from highly 
corrupt countries evade tax in the US. In a similar vein, corporate misconduct such as earnings 
management, accounting fraud, option backdating and opportunistic insider trading, occurs 
more in firms whose officers originate from highly corrupt countries (Liu, 2016). Therefore, 
among foreign CEOs, their country of origin may have a different impact on corporate risk 
since foreign CEOs’ knowledge of how foreign organizations operate may bring these practices 
to their firm, which could result in corporate policies that impact the firm’s risk. Our assertion 
follows Acharya, Amihud and Litov (2011) who find that in countries with better creditor 
rights, firms take fewer risks because managers are afraid to lose their jobs in case of 
bankruptcy. Chava and Roberts (2008) and Nini, Smith and Sufi (2009) document that strong 
creditor rights in the form of restrictive debt covenants and enforcement of debt covenant 
violations decreases capital investment. In a similar vein, Favara et al. (2017) show that strong 
creditor rights decrease firm risk taking across countries. Cho et al. (2014) find that strong 
creditor protection reduces the extent to which firms issue and finance projects with long term 
debt. Acharya and Subramanian (2009) and Acharya, Sundaram and John (2011) document 
that strong creditor rights reduce innovation in high tech industries and lower the use of 
financial leverage. In support of that study, Chiou, Lee and Lee (2010) document that stocks 
in common law countries are less risky than those in civil law countries, in particular, of 
French/Spanish civil law origin. We formally state our second hypothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Foreign CEOs with experience from countries with better creditor 
rights reduce firm risk and those from poor creditor rights increase firm risk.  
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3. Sample selection 
Data on CEOs’ birth country, education and work experience are hand collected from 
Marquis Who’s Who biography online database, Notable Names Database (NNDB), as well as 
companies’ websites. To be included in the sample, a CEO must have been born and attended 
school in the home country. This allows us to properly assign them their nationality and 
examine a direct impact of their foreign identity on firm performance and corporate policies. 
The list of CEOs whose information was obtained from Marquis Who’s Who database are 
taken from Compustat Execucomp. We obtain accounting and stock market data from 
Compustat and the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) databases, respectively. We 
exclude financial (SIC 6000-6999) and utility (SIC 4000-4999) firms. Our final sample consists 
of 9,590 firm-year observations from 2000 to 2017 with 1,655 unique CEOs. The nationality 
mix of CEOs in our sample is presented in Appendix A1. All variables are defined in in 
Appendix A2. 
3.1 Summary statistics 
Table 1 reports the summary statistics of our sample. Panel A shows that firms managed 
by foreign CEOs form 13.7% of our total sample. The mean (median) age is 65 (65). Firms 
managed by female CEOs represent 2.7% of the sample; CEOs who are chair of their firms 
form 63.3%. The mean (median) CEO portfolio delta is $709.1 ($217.8) and the portfolio vega 
is $145.9 ($46.1). We find that 11% of the CEOs in our sample have Ivy League education and 
9.5% have military experience. Panel B summarises the firm characteristics. Mean (median) 
firm size is $10,420.5 ($2,180.06) million. The mean (median) leverage is 22.1% (20.9%). 
Firms hold average (median) cash of 15.9% (10%). Firms exhibit mean (median) Tobin’s Q of 
2.1(1.7). The mean (median) total firm risk is 39.8% (34.8%) measured as the standard 
deviation of daily stock returns and mean (median) idiosyncratic risk is 31.3% (27.3%) 
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measured as the annualized standard deviation of the residuals from the regression of daily 
stock returns on the Fama and French three factors. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Table 2 compares the means of CEO and firm characteristics for domestic and foreign 
CEOs in our sample. In Panel A, the average foreign CEO is 63 years which is younger than 
domestic CEOs. Foreign CEOs have longer tenure and are less likely to hold the dual position 
as chair of the firms they manage. Foreign CEOs are less likely than domestic CEOs to have 
Ivy League education and military experience. Comparing the sample means of firms managed 
by domestic and foreign CEOs in Panel B, we find that firms managed by foreign CEOs invest 
more in R&D and have more total and idiosyncratic risk. If we use Tobin’s Q as a measure of 
firm performance, foreign CEOs perform better than domestic CEOs. Firms managed by 
foreign CEOs are more likely to undertake M&As. Overall, Table 2 shows a significant 
difference between the means of CEO and firm characteristics for domestic and foreign CEOs. 
This confirms our prediction that firm risk and corporate policies of firms managed by foreign 
CEOs are likely to be different from firms managed by domestic CEOs. However, these 
differences may be because of time trends, firm characteristics and CEO characteristics that 
may correlate with the appointment of foreign CEOs to firms. As a result, in the next section 
we test the relationship between foreign CEOs and firm risk and corporate policies in a 
multivariate analysis in the next section.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Foreign CEOs and firm risk 
To test our first hypothesis that foreign CEOs increase firm risk, we estimate the 
following regression model: 
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𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀 𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁 𝐶𝐸𝑂)𝑗 + 𝛽2(𝐶𝐸𝑂  𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆)𝑗𝑡−1 +
𝛽3(𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆)𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽 4(𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆)𝑖𝑡 +∈𝑖𝑗𝑡 ,                            (1) 
where: “i” denotes the firm, “j” denotes the CEO, and “t” denotes year. Firm total risk is 
measured as the annualized standard deviation of firm daily stock returns (Bernile, Bhagwat & 
Yonker 2018; Serfling 2014). We follow Ang et al. (2009) and calculate idiosyncratic risk as 
the annualized standard deviation of the residuals from the regression of daily stock returns on 
the Fama and French three factors. Firm beta is measured using the standard capital asset 
pricing model. Foreign CEO is our main variable of interest. Foreign CEO is a dummy variable 
that takes the value of one if a CEO’s nationality is other than American and/or a bachelor’s 
degree in the home country and/or foreign work experience, and zero otherwise. In all the 
estimated regression models, we control for major firm and CEO characteristics identified in 
the literature to impact firm risk. 
The CEO characteristics we control for are age (Serfling, 2014), gender (Faccio, 
Marchica & Mura, 2016), tenure (Berger, Ofek & Yermack, 1997), delta and vega (Coles, 
Daniel & Naveen, 2006; Core & Guay, 2002), military experience (Cain & McKeon, 2016), 
Ivy League education, and MBA degree. We obtain CEO age, gender, and tenure from 
ExecuComp. We follow Core and Guay (2002) to calculate CEO delta and vega using 
ExecuComp data. CEO military experience, Ivy League education and MBA degree are 
obtained from Marquis Who’s Who database. The firm characteristics we control for are size, 
leverage, return on equity, R&D expenditure, market-to-book ratio and capital expenditure. 
We estimate an OLS regression where the dependent variable is the firm risk and the 
independent variables include the foreign CEO dummy and various controls. If foreign CEOs 
prefer more risk, we expect a positive relationship between foreign CEOs and risk measures. 
The results are shown in Table 3. In columns (1-4), the dependent variable is the annualized 
standard deviation of the firm’s daily stock returns, a proxy for the firm’s total risk. The 
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dependent variable in columns (5-8) is the idiosyncratic risk, a measure of firm specific risk. 
In columns (1) and (5), we regress a firm’s measures of risk on only foreign CEOs, holding all 
other factors constant but include year and industry fixed effects to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity across industries and years.  
We find the coefficient of foreign CEOs to be positive and statistically significant at 
the 1% level. This suggests that holding all other factors constant, compared with domestic 
CEOs, foreign CEOs are associated with higher stock return volatility and idiosyncratic risk in 
the firms they manage, supporting H (1). Specifically, foreign CEO status increases a firm’s 
total risk by 4.4 percentage points and idiosyncratic risk by 2.7 percentage points. We include 
CEO portfolio delta and vega in columns (2) and (6) to control for the CEO wealth effect for 
risk taking. We find that the inclusion of these risk-taking compensation incentives in the model 
do not remove the positive impact of foreign CEOs on a firm’s risk. Thus, foreign CEOs 
corporate risk taking behaviour is not motivated exclusively by the incentives in their 
compensation package. Columns (3) and (7) include firm characteristics that could have a 
significant impact on a firm’s risk. We find the coefficient on the foreign CEO to be positive 
and statistically significant at the 1% level for total risk and at the 5% level for idiosyncratic 
risk when controlling for these variables. Given that the sample means of total risk and 
idiosyncratic risk are 0.398 and 0.313, respectively, the impact of foreign CEOs on firms’ total 
risk (0.0357/0.398=8.9%) and idiosyncratic risk (0.0192/0.313=6.1%) is economically 
significant. Columns (4) and (8) include CEO characteristics that have been documented in the 
literature to impact firm risk but the relationship between foreign CEOs and firm measures of 
risk remain positive and statistically significant. We test the impact of foreign CEOs on 
systematic risk, measured by the firm’s beta in column (9). We do not find any significant 
relationship between foreign CEOs and beta. This suggests that foreign CEOs do not impact 
the firm’s beta. Our results suggest that, compared with domestic CEOs, foreign CEOs prefer 
35 
 
more risk because firms managed by foreign CEOs have higher stock return volatility and 
idiosyncratic risk. Our results are consistent with the theory that openness to experience 
positively relates to risk taking behaviour (Bono & Judge, 2004; Costa & McCrae, 1992; Judge 
et al., 2002). Nevertheless, the greater risk-taking behaviour of foreign CEOs does not make 
diversified investors worse off as idiosyncratic risk is likely to be diversified away and the 
impact on firms’ beta is insignificant. 
We find that most control variables in Table 3 have estimates similar to the results of 
existing studies. For example, Serfling (2014) finds that older CEOs have a negative 
relationship with firm total and idiosyncratic risk. We find a negative relationship between 
CEO age and firm total and idiosyncratic risk. Consistent with Cain and McKeon (2016), 
Faccio, Marchica and Mura (2016) and Serfling (2014), we find a negative relationship 
between firm size and measures of risk in all models. Firms that have high R&D expenditure 
are more risky (Bartram, Brown & Stulz, 2012; Comin & Philippon, 2005; Irvine & Pontiff, 
2008). We find a positive relationship between R&D expenditure and measures of risk. Long 
tenure entrenches CEOs and makes them risk averse (Berger, Ofek & Yermack, 1997). We 
find a negative relationship between CEO tenure and firm risk. Our results are consistent with 
prior studies. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
4.2 Does country of origin impact foreign CEOs’ risk taking behaviour? 
In this section, we test hypothesis H2 whether foreign CEOs’ country of origin matters 
for firm risk taking behaviour since foreign CEOs come from different countries and have been 
shaped by the formal and informal institutions of these countries (Hunter, 1988; Markus & 
Kitayama, 1994; Schwartz, 1999). In this analysis, we want to examine among the foreign 
CEOs, which origin drives the results in Table 3. To address this issue, we create country 
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dummies for foreign CEOs of common law  and civil law origin as in La Porta et al. (1998). 
We also create country dummies for CEOs of English origin, French origin, German origin, 
and Scandinavian origin. We then estimate an OLS regression of firm measures of risk on these 
origins and control variables and present the results in Table 4.  
The dependent variable in columns (1-2) is total risk and the dependent variable in 
columns (3-4) is idiosyncratic risk. In columns (1) and (3) we include foreign CEO civil law 
origin and common law origin in the model. We find the coefficient of civil law to be positive 
and statistically significant at 1% level for both total risk and idiosyncratic risk. This suggests 
that compared with domestic CEOs, firms managed by foreign CEOs of civil law origin have 
higher total and idiosyncratic risk. In column (1), we find the coefficient of common law to be 
negative but statistically insignificant. Column (3) shows a positive and statistically negative 
relation between foreign CEOs common law and idiosyncratic risk. In columns (2) and (4), we 
include German, French, Scandinavian, and English origins. We find the coefficient of German 
origin to positive and statistically significant for idiosyncratic risk but insignificant for total 
risk. We find the coefficient of French origin to be positive and statistically significant for both 
total risk and idiosyncratic risk. This suggests that compared with domestic CEOs, firms 
managed by foreign CEOs of French origin are riskier. We find a negative and statistically 
significant relation between English origin and idiosyncratic risk. Overall, the results in Table 
4 shows that the positive relation between foreign CEOs and firm risk documented in Table 3 
is driven by foreign CEOs of civil law origin. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
4.2.1 Sub-sample analysis for only foreign CEOs 
In this analysis, we drop firm-year observations with American CEOs from our sample 
and conduct the analysis using firm-year observations with only foreign CEOs (American 
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CEOs are of common law origin which can impact the results in Table 4). We create a country 
dummy of one and zero otherwise if a foreign CEO is of a common law origin as in La Porta 
et al. (1998). We then estimate an OLS regression of firm measures of risk on common law 
and other control variables. We also estimate firm measures of risk on the continue variable for 
creditor rights of Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer (2007). 
Table 5 reports the results. The dependent variable in columns (1-2) is total risk and 
columns (3-4) is idiosyncratic risk. In columns (1) and (3), we regress firm measures of risk on 
the country dummy for foreign CEOs of common law origin. We find the coefficient of 
common law to be negative and statistically significant at the 1% level for both total risk and 
for idiosyncratic risk. The results support H (2) and suggest that, compared with foreign CEOs 
of civil law origin, foreign CEOs from common law countries reduce firm total and 
idiosyncratic risk. Specifically, a unit increase in the appointment of a foreign CEO from a 
common law country reduces firm total and idiosyncratic risk by 4.8% and 3.5%, respectively. 
In columns (2) and (4), we estimate firm measures of risk on the creditor rights score for each 
country of origin in our sample. We find the creditor rights coefficient has a negative, 
significant relationship with firm measures of risk. Thus, foreign CEOs from better creditor 
rights countries reduces firm risk, further supporting H (2). A unit increase in the appointment 
of a foreign CEO from better creditor rights country reduces firm total and idiosyncratic risk 
by 2.4% and 2.1%, respectively. Our results are consistent with our prediction that foreign 
CEOs from better creditor rights countries reduce firm risk.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
To better understand the impact of foreign CEOs’ country of origin on firm total and 
idiosyncratic risks we create country dummies for CEOs of English origin, French origin, 
German origin and Scandinavian origin because the literature shows that even among common 
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law and civil law countries, there are differences in investor protection and creditor rights 
(Djankov et al., 2008; Djankov, McLiesh & Shleifer, 2007; La Porta et al., 1998). For example, 
La Porta et al. (1998) and Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer (2007) find that French civil law 
countries provide the weakest creditor rights protection; among the civil law countries, German 
origin ranks highest for creditor rights protection.  
The results are shown in Table 6. The dependent variable in columns (1-5) is firm total 
risk and columns (6-10) is idiosyncratic risk3. In columns (1) and (6), we regress firm measures 
of risk on foreign CEOs from English origin and other control variables. We find the coefficient 
on the foreign CEOs of English origin is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. 
This suggests that, compared with foreign CEOs of other legal origins, foreign CEOs from 
countries of English legal origin take less risk. Specifically, English origin reduces firm total 
and idiosyncratic risk by 4.8% and 3.5%, respectively. In Columns (2) and (7), we regress risk 
measures on foreign CEOs of French origin. We find the coefficient of foreign CEOs of French 
legal origin to be positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. The results are also 
economically significant since a foreign CEO of French legal origin increases firm total and 
idiosyncratic risk by 7.6% and 6.3%, respectively. Thus, foreign CEOs from French legal 
origin take more risk. We then regress firm measures of risk on the dummy variable for foreign 
CEOs from German legal origin (see columns (3) and (8)). We find a negative, insignificant 
relationship between German origin CEOs and firm total risk and idiosyncratic risk. Columns 
(4) and (9) show the results for the regressions with the dummy variable for foreign CEOs from 
Scandinavian origin. We find that the latter does not affect firm risk. Lastly, we use French 
origin as the control group and include dummy variables for other origins in Columns (5) and 
(10). We find that, compared with foreign CEOs of French legal origin, foreign CEOs of other 
 
3 We do not include a firm’s systematic risk in the analysis because Table 3 shows that it is not 
impacted by the foreign CEO dummy. 
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origins have a significant negative relationship with firm total and idiosyncratic risk. Thus, 
CEOs of French legal origin are associated with higher risk than other foreign CEOs. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
Overall, our results suggest that foreign CEOs are not a homogeneous group, supporting 
our H (2), and that the legal origin of foreign CEOs matters for firm risk taking behaviour. 
4.3 Endogeneity concerns 
4.3.1 Propensity score matching  
A major concern with our results in Table 3 is that it is possible that foreign CEOs 
manage firms that differ from firms managed by domestic CEOs as shown in the univariate 
analysis in Table 2. This makes the appointment of a foreign CEO endogenous to firm-level 
characteristics and therefore could bias the coefficient estimates for foreign CEOs in our 
models. We first employ propensity score matching as in Conyon et al. (2018) and Serfling 
(2014) to evaluate the impact of foreign CEOs on firm risk. Propensity score matching is a 
method for estimating treatment effects to reduce bias in a non-randomized sample 
(Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). It is an effective method to alleviate endogeneity concerns of 
CEO and firm matching when we observe predictable firm characteristics (Angrist & Pischke, 
2009; Armstrong, Ittner & Larcker, 2012; Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). Propensity score 
matching requires the treatment group to be matched with a control group that has similar 
characteristics and similar values of the propensity score as the treatment group. The treatment 
group in our study is foreign CEOs and the control group (comparison) is domestic CEOs.  
We first estimate a probit model to predict the selection of foreign CEOs using firm and 
CEO characteristics following prior studies (Conyon et al., 2018; Malmendier & Tate, 2009). 
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The results are reported in Table 7, Panel A4. We find that foreign CEOs are more likely to 
manage smaller firms and that foreign CEOs are younger and have longer tenure. We then use 
the propensity score of the probit estimates to match firms managed by foreign and domestic 
CEOs. We use the nearest neighbour algorithm with a caliper 0.001 to match the firms, 
restricting the observations to be on common support to obtain the average treatment effect on 
the treated (ATT). The matched sample consists of 1,204 firms managed by foreign CEOs and 
1,204 firms managed by domestic CEOs. ATT measures the difference in firm risk between 
firms managed by foreign CEOs and comparable firms managed by domestic CEOs with 
similar propensity scores.  
The ATT of foreign CEOs on firm total and idiosyncratic risk is presented in Table 7, 
Panel B. Comparing the means of the unmatched sample, total and idiosyncratic risks are 
higher by 0.041 and 0.022, respectively, for firms managed by foreign CEOs compared with 
firms run by domestic CEOs. The differences are statistically significant at the 1% level. We 
find that, after matching, the differences are still statistically significant. The findings in Table 
7 show that the positive relationship between firms’ risk and foreign CEOs remains after taking 
into account selection bias based on firm characteristics. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
4.3.2 Instrumental variables approach 
Our OLS analysis assumes that CEOs are randomly selected into firms. This might not 
be true in our case since firms’ demand for certain CEO attributes might compel them to choose 
one CEO over another. For example, a firm may appoint a foreign CEO to take advantage of 
an international skill set to serve the firm’s strategic purpose. Second, a firm may appoint a 
foreign CEO for his/her risk taking behaviour to fulfil corporate strategies. For instance, if a 
 
4 The covariate balance is shown in Appendix A3. 
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firm wants to expand its operations, it might hire a foreign CEO because of cross cultural and 
international experience. Thus, the demand for the special skills of a CEO and a firm’s strategy 
might lead to their selection (Greve, Biemann & Ruigrok, 2015; Magnusson & Boggs, 2006; 
Masulis, Wang & Xie, 2012).  
To mitigate this concern, we use two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation to deal with 
the potential endogenous foreign CEO dummy in our OLS model. Our instrumental variable 
(IV) identification is based on Knyazeva, Knyazeva and Masulis (2013) who argue that the 
supply of corporate directors depends on the local availability of qualified prospective directors 
and therefore used the local director pool as an IV for board composition. Consistent with this 
argument, Bernile, Bhagwat and Yonker (2018) use supply of non-local potential directors 
residing one non-stop flight away from the firm headquarters as the instrumental variable for 
board diversity. Based on these studies, we use the number of foreign born (immigrant) citizens 
as a percentage of the total population of the state in which the firm is headquartered (foreign 
borns) as an IV for foreign CEO5. We estimate the following two-stage least squares model: 
Stage 𝟏: 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝐶𝐸𝑂 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑠) + 𝛽2(𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠) +
𝛽3(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠) + 𝛽4 (𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠) +∈                                                                                          (2) 
Stage 𝟐: 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝐶𝐸𝑂) +
𝛽2(𝐶𝐸𝑂  𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠) + 𝛽3(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠) + 𝛽4 (𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠) +∈                                                       
(3) 
We perform the Stock and Yogo (2005) weak instrument test to assess the strength of 
our instrumental variable. We find that the Craig-Donald F-statistics from the first stage 
regression is 48.661, which is greater than any of the Stock and Yogo (2005) critical F-values 
 
5 Data on number of foreign born for each state is obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau 
American Community survey. Data is available for 2000 and 2005 to 2017. We interpolate to 




for weak instruments. This shows that the instrument in the first stage regression is strong. The 
results are reported in Table 8. Column (1) shows the first stage results of the probit estimate 
of Equation (2). We find that the coefficient on foreign borns is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. This suggests that the number of foreign borns in the state in which 
the firm is headquartered could be a determinant of the supply of foreign CEOs since it is 
positively correlated with foreign CEO appointment in Column (1). Columns (2) and (3) are 
the second stage results of Equation (3). In Column (2), we find the coefficient on the foreign 
CEO are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level which suggests that, compared 
with domestic CEOs, foreign CEOs manage riskier firms. Column (3) shows a positive 
relationship between idiosyncratic risk and foreign CEO that is consistent with our initial 
results using OLS. The findings from the 2SLS regression suggest that, after taking into 
account potential endogeneity, foreign CEOs are associated with higher firm total and 
idiosyncratic risk. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
4.4. Channels - what do foreign CEOs do? 
4.4.1. Foreign CEOs and firm investment   
We examine the impact of foreign CEOs on firm total investment defined as the sum 
of R&D, advertising and capital expenditure, and net acquisitions scaled by net property plant 
and equipment (Roussanov & Savor, 2014). We also examine the impact of foreign CEOs on 
the individual components of firm total investment. The results are shown in Table 9. In 
Column (1), we estimate the OLS regression where the dependent variable is firm total 
investment. We find that the coefficient of foreign CEOs is positive and statistically significant 
at the 1% level. This suggests that, compared with domestic CEOs, foreign CEOs make more 
investments. In Column (2), we regress R&D expenditure scaled by total assets on foreign 
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CEOs. The coefficient of foreign CEOs is 0.0067, which is significantly positive at the 1% 
level. This suggests that compared with domestic CEOs, foreign CEOs spend more on R&D. 
The results also suggest that foreign CEOs prefer more risk since R&D expenditure has been 
described as a risky investment because of the high degree of uncertainty in the outcome 
(Bartram, Brown & Stulz, 2012; Comin & Philippon, 2005; Irvine & Pontiff, 2008). In Column 
(3), we regress firm advertising expenditure on foreign CEOs and find a positive, statistically 
significant relationship between foreign CEOs and advertising expenditure at 1% level. 
Consistent with Jiang et al. (2015) and Roussanov and Savor (2014) this finding suggests that 
firms managed by foreign CEOs spend more on advertising. This evidence together with the 
results for R&D expenditure show that foreign CEOs spend more on intangible assets6. We 
thus interpret our finding as foreign CEOs’ preference for more risky investments since R&D 
and advertising expenditure has uncertain outcomes and more so since intangible assets usually 
have a salvage value of zero. In Column (4), we estimate firm capital expenditure on foreign 
CEOs and find the coefficient of the foreign CEOs is negative and statistically significant at 
the 1% level. Thus, compared with domestic CEOs, foreign CEOs invest less on capital 
expenditure. We estimate net acquisitions defined as acquisitions less asset sales and regress 
on foreign CEOs in Column (5). We find a positive relationship between foreign CEOs and net 
acquisitions. Thus, the positive relation we find between foreign CEOs and total investment is 
fuelled by R&D, advertising, and net acquisitions. Our results therefore suggest aggressive 
investment behaviour of firms managed by foreign CEOs, which potentially results in higher 
idiosyncratic risk.  
 [Insert Table 9 here] 
 
6 Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) consider R&D and advertising expenditure as a firm’s 
two major intangible assets.  
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4.4.2. Mergers and acquisitions  
M&As have been described as risky investment opportunities because of the 
uncertainties in their outcomes and the implications for acquiring firm shareholders 
(Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991; Malhotra, Zhu & Reus, 2015; Ravenscraft & Scherer, 2011; 
Wally & Baum, 1994; Zhu & Chen, 2015). Graham, Harvey and Puri (2015) find that compared 
with other corporate policies, CEOs have a major influence on M&As and therefore their risk 
preferences are important for such corporate decisions (Graham, Harvey & Puri 2013). We 
examine the propensity of foreign CEOs to engage in M&As by estimating a logit model for 
acquisition propensity measured as a dummy of one if a firm engaged in M&A in a fiscal year 
and zero otherwise. We obtain M&As data from Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum database. 
Our sample selection criteria follow the previous studies (e.g., Golubov, Petmezas & Travlos, 
2012; Golubov, Yawson & Zhang, 2015)7. We control for firm size, market-to-book, leverage, 
free cash flow, loss dummy, dividend yield, capital expenditure (Bauguess & Stegemoller, 
2008; Cain & McKeon, 2016; Harford, Humphery-Jenner & Powell, 2012; Malmendier & 
Tate, 2008). We also control for CEO age (Yim, 2013), gender (Huang & Kisgen, 2013), CEO 
delta and vega, military experience (Cain & McKeon, 2016), MBA, tenure, and Ivy League 
education. The results are shown in Table 10. 
Model (1) reports the marginal effects of foreign CEOs and other control variables on 
acquisition propensity. We find the coefficient of the Foreign CEOs dummy to be positive and 
statistically significant at 1%. This suggests that compared with domestic CEOs, firms 
 
7 Acquirers must be US publicly traded firms. The transaction value must be greater than or 
equal to $1million. Acquirers should have less than 10% of initial stake in the target firm and 
seek over 50% of the target after the transaction. Deals labelled as bankruptcy acquisitions, 
liquidations self-tender, leveraged buyouts, privatizations, repurchases, restructuring, reverse 
takeovers, and going private transactions are excluded. Targets are US and non-US public, 
private or subsidiary firms. The bidder should have accounting data available in Compustat 
and stock data in CRSP. 
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managed by foreign CEOs are more likely to engage in M&As. Specifically, foreign CEOs 
increase the likelihood of M&A activity in a fiscal year by 3.3%. We include CEOs’ 
characteristics in column (2) and still find a positive relationship between foreign CEOs and 
firm propensity to engage in M&As. This suggests that foreign CEOs risk preference extends 
to firms’ M&As activity.  
[Insert Table 10 here] 
 
4.4.2.1 Foreign acquisitions  
Cross border (or foreign) acquisitions compared with domestic acquisitions have many 
uncertainties because of unfamiliar cultural values and the institutional settings of the target 
firm’s country (Anderson et al., 2011; Mantecon, 2009; Piaskowska & Trojanowski, 2014). 
Cross border acquisitions increase the uncertainty on the firm’s future income streams as 
returns from the investment choice often cannot be predicted (Lu & Beamish, 2004; Mitchell, 
Shaver & Yeung, 1994; Shrader, Oviatt & McDougall, 2000).  
To examine the impact of foreign CEOs on cross border acquisitions, we estimate logit 
models where the dependent variable is Foreign Acquisition defined as a dummy variable that 
equals one if the target firm is outside the US and zero otherwise. Table 11 shows the marginal 
effect of foreign CEOs on cross border acquisitions. In Column (1), we control for firm 
characteristics, year and industry fixed effects. We find a positive relationship between foreign 
CEOs and cross border acquisitions. This suggest that compared with domestic CEOs, foreign 
CEOs are more likely to do cross border acquisitions which are riskier than domestic 
acquisitions. We control for CEOs’ compensation in Column (2) and still find a positive 
relationship between foreign CEOs and cross border acquisitions. In column (3), we control 
for CEOs’ characteristics that can impact cross-border acquisitions, but the results remain 
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unchanged. The positive relationship we find between foreign CEOs and cross border 
acquisitions suggests that foreign CEOs are more likely than domestic CEOs to enter and 
increase their presence in foreign markets. On one hand, foreign CEOs’ experience in other 
countries other than US provide useful networks and local contacts that can provide easier 
access to information about foreign targets. On the other hand, foreign CEOs cross-cultural 
experience gives them higher confidence, decreased uncertainty in terms of cultural differences 
and country risk of the foreign targets (Andrade, Mitchell & Stafford, 2001; Carpenter, Pollock 
& Leary, 2003; Herrmann & Datta, 2005; Tihanyi et al., 2000) which increases their likelihood 
to do cross border deals. Thus, foreign CEOs’ risk taking behaviour increases their tolerance 
for ambiguity.  
[Insert Table 11 here] 
4.4.2.2 Home-bias acquisitions 
Empirical evidence suggests that individual investors are more likely to invest a larger 
portion of their portfolio domestically than in foreign markets (French & Poterba, 1991; Kang 
1997; Tesar & Werner, 1995). These investments are made in local firms (Grinblatt & 
Keloharju, 2001; Ivković & Weisbenner, 2005; Seasholes & Zhu, 2010). The reasons for home 
bias investment behaviour have been documented as information asymmetry (Coval & 
Moskowitz, 1999; Ivković & Weisbenner, 2005), familiarity (Grinblatt & Keloharju, 2001; 
Huberman, 2001; Pool, Stoffman & Yonker, 2012; Seasholes & Zhu, 2010) and uncertainty 
avoidance (Anderson et al., 2011; Beugelsdijk & Frijns, 2010). Home-bias investment is less 
risky. This home-bias investment behaviour is also observed in M&As. For example, Jiang, 
Qian and Yonker (2018) find that in the US, CEOs are more likely to acquire targets in the 
state of the CEO’s childhood home than targets further away from that state. Similarly, Chung, 
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Green and Schmidt (2018) document that CEOs are more likely to acquire targets close to their 
place of birth. 
Based on the prior evidence of home-bias investment behaviour and the evidence in 
Table 11 that foreign CEOs are more likely to do cross border acquisitions, we test whether 
foreign CEOs also exhibit home-bias when making cross border acquisitions. We define Home 
target acquisition as a dummy variable equal to one if the target country is same as the CEO’s 
country of origin and zero otherwise. If foreign CEOs acquire targets from their home country, 
they will have an information advantage of the target firm that could help them identify suitable 
targets. They will also have a better knowledge of institutional settings and the economic 
environment in which the target firm operates that helps reduce the uncertainties associated 
with cross border acquisitions. The familiarity of foreign CEOs in their home country gives 
them an advantage on the cultural differences that increase integration costs and impact the 
post–acquisition performance of cross border acquisitions (Ahern, Daminelli & Fracassi, 2015; 
Barkema, Bell & Pennings, 1996; Datta & Puia, 1995; Slangen, 2006; Very & Schweiger, 
2001).  
Table 12 reports logit regression of the marginal effect of foreign CEOs on acquisition 
of targets from their home country. In Column (1), we include firm characteristics, industry 
and year fixed effects. We find that the coefficient on the foreign CEOs is negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. This suggests that compared with domestic CEOs, 
foreign CEOs are less likely to acquire targets from their home country. In Column (2), we 
control for CEOs’ compensation and still find a negative relationship between foreign CEOs 
and home target acquisitions. We control for CEO characteristics in Column (3) but the results 
remain the same. Our results suggest that foreign CEOs do not show home-bias investment 
behaviour when they undertake cross border acquisitions. This exacerbates the inherent 
uncertainties and riskiness of cross border acquisitions by foreign CEOs. We interpret our 
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findings of a negative relationship between foreign CEOs and home-bias acquisitions as 
foreign CEOs’ preference for riskier acquisitions, which is consistent with our previous results. 
[Insert Table 12 here] 
4.4.3 Foreign CEOs, firm value, and operating performance  
In the previous sections, we find that firms managed by foreign CEOs have a higher 
total risk and idiosyncratic risk. If the higher risk taken by foreign CEOs is beneficial to 
shareholders, then we should observe a higher valuation of firms managed by foreign CEOs. 
We measure firm value using two parameters. The first measure is the residual income 
approach of Ohlson (1995) as expressed in the following model: 





    ,      (4) 
where: 𝑃𝑡 is value of the firm at time t, 𝑌𝑡 𝑖𝑠 book value of the firm at time t, NI is net income 
and re is cost of equity. The second measure is the market-to-book value. In addition to firm 
value, we also examine the impact of foreign CEOs on operating performance. We measure 
operating performance using return on assets (ROA) and the industry adjusted ROA. We 
control for firm size, leverage, capital expenditure, stock return volatility, CEO tenure, CEO 
age based on prior studies (Coles, Daniel & Naveen, 2008; Giannetti, Liao & Yu, 2015; 
Knyazeva, Knyazeva & Masulis, 2013), MBA, Ivy League education and military experience. 
The results of the estimates are shown in Table 13.  
In Column (1), Panel A, we find a positive relationship between foreign CEOs and 
residual income that is statistically significant at the 5% level. This suggests that firms managed 
by foreign CEOs have a higher valuation using the residual income approach. In Column (2), 
Panel A, we find a positive and statistically significant relationship between foreign CEOs and 
return on assets. The coefficient estimate suggests that firms managed by foreign CEOs have a 
higher operating performance. Column (3) shows a positive but statistically insignificant 
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relationship between foreign CEOs and the industry adjusted return on assets. Column (4) is 
the result for firm value using market-to-book. The coefficient on foreign CEOs is positive and 
statistically significant at the 5% level. This suggests that firms managed by foreign CEOs have 
a higher valuation. Overall, the results in Panel A, Table 13 show that firms managed by foreign 
CEOs have a higher valuation and operating performance.   
We next consider the geographic segment of the firms. Our basis for this analysis is that 
since foreign CEOs come from diversified countries, firms that are geographically segmented 
would benefit more from foreign CEOs’ international experience. We test this by interacting 
geographic segments of the firm with the foreign CEOs dummy. The results are shown in Panel 
B, Table 13. In all columns, the coefficient estimates on the foreign CEOs dummy is negative 
with columns (2), (3) and (4) being statistically significant at 1%, 1%, and 5% respectively. 
This result is not consistent with what we find in Panel A. However, we find that the coefficient 
on the interaction of foreign CEOs and geographic segments is positive and statistically 
significant at 5% for residual income, 1% for ROA and industry adjusted ROA and 5% for 
market-to-book. These results indicate that the positive relationship between foreign CEOs, 
firm value, and operating performance in Panel A is fuelled by foreign CEOs who manage 
geographically diversified firms. The implication of this result is that not all firms benefit from 
the appointment of foreign CEOs.  
[Insert Table 13 here] 
4.4.4 Foreign CEOs and management practices 
We have shown in Tables 4 and 5 that foreign CEOs’ legal origin matters for firm risk 
taking behaviour. In this section, we test whether foreign CEOs from countries with high 
ranking on management practices and investor protection have an impact on firm productivity 
and corporate governance. We follow Giannetti, Liao and Yu (2015) and measure management 
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quality in a country using Bloom et al.’s (2012) monitoring production index that measures the 
introduction of modern management techniques to reduce costs and improve quality8. We 
create country dummy of one if a foreign CEO has experience from any of the top three 
countries for monitoring management score in Bloom et al. (2012) and zero otherwise. We 
measure the corporate governance of a country using Djankov et al.’s (2008) revised anti-
director rights index. We create country dummy of one if a foreign CEO has experience from 
any of the countries that score the highest in the revised anti-director rights in Djankov et al. 
(2008) for investor protection and zero otherwise. The indicator for management practices is 
total factor productivity since Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) show that good management 
practices relate to firm productivity. We follow Giannetti, Liao and Yu (2015) and calculate 
the total factor productivity as the residual of the following OLS regression: 
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐾𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡 +∈𝑖𝑗𝑡 ,               (5) 
where: 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the log of firm i's sales in industry j for year t; 𝐿𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the log of the number of 
employees of firm i in year t; 𝐾𝑖𝑗𝑡   is the log of total assets of firm i in year t; and 𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the 
log of the expenses for material and other inputs of firm i in year t.  
The corporate governance indicator is earnings management that Leuz, Nanda and 
Wysocki (2003) find to be negatively related with investor protection across countries. We 
measure earnings management following Tucker and Zarowin’s (2006) construct of 
discretionary accrual, as the residual of the following OLS regression: 
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1(
1
𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡−1
) + 𝛽2(𝛥𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡/𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝛽3(𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡/𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝛽3 (
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡−1
) + ∈𝑖𝑗𝑡 , (6)               
where: 𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡  is net income minus cash flows from operating activities scaled by lagged total 
assets; 𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡−1 is lagged total assets; 𝛥𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 is change in revenue; 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡 is property, plant and 
 
8 We also use overall management score and obtain similar results since countries that rank 
highest on the monitoring score are the same as are ranked highest for overall management. 
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equipment; and 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 is return on assets. Table 14 reports regression estimates of Equations 5 
and 6. 
In Column (1), we regress firm total factor productivity on foreign CEOs from high 
ranking management practice countries and firm characteristics. The coefficient on the high 
ranking management practice is positive and statistically significant at 1%. This suggests that 
foreign CEOs with experience in high management practice countries improves the 
productivity of the firms they manage in the US. In Column (2), we include CEO characteristics 
and still find a positive relationship between management practices and total factor 
productivity. This suggests that foreign CEOs bring management practices they have been 
exposed to into the firms they manage. Therefore, employing a CEO from a high ranking 
management country could be beneficial to shareholders because the CEO may transfer 
knowledge of best practices into the local firm. 
In Column (3), we regress earnings management on foreign CEOs from high ranking 
corporate governance countries and firm characteristics. There is a negative relationship 
between corporate governance and earnings management since the coefficient on the foreign 
experience high ranking corporate governance countries is negative and statistically significant 
at 1%. This result suggests that foreign CEOs with experience from good corporate governance 
countries reduce earnings manipulation. We include CEOs’ characteristics in Column (4) and 
the negative relationship between earnings management and good corporate governance 
remains positive and statistically significant. Thus, the corporate governance of firms that 
appoint a foreign CEO from a good corporate governance country may improve and one 
channel through which this could be achieved is through reduction in earnings management. 
The finding is consistent with Giannetti, Liao and Yu’s (2015) results that foreign directors 
from countries with strong management practices improve operational efficiency and those 
from countries with strong corporate governance structures improve corporate governance in 
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their firms. The study therefore contributes to the literature on the brain gain for firms that 
employ foreign executives. The results support Caligiuri, Lazarova and Zehetbauer’s (2004) 
view that the impact of executives’ international behaviour on firms may not be complete if we 
focus solely on their international experience and that top managers nationality should be 
accounted for when considering their international experience.  
[Insert Table 14 here] 
5. Conclusion 
This chapter examines the impact of foreign CEOs on firm risk and corporate policies. 
Using hand collected data on CEOs’ place of birth, education, and other characteristics, we 
provide new evidence on why there is variation in managerial decision making. We find that 
compared with domestic CEOs, foreign CEOs prefer more risk since firms managed by foreign 
CEOs have both high total risk and idiosyncratic risk. Using 2-stage least squares regression 
and propensity score matching to control for CEOs selection bias, our robustness checks show 
the results confirm a causal relationship between foreign CEOs and firm risk. We document 
that the country of origin of foreign CEOs is an important determining factor for firm risk. We 
show that foreign CEOs with experience from countries with better creditor rights reduce firm 
risk and those from poor creditor rights increase firm risk. This suggests that foreign CEOs 
transfer knowledge of how foreign organizations operate into the firms they manage in the US. 
We find that firms managed by foreign CEOs invest more in intangible assets, such as 
R&D and advertising, which are very risky. We also find that firms managed by foreign CEOs 
are more likely to do M&As. These investment policies could partially explain the high risk 
observed for firms managed by foreign CEOs. Our results show the risk taking behaviour of 
foreign CEOs is beneficial to shareholders since firms managed by foreign CEOs have a higher 
firm valuation but unaffected market risk. We also find that firms managed by foreign CEOs 
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have a high operating performance. Further analysis shows that the high firm valuation and 
operating performance associated with foreign CEOs benefits shareholders of firms that are 
geographically segmented. We also find that foreign CEOs that come from countries with good 
management have higher total factor productivity and those from good corporate governance 
countries manipulate earnings less.  
The implication of our study is that policy makers should consider the geographic 
segments of their firms before recruiting foreign CEOs. The study contributes to the corporate 
finance literature by showing that foreign CEOs are important determinants of corporate 
policies, firm risk, and firm performance. In conclusion, this papers shows that foreign CEOs 
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Appendix A: Stocks of foreign born labour force in OECD countries in thousands and percentages 
 
  
    
    
      1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
AUS Australia .. .. 2 360.2 2 397.1 2 450.6 2 502.0 2 584.0 2 663.1 2 778.9 2 914.9 
    % of total labour force .. .. 24.5 24.6 24.7 24.9 25.0 25.2 25.8 26.5 
AUT Austria  470.1  474.2  514.9  507.3  557.3  584.6  624.6  662.0  695.4  682.8 
  % of total labour force 12.3 12.4 13.5 13.3 14.3 15.3 15.6 16.2 16.8 16.3 
BEL Belgium  450.5  454.6  456.7  489.1  499.3  512.1  535.9  569.8  498.6  473.8 
    % of total labour force 10.4 10.4 10.7 11.3 11.4 11.5 11.7 12.3 10.6 10.0 
CAN Canada .. .. 3 150.8 .. .. .. .. 3 634.8 .. .. 
  % of total labour force .. .. 19.9 .. .. .. .. 21.2 .. .. 
CHE Switzerland .. 1 007.4 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
    % of total labour force .. 26.3 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
DNK Denmark .. .. .. ..  154.4  161.0  167.1  175.3  188.1  202.7 
    % of total labour force .. .. .. .. 5.4 5.9 6.1 6.4 6.6 6.8 
ESP Spain  645.1  804.4 1 085.5 1 448.4 1 832.6 2 240.7 2 782.0 3 229.6 3 719.8 4 132.6 
    % of total labour force 3.8 4.5 6.1 7.8 9.5 11.2 13.4 15.1 16.9 18.2 
FIN Finland .. .. .. ..  81.3  87.6  96.0  102.1  112.8  124.2 
  % of total labour force .. .. .. .. 3.1 3.4 3.6 3.9 4.2 4.6 
FRA France         2 855.8 3 052.9 3 025.6 3 146.6 3 308.6 3 332.8 
    % of total labour force         10.7 11.3 11.1 11.4 11.9 11.8 
GBR United Kingdom .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 3 081.0 3 340.0 3 678.0 
  % of total employment .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 11.0 11.8 12.6 
GRC Greece  286.7  266.6  290.3  338.2  349.4  402.7  421.7  400.2  426.6  477.7 
    % of total labour force 6.4 5.9 6.5 7.4 7.5 8.5 8.9 8.3 8.8 9.8 
HUN Hungary  68.7  66.8  55.2  54.8  77.0  85.2  78.9  73.8  73.7  89.8 
  % of total labour force 1.7 1.7 1.4 1.3 1.9 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.8 2.1 
IRL Ireland  128.8  135.8  153.3  170.8  185.9  187.6  232.4  287.3  339.6  443.2 
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    % of total labour force 7.8 7.9 8.7 9.5 10.1 9.9 11.8 13.9 15.8 20.3 
ITA Italy .. .. .. .. .. .. 1 907.2 2 094.6 2 245.0 2 546.5 
  % of total labour force .. .. .. .. .. .. 7.9 8.6 9.2 10.3 
LUX Luxembourg  72.6  75.5  79.0  79.8  84.1  89.1  89.8  91.3  98.3  98.7 
    % of total labour force 40.4 41.0 42.0 41.4 43.5 45.0 44.4 44.6 46.6 46.4 
MEX Mexico ..  118.8 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
  % of total labour force .. 0.4 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
NLD Netherlands  684.2  895.3  867.9  932.0  906.0  929.1  968.1  931.4  949.4  989.4 
    % of total labour force 8.7 11.2 10.7 11.3 10.9 11.2 11.6 11.0 11.1 11.4 
NOR Norway  124.2  138.1  139.9  153.3  163.2  166.4  173.5  186.9  817.0  215.3 
  % of total labour force 5.4 6.0 6.0 6.5 7.0 7.1 7.4 7.8 8.4 8.5 
NZL New Zealand .. ..  372.3 .. .. .. ..  498.8 .. .. 
    % of total labour force .. .. 19.9 .. .. .. .. 23.8 .. .. 
POL Poland .. .. .. .. ..  58.8  55.9  50.9  43.2  51.7 
  % of total labour force .. .. .. .. .. 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
PRT Portugal  232.7  276.9  302.2  321.3  349.2  379.3  405.5  417.1  444.0  497.5 
    % of total labour force 4.8 5.6 6.1 6.3 6.8 7.4 7.8 7.9 8.4 9.4 
SWE Sweden  428.3  445.5  448.7  442.5  452.8  461.4  497.8  521.6 .. .. 
    % of total labour force 9.8 10.1 10.0 9.9 10.1 10.3 10.8 11.2 .. .. 
USA United States 17 054.7 18 028.5 18 994.1 20 917.6 21 563.6 21 985.2 22 421.6 23 342.9 24 777.8 25 085.5 
    % of total labour force 12.3 12.9 13.4 14.6 14.8 15.1 15.2 15.6 16.3 16.5 
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Appendix A1: CEO Nationality mix 
This table presents the nationality mix of CEOs in our sample. A CEO’s nationality is obtained 
from Marquis Who’s Who database, NNDB and company websites. 
Nationality Frequency Percent Cum.percent Cum. frequency 
American 8279 86.33 86.33 8279 
Argentine 13 0.14 86.47 8292 
Australian 95 0.99 87.46 8387 
Belgian 9 0.09 87.55 8396 
Brazilian 8 0.08 87.63 8404 
British 241 2.51 90.15 8645 
Canadian 131 1.37 91.51 8776 
Chinese 10 0.1 91.62 8786 
Colombian 1 0.01 91.63 8787 
Croatian 17 0.18 91.8 8804 
Cuban 10 0.1 91.91 8814 
Cypriot 1 0.01 91.92 8815 
Danish 32 0.33 92.25 8847 
Dutch 31 0.32 92.58 8878 
Egyptian 3 0.03 92.61 8881 
Filipino 1 0.01 92.62 8882 
French 52 0.54 93.16 8934 
German 56 0.58 93.74 8990 
Greek 20 0.21 93.95 9010 
Hong Kong 10 0.1 94.06 9020 
Indian 168 1.75 95.81 9188 
Iranian 13 0.14 95.94 9201 
Irish 37 0.39 96.33 9238 
Israeli 44 0.46 96.79 9282 
Italian 51 0.53 97.32 9333 
Jamaican 5 0.05 97.37 9338 
Lebanese 14 0.15 97.52 9352 
Malaysian 6 0.06 97.58 9358 
Mexican 12 0.13 97.71 9370 
New Zealander 17 0.18 97.88 9387 
Norwegian 7 0.07 97.96 9394 
Pakistani 10 0.1 98.06 9404 
Russian 12 0.13 98.19 9416 
South African 58 0.6 98.79 9474 
Spanish 14 0.15 98.94 9488 
Swedish 23 0.24 99.18 9511 
Swiss 36 0.38 99.55 9547 
Taiwanese 34 0.35 99.91 9581 




Appendix A2.  
Variables definition 
This table gives the variables’ definitions. 
 
Variable    Definition and data source(s) 
Foreign CEO Dummy variable for one (zero otherwise) if a CEO has 
nationality other than American and/or bachelor’s degree in 
home country and/or foreign work experience. Source: Marquis 
Who’s Who, NNDB, firm website.      
CEO Age    Natural logarithm of age of the CEO. Source: Execucomp. 
CEO Tenure Natural logarithm of the number of years the CEO has held the 
role in the firm. Source: Execucomp 
Female  Dummy variable equals one for female CEOs (zero otherwise). 
Source: Execucomp. 
MBA  Dummy variable equals one if the CEO has received an MBA 
degree (zero otherwise). Source: Marquis Who’s Who, NNDB, 
firm website. 
Ivy League   Dummy variable equals one if the CEO has Ivy League  
    education. (zero otherwise) Source: Marquis Who’s Who,  
    NNDB, firm website. 
Military Experience   Dummy variable equals one if the CEO has military experience  
    (zero otherwise). Source: Marquis Who’s Who database. 
Chairman/CEO Dummy variable equals one if the CEO is the Chairman of the 
Board, (zero otherwise). Source: Execucomp. 
CEO portfolio delta Dollar change in CEO portfolio value for a 1% change in the 
stock price (Core & Guay 2002). Source: Execucomp. 
CEO portfolio vega Dollar change in CEO portfolio value for a 0.01 change in stock 
return volatility (Core & Guay 2002).  Source: Execucomp. 
Firm size    Log of total assets of the firm. Source: Compustat. 
Leverage   Long term debt plus short term debt divided by the book 
    value of total assets. Source: Compustat. 
Cash holding Cash and marketable securities normalised by total assets. 
Source: Compustat 
Tobin’s Q    Market value of assets divided by the book value of assets,  
               where market value of asset is equal to the book value of asset  
    plus market value of common stock minus book value of  
common minus balance sheet deferred taxes. Source: CRSP 
and Compustat. 
Return on assets  Net income divided by total assets. Source: Compustat. 
Industry adjusted ROA Firm ROA minus 2-digit SIC median ROA.  
Capital expenditure Firm capital expenditure divided by book value of assets. 
Source: Compustat. 
R&D expenditure  Firm R&D expenditure divided by book value of assets.  
    Source: Compustat. 
Advertising expenditure Firm advertising expenditure divided by book value of assets. 
    Source: Compustat. 
Net acquisitions  Acquisitions minus asset sales. Source: Compustat. 
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Total investment  R&D plus Advertising expenditure plus Capital expenditure 
plus Net Acquisitions scaled by net property plant and 
equipment. Source: Compustat. 
Market-to -book  Market value of firm divided by book value of asset. Source: 
CRSP     and Compustat.  
Firm total risk Annualised standard deviation of daily stock returns. Source: 
CRSP 
Idiosyncratic risk Annualised standard deviation of the residuals from the 
regression of daily stock returns on the Fama and French three 
factors. Source: CRSP. 
Return on equity Net income divided by total equity. Source: Compustat. 
Tangible asset    Property, plant and equipment divided by book value of assets. 
Source: Compustat. 
Earnings management Tucker and Zarowin (2006) construct of discretionary accrual, 
measured as the residual of the following regression: 
 𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1(
1
𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡−1
) + 𝛽2(𝛥𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡/𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝛽3(𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡/
𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝛽3 (
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡−1
) + ∈𝑖𝑗𝑡. Source: Compustat .   
Total factor productivity Giannetti, Liao and Yu’s (2015) measure as the residual of the 
following OLS regression: 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐾𝑖𝑗𝑡 +
𝛽3𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡 +∈𝑖𝑗𝑡 . Source: Compustat.   
Mergers and acquisitions Dummy equals one if a firm engaged in mergers and acquisitions 
in a fiscal year (zero otherwise). Source: SDC. 
Loss dummy Dummy equals one if a firm has negative net income in a given 
fiscal year (zero otherwise). Source: Compustat. 
Dividend yield Cash dividend per share divided by price at year end. Source: 
Compustat. 
Free cash flow Operating income before depreciation minus interest expense 
minus income tax plus changes in deferred taxes and investment 
tax credits minus dividends on both preferred and common 
shares divided by book value of total assets. Source: Compustat. 
Foreign born  People residing in the state where firm is headquartered who 
were not US citizens at birth. Source: US Census Bureau 
American Community Survey. 
Geographic segment Number of geographic segments that the firm operates.  
 Source: Compustat. 
Cross border acquisition Dummy equals one if the target is a non-US firm (zero  
    otherwise). Source: SDC. 
Home bias acquisitions Dummy equals one if target country is same as CEO’s country 
(zero otherwise). Source: SDC.  
Overconfidence  Dummy equals one if a CEO holds stocks that are more than 67% 
in the money (zero otherwise). The measure follows Campbell 








Appendix A3. Covariate balance  
This table presents the results of the covariate balance for the matched samples for the 
propensity score matching. We compare the sample means of each covariate between the 
treated group (firms managed by foreign CEOs) and the control group (firms managed by 
domestic CEOs) using t-test. The results show that before the matching, the means of all the 
covariates between the two groups are different and statistically significant. We find that after 
the matching, there is no significant different between the means of all the covariates. This 
shows that the matching method effectively increases the similarities between the treated and 
control groups. 
     
  
Variable              Mean   t-Test   
  Treated Control t-stat p-value 
Firm size      
unmatched 8900.4 10661.3 -2.44 0.025 
Matched 8848.2 8663.2 0.20 0.839 
Market-to-book     
unmatched 1.644 1.499 3.935 0.000 
Matched 1.641 1.645 -0.08 0.935 
Geographic segment     
unmatched 1.870 1.629 16.92 0.000 
Matched 1.862 1.887 -1.52 0.130 
Leverage     
unmatched 0.208 0.223 -2.86 0.004 
Matched 0.209 0.206 0.43 0.668 
CEO age     
unmatched 63.301 65.428 -9.01 0.000 
Matched 63.392 63.434 -0.13 0.899 
CEO tenure     
unmatched 6.237 5.728 2.77 0.006 


















Appendix A4.  
This table presents the results of foreign CEOs on firm risk controlling for country of 
incorporation effect. 
 
   
  (1) (2) 
Variables Total risk Idiosyncratic risk 
Foreign CEO 0.0357*** 0.0209** 
 (2.9271) (2.3178) 
Firm size  -0.0421*** -0.0338*** 
 (-21.6947) (-22.9317) 
Market-to-book -0.0179*** -0.0163*** 
 (-7.4345) (-8.3907) 
R&D expenditure  0.7654*** 0.7166*** 
 (9.4039) (11.1116) 
Return on equity -0.0350*** -0.0227*** 
 (-4.3632) (-3.4852) 
Leverage 0.1143*** 0.1000*** 
 (5.7453) (6.7024) 
CEO portfolio delta 0.0048** 0.0046*** 
 (2.5306) (2.9138) 
CEO portfolio vega -0.0519* -0.0363* 
 (-1.8737) (-1.6495) 
CEO age  -0.0274** -0.0395*** 
 (-2.5481) (-4.7638) 
CEO tenure  -0.0099*** -0.0069*** 
 (-3.1137) (-2.8800) 
Female CEO  0.0068 -0.0064 
 (0.5376) (-0.6265) 
MBA  -0.0192*** -0.0174*** 
 (-4.2713) (-5.0213) 
Ivy League education -0.0069 -0.0042 
 (-1.2985) (-1.0425) 
Military experience  -0.0038 -0.0012 
 (-0.6033) (-0.2485) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
Firm country of incorporation effect  Yes Yes 
Observations 8,186 7,813 






































Summary statistics  
This table presents the summary statistics for the full sample of our study. Panel A reports summary statistics of CEOs’ characteristics. Firm 
characteristics are presented in Panel B. Data on CEOs’ characteristics are from Marquis Who’s Who database, NNDB and company websites. 
Firm level data are from Compustat and CRSP. M&As data are from Thomson Financial SDC database. All variables are defined in Appendix A2. 
Variable  No.obs. Mean Median Std dev. Min Max 
Panel A:CEO characteristics            
Foreign CEO 9590 0.137 0 0.344 0 1 
CEO age  9585 65.1 65 8.516 32 96 
CEO tenure  9590 5.798 3.8 6.173 0 32.8 
Female CEO 9590 0.027 0 0.162 0 1 
Chairman/CEO 9590 0.633 1 0.482 0 1 
CEO portfolio delta ($000) 9590 709.139 217.826 1586.213 0 11291.1 
CEO portfolio vega ($000) 9590 145.993 46.073 248.481 0 1383.247 
MBA  9590 0.312 0 0.463 0 1 
Ivy League 9590 0.110 0 0.313 0 1 
Military experience  9590 0.095 0 0.293 0 1 
Panel B: Firm characteristics            
Firm size ($mil) 9590 10420.53 2180.06 38094.73 5.049 797769 
Leverage 9555 0.221 0.209 0.181 0 0.820 
Cash holdings  9582 0.159 0.100 0.165 0.001217 0.754 
Tobin's Q 9560 2.061 1.657 1.243 0.797963 7.478 
Capital expenditure 9563 0.047 0.034 0.042 0 0.230 
R&D expenditure 9590 0.031 0.005 0.052 0 0.259 
Mergers and acquisitions 9590 0.228 0 0.419 0 1 
Total firm risk 9405 0.398 0.348 0.200 0.141 1.196 
Idiosyncratic risk 9020 0.313 0.273 0.159 0.111 0.961 






Summary statistic for sub samples  
This table compares the summary statistics of domestic and foreign CEOs’ sub samples in our study. Panel A presents the differences in means of 
CEOs’ characteristics. Panel B reports the differences in means of firm characteristics. ***, ** and * represent significance level at 1%, 5%, 
and10%, respectively. Definitions of the variables are presented in Appendix A2. 
 
      
Domestic CEOs 
(1)       Foreign CEOs (2)       (1)-(2) 
Variable 
      
Obs. 




            
Std.dev. 
       
Min  
         
Max Obs. Mean Median Std.dev. Min Max Diff means 
Panel A: CEO characteristics                      
CEO age  8274 65.428 65 8.584 32 96 1311 63.301 63 7.831 42 87 2.127*** 
Female CEO 8279 0.030 0 0.172 0 1 1311 0.005 0 0.068 0 1 0.025*** 
CEO tenure  8279 5.728 3.800 6.173 0 32.8 1311 6.237 4.100 6.161 0 32.8 -0.0509*** 
Chairman/CEO 8279 0.646 1 0.478 0 1 1311 0.548 1 0.498 0 1 0.098*** 
MBA  8279 0.314 0 0.464 0 1 1311 0.301 0 0.459 0 1 0.013 
Ivy League 8279 0.120 0 0.325 0 1 1311 0.049 0 0.216 0 1 0.071*** 
Military experience  8279 0.109 0 0.311 0 1 1311 0.006 0 0.078 0 1 0.103*** 
Panel B: Firm characteristics                            
Firm size ($mil) 8279 10661.3 2219.5 39909.77 5.049 797769 1311 8900.4 2058.8 23557.9 10.231 284421 1760.9** 
Cash holdings  8271 0.151 0.093 0.159 0.001 0.754 1311 0.208 0.146 0.186 0.001 0.754 -0.057*** 
Tobin's Q 8250 2.046 1.635 1.251 0.798 7.478 1310 2.156 1.778 1.187 0.798 7.478 -0.110*** 
Capital expenditure 8252 0.048 0.035 0.042 0 0.230 1311 0.040 0.030 0.039 0 0.230 0.008*** 
R&D expenditure  8279 0.028 0.002 0.049 0 0.259 1311 0.053 0.028 0.065 0 0.259 -0.025*** 
Mergers and acquisitions 8279 0.220 0 0.414 0 1 1311 0.274 0 0.446 0 1 -0.054*** 
Total risk 8134 0.398 0.348 0.210 0.141 1..155 1271 0.439 0.350 0.431 0.139 2.150 -0.041*** 






Foreign CEOs and firm risk 
This table presents OLS regression estimates for foreign CEOs and other control variables on a firm’s total and idiosyncratic risk. The dependent 
variable in columns (1) – (4) is the annualized standard deviation of firm daily stock returns. The dependent variable in columns (5-8) is the firm’s 
idiosyncratic risk. Columns (1) and (5) do not control for firm and CEO characteristics. We control for CEO delta and vega in columns (2) and 
(6). Firm characteristics are controlled in columns (3) and (7). CEO characteristics are considered in columns (4) and (8). Column (8) reports 
estimates of systematic risk. We include year and two-digit SIC industry fixed effects in all the models, but coefficients are not reported. All 
variables are defined in Appendix A2. The t-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and firm clustering. The symbols ***, ** 
and * denote significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
 Total risk       Idiosyncratic risk     Systematic risk 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Foreign CEO 0.0435*** 0.0477*** 0.0357*** 0.0356** 0.0266*** 0.0291*** 0.0192** 0.0234** 0.0124 
 (3.7381) (3.7061) (2.9554) (3.3508) (3.0062) (3.0119) (2.1492) (2.3089) (0.2785) 
CEO portfolio delta  0.0099*** 0.0045** 0.0057**   0.0082*** 0.0038** 0.0061*** 0.0172*** 
  (6.1440) (2.3370) (2.0905)   (6.1803) (2.3884) (2.8712) (3.1975) 
CEO portfolio vega   0.0435* -0.0658** -0.0582*   0.0451** -0.0511** -0.0293 -0.0794 
  (1.9400) (-2.3088) (-1.9066)   (2.4851) (-2.2305) (-1.2453) (-1.2239) 
Firm size    -0.0421*** -0.0427***    -0.0373*** -0.0343*** -0.0414*** 
   (-21.1469) (-19.0509)    (-23.1136) (-20.2047) (-10.0483) 
Market-to-book   -0.0170*** -0.0174***    -0.0173*** -0.0181*** -0.0104* 
   (-7.0935) (-5.9141)    (-8.7260) (-6.8979) (-1.9187) 
R&D expenditure   0.7709*** 0.7828***    0.6748*** 0.6725*** 0.6408*** 
   (9.5032) (8.8731)    (10.1406) (7.8754) (5.1016) 
Return on equity   -0.0334*** -0.0403***    -0.0258*** -0.0242*** -0.0512*** 
   (-4.2907) (-4.3570)    (-4.1722) (-3.4881) (-2.9800) 
Leverage   0.1175*** 0.0999***    0.0967*** 0.0898*** 0.1965*** 
   (5.8957) (4.5182)    (6.0814) (6.0572) (5.5960) 
Capital expenditures    -0.0641 -0.0372    -0.0962* -0.0943* 0.7323*** 
   (-0.9349) (-0.5987)    (-1.7197) (-1.6799) (4.8153) 
CEO age    -0.0244**     -0.0422*** -0.0562** 
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    (-2.0407)     (-4.3598) (-2.2828) 
CEO tenure     -0.0084***     -0.0082*** -0.0172** 
    (-2.6662)     (-3.2059) (-2.5425) 
Female CEO    0.0179     0.0072 -0.0765*** 
    (1.3977)     (0.6774) (-2.8384) 
MBA     -0.0220***     -0.0179*** 0.0116 
    (-4.3652)     (-4.5699) (1.0712) 
Ivy League    -0.0091     -0.0070* -0.0346** 
    (-1.5200)     (-1.6532) (-2.4335) 
Military experience     -0.0011     0.0043 -0.0568*** 
    (-0.1716)     (0.8343) (-3.3995) 
Overconfidence    
0.0027    
(0.4306)    
    0.0037   
  (0.8252) 
0.0234*   
(1.7892) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixe effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 9,399 8,376 8,289 6,911 9,015 8,096 8,021 6,588 6,875 






Foreign CEOs’ country of origin and firm risk 
This table presents OLS regression estimates for foreign CEOs and other control variables on a firm’s total and idiosyncratic risk. The dependent 
variable in columns (1) – (2) is the annualized standard deviation of firm daily stock returns. The dependent variable in columns (3-4) is the firm’s 
idiosyncratic risk. Columns (1) and (3) include foreign CEOs of civil and common law origins. Columns (2) and (4) include foreign CEOs of 
German, French, Scandinavian and English origins. We include year and two-digit SIC industry fixed effects in all the models, but coefficients 
are not reported. All variables are defined in Appendix A2. The t-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and firm clustering. 
The symbols ***, ** and * denote significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
            
      
  Total risk   Idiosyncratic risk   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Foreign CEO civil law origin 0.1132***  0.0817***  
 (3.2675)  (3.2201)  
Foreign CEO common law origin -0.0111  -0.0206***  
 (-1.3498)  (-3.7608)  
German origin  0.0587   0.0519* 
  (1.5302)   (1.7446) 
French origin  0.1509**   0.1066** 
  (2.5244)   (2.4743) 
Scandinavian origin  0.0999   0.0614 
  (1.3859)   (1.1077) 
English origin  -0.0067   -0.0112** 
  (-0.8649)   (-2.2175) 
Firm Size  -0.0420*** -0.0424*** -0.0338*** -0.0341*** 
 (-21.8251) (-20.6938) (-23.1373) (-21.6084) 
Market-to-book -0.0170*** -0.0170*** -0.0153*** -0.0153*** 
 (-7.3835) (-7.3672) (-8.3747) (-8.3461) 
R&D expenditure 0.7599*** 0.7494*** 0.7112*** 0.7052*** 
 (9.4424) (9.2669) (11.1899) (11.0914) 
Leverage  0.1154*** 0.1158*** 0.1007*** 0.1010*** 
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 (5.8664) (5.8504) (6.8690) (6.8616) 
Return on equity -0.0349*** -0.0341*** -0.0225*** -0.0220*** 
 (-4.4020) (-4.4608) (-3.5049) (-3.5335) 
CEO portfolio delta 0.0036* 0.0032 0.0035** 0.0032* 
 (1.7221) (1.3711) (2.0307) (1.6701) 
CEO portfolio vega -0.0482* -0.0491* -0.0337 -0.0346 
 (-1.7835) (-1.7904) (-1.5655) (-1.5811) 
CEO age -0.0275** -0.0282*** -0.0388*** -0.0392*** 
 (-2.5661) (-2.5851) (-4.7505) (-4.6994) 
CEO tenure -0.0093*** -0.0091*** -0.0065*** -0.0063** 
 (-2.9151) (-2.7267) (-2.7126) (-2.5153) 
Female CEO 0.0048 0.0043 -0.0089 -0.0093 
 (0.3760) (0.3293) (-0.8526) (-0.8898) 
Military experience -0.0051 -0.0051 -0.0028 -0.0025 
 (-0.8056) (-0.7976) (-0.5465) (-0.5043) 
Ivy league education -0.0060 -0.0056 -0.0045 -0.0038 
 (-1.1181) (-1.0359) (-1.0897) (-0.9252) 
MBA  -0.0183*** -0.0183*** -0.0161*** -0.0162*** 
 (-4.1983) (-4.2222) (-4.9034) (-4.9790) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8,181 8,181 7,808 7,808 












Table 5  
Foreign CEOs’ country of origin and firm risk- sub-sample analysis 
This table presents OLS regression estimates for foreign CEOs’ country dummies based on creditor rights and other control variables on a firm’s 
total and idiosyncratic risk. The dependent variable in columns (1) – (2)) is the annualized standard deviation of firm daily stock returns. The 
dependent variable in columns (3-4) is the firm’s idiosyncratic risk. In columns (1) and (3) we regress firm measures of risk on foreign CEOs from 
common law countries. We estimate firm measures of risk on continues variable for creditor right in columns (2) and (4). We include year and 
two-digit SIC industry fixed effects in all the models but coefficients are not reported. All variables are defined in Appendix A2. The t-statistics 




Total risk   Idiosyncratic risk   
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Foreign CEO Common law  -0.0483***  -0.0349***  
 (-3.8439)  (-3.5203)  
Creditor rights (foreign CEO country)   -0.0241**   -0.0212** 
  (-2.0508)   (-2.2619) 
CEO portfolio delta  -0.0038 -0.0082 -0.0026 -0.0068 
 (-1.0080) (-1.2114) (-0.9144) (-1.3155) 
CEO portfolio vega  -0.0842* -0.2579** -0.0773** -0.2080** 
 (-1.6953) (-2.3351) (-2.0598) (-2.5322) 
Firm size  -0.0436*** -0.0711*** -0.0381*** -0.0595*** 
 (-8.7438) (-5.6757) (-9.4062) (-6.1837) 
Market-to-book -0.0094 -0.0194* -0.0073 -0.0143* 
 (-1.5015) (-1.9367) (-1.4459) (-1.8581) 
R&D expenditure  0.5514*** 0.5485* 0.5079*** 0.5468** 
 (4.8320) (1.7056) (5.4215) (2.1147) 
Return on equity -0.0466*** -0.1179** -0.0300** -0.0735* 
 (-2.7485) (-2.0081) (-2.2723) (-1.7112) 
Leverage  0.0928** 0.0555 0.0702** 0.0255 
 (2.1998) (0.6387) (2.1334) (0.3944) 
Capital expenditure  0.0186 -0.1702 0.0142 -0.1378 
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 (0.1165) (-0.6804) (0.1140) (-0.7422) 
CEO age  -0.0466* -0.0908 -0.0398* -0.0804* 
 (-1.6618) (-1.3805) (-1.8063) (-1.6624) 
CEO tenure  -0.0102 -0.0086 -0.0118* -0.0095 
 (-1.2299) (-0.5409) (-1.7769) (-0.7869) 
Female CEO -0.1050* -0.2311*** -0.0792 -0.1638** 
 (-1.8971) (-2.8385) (-1.6273) (-2.4076) 
MBA  -0.0531*** -0.1173*** -0.0455*** -0.0943*** 
 (-4.4812) (-4.1116) (-4.7083) (-4.1302) 
Ivy League -0.0488* -0.0892** -0.0351 -0.0460* 
 (-1.8650) (-2.4329) (-1.6126) (-1.7593) 
Military experience  -0.2152*** -0.3292*** -0.1629*** -0.2275*** 
 (-4.5547) (-3.4325) (-4.8352) (-3.4696) 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,116 1,116 1,100 1,100 






Foreign CEOs’ country of origin and firm risk -sub-sample analysis  
This table presents an OLS regression estimates for foreign CEOs’ country dummies based on creditor rights and other control variables on a 
firm’s total and idiosyncratic risk. The dependent variable in columns (1) – (5) is annualized standard deviation of firm daily stock returns. The 
dependent variable in columns (6-10) is the firm’s idiosyncratic risk. In columns (1) and (5) we regress firm measures of risk on foreign CEOs 
from English legal origin. We repeat the analysis in columns (2) and (6) for foreign CEOs from French legal origin. We estimate firm measures 
of risk on foreign CEOs from German legal origin in columns (3) and (8). Columns (4) and (9) is foreign CEOs of Scandinavian legal origin. We 
use French legal origin as the control group in columns (5) and (10). We include year and two digits SIC industry fixed effects in all the models, 
but coefficients are not reported. All variables are defined in Appendix A2. The t-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and 
firm clustering. The symbols ***, ** and * denote significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
   Total risk       Idiosyncratic risk         
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
English origin -0.0483***    -0.0708*** -0.0349***    -0.0496*** 
 (-3.8439)    (-4.3691) (-3.5203)    (-3.9407) 
French origin  0.0764***      0.0633***    
  (3.8906)      (4.1484)    
German origin   -0.0087  -0.0614**    -0.0021  -0.0394* 
   (-0.3902)  (-2.3624)    (-0.1207)  (-1.9174) 
Scandinavian origin    0.0152 -0.0460     0.0161 -0.0271 
    (0.4322) (-1.1863)     (0.5499) (-0.8637) 
CEO portfolio delta -0.0038 -0.0052 -0.0017 -0.0017 -0.0048 -0.0026 -0.0039 -0.0010 -0.0010 -0.0032 
 (-1.0080) (-1.2142) (-0.4438) (-0.4453) (-1.2642) (-0.9144) (-1.2162) (-0.3542) (-0.3562) (-1.1496) 
CEO portfolio vega -0.0842* -0.0888* -0.0848 -0.0846 -0.0867* -0.0773** -0.0813** -0.0773* -0.0775* -0.0789** 
 (-1.6953) (-1.7725) (-1.6102) (-1.6065) (-1.7696) (-2.0598) (-2.1565) (-1.9570) (-1.9620) (-2.1273) 
Firm size  -0.0436*** -0.0460*** -0.0444*** -0.0441*** -0.0457*** -0.0381*** -0.0402*** -0.0386*** -0.0386*** -0.0394*** 
 (-8.7438) (-8.9470) (-8.6043) (-8.6399) (-8.8862) (-9.4062) (-9.6588) (-9.1802) (-9.2977) (-9.4116) 
Market-to-book -0.0094 -0.0102 -0.0119* -0.0115* -0.0107* -0.0073 -0.0077 -0.0091* -0.0088* -0.0081 
 (-1.5015) (-1.6314) (-1.8702) (-1.8036) (-1.6943) (-1.4459) (-1.5338) (-1.7695) (-1.7212) (-1.6016) 
R&D expenditure  0.5514*** 0.4643*** 0.5377*** 0.5475*** 0.5144*** 0.5079*** 0.4446*** 0.5092*** 0.5169*** 0.4812*** 
 (4.8320) (4.1223) (4.5514) (4.7386) (4.5934) (5.4215) (4.8601) (5.2616) (5.4813) (5.2650) 
Return on equity -0.0466*** -0.0424** -0.0468*** -0.0473*** -0.0428** -0.0300** -0.0266** -0.0301** -0.0303** -0.0277** 
 (-2.7485) (-2.5451) (-2.6871) (-2.7141) (-2.5724) (-2.2723) (-2.0486) (-2.2245) (-2.2400) (-2.1221) 
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Leverage 0.0928** 0.0923** 0.0807* 0.0814* 0.0965** 0.0702** 0.0704** 0.0599* 0.0607* 0.0735** 
 (2.1998) (2.2137) (1.8690) (1.8761) (2.3037) (2.1334) (2.1877) (1.7800) (1.7955) (2.2521) 
Capital expenditure  0.0186 0.0436 0.0752 0.0725 0.0280 0.0142 0.0341 0.0531 0.0554 0.0189 
 (0.1165) (0.2800) (0.4726) (0.4580) (0.1719) (0.1140) (0.2830) (0.4285) (0.4496) (0.1491) 
CEO age  -0.0466* -0.0430 -0.0402 -0.0402 -0.0516* -0.0398* -0.0361* -0.0341 -0.0345 -0.0437** 
 (-1.6618) (-1.5611) (-1.4311) (-1.4309) (-1.8734) (-1.8063) (-1.6692) (-1.5460) (-1.5661) (-2.0061) 
CEO tenure  -0.0102 -0.0109 -0.0114 -0.0111 -0.0116 -0.0118* -0.0127* -0.0129* -0.0128* -0.0125* 
 (-1.2299) (-1.3048) (-1.3148) (-1.3077) (-1.3869) (-1.7769) (-1.9099) (-1.8567) (-1.8824) (-1.8651) 
Female CEO  -0.1050* -0.1155** -0.1066* -0.1050* -0.1106** -0.0792 -0.0878* -0.0797 -0.0783 -0.0828* 
 (-1.8971) (-2.0364) (-1.8302) (-1.8231) (-2.0027) (-1.6273) (-1.8092) (-1.5588) (-1.5482) (-1.7163) 
MBA -0.0531*** -0.0593*** -0.0591*** -0.0587*** -0.0561*** -0.0455*** -0.0499*** -0.0493*** -0.0495*** -0.0479*** 
 (-4.4812) (-4.9430) (-4.7843) (-4.7714) (-4.5781) (-4.7083) (-5.1331) (-4.8717) (-4.9471) (-4.7606) 
Ivy League -0.0488* -0.0448* -0.0565** -0.0581** -0.0439 -0.0351 -0.0303 -0.0387* -0.0414* -0.0318 
 (-1.8650) (-1.7323) (-2.2229) (-2.2383) (-1.6442) (-1.6126) (-1.4036) (-1.8262) (-1.8938) (-1.4260) 
Military experience  -0.2152*** -0.2468*** -0.1921*** -0.1902*** -0.2351*** -0.1629*** -0.1917*** -0.1451*** -0.1438*** -0.1761*** 
 (-4.5547) (-4.6137) (-4.4722) (-4.4606) (-4.6614) (-4.8352) (-4.9865) (-4.6784) (-4.6848) (-5.0250) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,116 1,116 1,116 1,116 1,116 1,100 1,100 1,100 1,100 1,100 






Propensity score matching  
Panel A reports the determinants of foreign CEO. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 
one if a CEO is foreign and zero otherwise. We include year and industry fixed effects in all 
the models but coefficients are not reported. All variables are defined in Appendix A2. The z-
statistics are in parentheses. Panel B presents the impact of foreign CEOs on firm total and 
idiosyncratic risk based on propensity scores. The treated variable is foreign CEO which equals 
one if a CEO has a nationality other than American and zero otherwise. The average treatment 
effect on the treated (ATT) measures the difference in firm risk between the two groups. The 
symbols ***, ** and * denote significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Determinant of Foreign CEO 
  Foreign CEO 








CEO age  -0.3392*** 
 (-4.0859) 
CEO tenure  0.0586** 
 (2.1742) 
Industry fixed effects Yes  




Panel B. Impact on risk 
Variable Sample 
Treated 
(n = 1204) 
Controls 
(n = 1204) Difference T-stat 
Total risk Unmatched 0.439 0.398 0.041 5.22*** 
 ATT 0.441 0.396 0.045 3.15*** 
Idiosyncratic risk Unmatched 0.336 0.314 0.022 3.76*** 







Two stage least squares for foreign CEO and firm risk 
This table reports the two stage least square regression using the number of foreign born in the 
state in which the firm is located as an instrumental variable for foreign CEO. Column (1) is 
the first stage of the regression. Column (2) is the second stage of the regression for firm total 
risk. Column (3) is the second stage of the regression for idiosyncratic risk. We include year 
and industry fixed effects in all the models, but coefficients are not reported. All variables are 
defined in Appendix A2. The t-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and 
firm clustering. We report the first stage Craig-Donald Wald F-statistics and the Stock –Yogo 
weak ID test critical values for the Craig-Donald Wald F-statistics.  The symbols ***, **, and 
* denote significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
       Foreign CEO   Total risk   Idiosyncratic risk   
             Ist stage  2nd stage  2nd stage  
  (1) (2) (3) 
Foreign born in state 0.0418***   
 (7.1243)   
Foreign CEO   0.3637*** 0.2950*** 
  (3.5005) (3.5132) 
CEO portfolio delta 0.0046* 0.0038* 0.0029* 
 (1.6301) (1.8129) (1.6632) 
CEO portfolio vega 0.0782** -0.0803*** -0.0606*** 
 (2.1142) (-2.8263) (-2.6722) 
Firm size  -0.0066** -0.0406*** -0.0357*** 
 (-2.4042) (-20.2085) (-22.0184) 
Market to-book -0.0077** -0.0160*** -0.0169*** 
 (-2.2452) (-6.2399) (-8.0064) 
Leverage 0.0489** 0.1030*** 0.0829*** 
 (2.0233) (5.7356) (5.7150) 
Capital expenditure  -0.1797* 0.0032 -0.0220 
 (-1.6921) (0.0375) (-0.3224) 
Return on equity 0.0041 -0.0348*** -0.0280*** 
 (0.531) (-6.6772) (-6.5994) 
R&D expenditure  0.4333*** 0.5816*** 0.5126*** 
 (4.7601) (6.7221) (7.0827) 
Female CEO  -0.1110*** 0.0421** 0.0467*** 
 (-4.8934) (2.1227) (2.8675) 
CEO age  -0.0434*** -0.0138 -0.0061 
 (-2.7494) (-1.1320) (-0.6233) 
CEO tenure  0.0129** -0.0147*** -0.0116*** 
 (2.6521) (-3.8163) (-3.8102) 
MBA  0.0120 -0.0222*** -0.0225*** 
 (1.5825) (-3.6814) (-4.5728) 
Ivy League -0.1031*** 0.0265* 0.0232** 
 (-8.472) (1.9434) (1.9772) 
Military experience  -0.1177*** 0.0366** 0.0388*** 
 (-8.7484) (2.2904) (2.9738) 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
First stage Cragg Donald F-stat  48.661 45.681 
10% maximal IV size   16.38 16.38 
15% maximal IV size   8.96 8.96 
Observations                    8,131 8,131 7,868 




Foreign CEOs and investment  
This table reports the OLS results of firm total investment on foreign CEOs and control variables. We define total investment as the sum of R&D, 
advertising and capital expenditure and net acquisitions scaled by net property plant and equipment. Column (1) reports the results for total 
investment. Columns (2-5) report the results of the individual components of total investment. We include year and two digit SIC industry fixed 
effects in all the models but coefficients are not reported. All variables are defined in Appendix A2. The t-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for 
heteroscedasticity and firm clustering. The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 
 Total investment R&D expenditure  Adverting expenditure  Capital expenditure  Net acquisitions 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Foreign CEO 0.0124*** 0.0067*** 0.0052*** -0.0031*** 0.0036* 
 (4.2055) (4.5887) (4.0779) (-3.0203) (1.7566) 
Firm size  -0.0064*** -0.0023*** 0.0003 -0.0016*** -0.0028*** 
 (-9.1419) (-6.9846) (0.9246) (-5.9947) (-5.3742) 
Leverage 0.0334*** 0.0090*** 0.0005 -0.0145*** 0.0384*** 
 (4.4579) (2.7608) (0.2175) (-5.9292) (5.6934) 
Market-to-book 0.0139*** 0.0027*** 0.0031*** 0.0062*** 0.0017** 
 (12.6816) (5.1027) (5.8521) (16.8126) (2.4117) 
Return on equity -0.0025 -0.0048*** 0.0033*** 0.0019*** -0.0029** 
 (-1.3220) (-5.1381) (3.5360) (2.8047) (-2.2629) 
Cash holdings 0.0098 0.1147*** 0.0017 -0.0446*** -0.0618*** 
 (1.3033) (24.7801) (0.5809) (-17.8898) (-11.4857) 
CEO portfolio delta 0.0016** 0.0003 0.0012*** 0.0007** -0.0006 
 (2.2711) (0.5380) (3.0843) (2.1897) (-1.5783) 
CEO portfolio vega 0.0058 0.0249*** -0.0017 0.0004 -0.0174 
 (0.2845) (3.4416) (-0.2957) (0.0669) (-0.7586) 
CEO age -0.0294*** -0.0091*** -0.0101*** -0.0046*** -0.0054* 
 (-7.1539) (-4.7015) (-6.1249) (-2.9146) (-1.6620) 
CEO tenure 0.0024** 0.0011* 0.0007 0.0004 0.0002 
 (1.9761) (1.9465) (1.3873) (0.7957) (0.2597) 
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Female CEO -0.0071 -0.0057** -0.0028 0.0032 -0.0011 
 (-1.1533) (-2.1001) (-1.2586) (1.3542) (-0.2300) 
MBA  0.0032 0.0016* 0.0005 -0.0003 0.0014 
 (1.5044) (1.7186) (0.6093) (-0.4457) (0.8033) 
Ivy League 0.0100*** 0.0066*** 0.0003 0.0011 0.0019 
 (3.2375) (4.4498) (0.2674) (1.1179) (0.7903) 
Military experience  0.0005 -0.0011 0.0029** -0.0017 0.0008 
 (0.1733) (-0.8428) (2.2255) (-1.5371) (0.3319) 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 9,343 9,361 9,361 9,343 9,361 
















Foreign CEOs and mergers and acquisitions (M&As) propensity 
This table reports logit results of M&As propensity on foreign CEOs and control variables. We 
define M&As propensity as a dummy equal to one if a firm engaged in M&As in a fiscal year 
and zero otherwise. Column (1) reports marginal effect of foreign CEO and firm characteristics. 
We include CEO characteristics in column (2). We include year and industry fixed effects in 
all the models, but coefficients are not reported. All variables are defined in Appendix A2. The 
z-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and firm clustering. The symbols 
***, **, and * denote significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) 
Foreign CEO 0.0327*** 0.0353*** 
 (2.7693) (2.9427) 
Firm risk 0.0344*** 0.0339*** 
 (11.5867) (10.7870) 
Market-to-book 0.0039 0.0030 
 (1.0823) (0.7898) 
Leverage 0.0021 -0.0029 
 (0.0751) (-0.1029) 
Free cash flow 0.1813*** 0.1749*** 
 (3.1736) (3.0571) 
Loss dummy -0.0695*** -0.0686*** 
 (-5.0179) (-4.9045) 
Dividend yield -1.7415*** -1.6294*** 
 (-5.1673) (-4.8377) 
Capital expenditure -0.6968*** -0.6860*** 
 (-4.8062) (-4.7045) 
CEO portfolio delta  -0.0053 
  (-1.3724) 
CEO portfolio vega  0.0147 
  (0.3119) 
CEO age  -0.0596*** 
  (-3.1894) 
CEO tenure  0.0047 
  (0.8190) 
Female CEO  -0.0046 
  (-0.1511) 
MBA  0.0181* 
  (1.9149) 
Ivy League  0.0329** 
  (2.4347) 
Military experience  0.0109 
  (0.7096) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0719 0.0746 
Observations 9,489 9,335 
 




Foreign CEOs and foreign acquisitions  
This table reports logit results of foreign acquisitions on foreign CEOs and control variables. 
We define foreign acquisition as a dummy equal to one if the target firm is outside US and zero 
otherwise. Column (1) reports the marginal effect of foreign CEOs and firm characteristics. 
We include CEOs’ compensation in column (2). Column (3) includes CEOs’ characteristics. 
We include year and industry fixed effects in all the models, but coefficients are not reported. 
All variables are defined in Appendix A2. The z-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for 
heteroscedasticity and firm clustering. The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance level at 
1%, 5%, and 10% respectively 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Foreign CEO 0.0541** 0.0544** 0.0513** 
 (2.3649) (2.3752) (2.2073) 
Firm Size  0.0362*** 0.0370*** 0.0365*** 
 (6.8296) (6.7539) (6.4989) 
Market-to-book 0.0139 0.0160* 0.0176* 
 (1.5640) (1.7163) (1.8512) 
Capital expenditure 0.2275 0.2327 0.2093 
 (0.7026) (0.7155) (0.6365) 
Leverage -0.1061* -0.1058* -0.1224* 
 (-1.6685) (-1.6598) (-1.9116) 
R&D expenditure -0.0483 -0.0900 -0.1577 
 (-0.1993) (-0.3637) (-0.6280) 
CEO portfolio delta  -0.0081 -0.0154 
  (-0.8479) (-1.2858) 
CEO portfolio vega  0.1089 0.0998 
  (0.9937) (0.8499) 
CEO age   -0.0195 
   (-0.5340) 
CEO tenure    0.0257** 
   (2.2476) 
MBA    -0.0004 
   (-0.0241) 
Ivy League   0.0031 
   (0.1238) 
Military experience    -0.0139 
   (-0.4214) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0675 0.0680 0.0697 







Foreign CEOs and home bias acquisitions  
This table reports logit results of home target acquisitions on foreign CEOs and control 
variables. We define home bias acquisition as a dummy equal to one if the target country is 
same as CEO’s country and zero otherwise. Column (1) reports the marginal effect of foreign 
CEO and firm characteristics. We include CEOs’ compensation in column (2). Column (3) 
includes CEOs’ characteristics. We include year and industry fixed effects in all the models, 
but coefficients are not reported. All variables are defined in Appendix A2. The z-statistics in 
parentheses are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and firm clustering. The symbols ***, **, and 
* denote significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Foreign CEO -0.7805*** -0.7806*** -0.7737*** 
 (-14.6554) (-14.6506) (-14.6218) 
Firm Size  -0.0298*** -0.0307*** -0.0301*** 
 (-6.3233) (-6.2988) (-6.0453) 
Market-to-book -0.0039 -0.0030 -0.0046 
 (-0.4728) (-0.3511) (-0.5313) 
Capital expenditures 0.1068 0.1084 0.1032 
 (0.3546) (0.3601) (0.3405) 
Leverage 0.1268** 0.1277** 0.1442*** 
 (2.2901) (2.3099) (2.6022) 
R&D expenditures -0.0685 -0.0490 0.0225 
 (-0.3109) (-0.2178) (0.0981) 
CEO portfolio delta  -0.0005 0.0049 
  (-0.0655) (0.5343) 
CEO portfolio vega  -0.0637 -0.0704 
  (-0.6629) (-0.6932) 
CEO age   0.0183 
   (0.5562) 
CEO tenure    -0.0184* 
   (-1.7772) 
MBA    -0.0006 
   (-0.0329) 
Ivy League   -0.0104 
   (-0.4855) 
Military experience    0.0116 
   (0.4219) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R-squared 0.3359 0.336 0.3393 







Foreign CEOs, firm value, and operating performance 
This table reports the OLS results of firm value and operating performance on foreign CEOs and control variables. Panel A shows the results 
without the impact of geographic segments. Panel B includes the impact of geographic segments. Column (1), Panel A is the result for residual 
income. Column (2), Panel A shows the results for return on assets. Column (3), Panel Ais the results for industry adjusted return on assets. The 
result for market-to-book is presented in Column (4), Panel A. We include year and industry fixed effects in all the models, but coefficients are 
not reported. All variables are defined in Appendix A2. The t-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and firm clustering. The 
symbols ***, ** and * denote significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
Panel A: Foreign CEOs, firm value and operating performance     
 Residual income Return on assets Industry adjusted ROA  Market-to-book 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Foreign CEO 0.0387** 0.0043* 0.0035 0.0715** 
 (1.9928) (1.6920) (1.4027) (1.9707) 
Firm size  0.9726*** 0.0019** 0.0021*** -0.0882*** 
 (187.2371) (2.3585) (2.7604) (-8.4807) 
Leverage -2.1063*** -0.0296*** -0.0254*** -1.6401*** 
 (-38.2591) (-3.9763) (-3.5606) (-15.1493) 
Capital expenditures  1.7758*** 0.6369*** 0.5760*** 5.5140*** 
 (9.8373) (19.8076) (18.5655) (12.0786) 
Stock return volatility -0.3407*** -0.0882*** -0.0787*** -0.4507*** 
 (-6.9512) (-7.2800) (-7.4913) (-6.1774) 
CEO age  -0.0109 0.0031 0.0025 -0.4255*** 
 (-0.3829) (0.7629) (0.6281) (-6.7512) 
CEO tenure  0.0195** 0.0023* 0.0026** 0.0596*** 
 (2.3389) (1.9508) (2.2673) (3.5711) 
MBA 0.0213 0.0039** 0.0039** -0.0458* 
 (1.5644) (2.0785) (2.1098) (-1.7528) 
Ivy League 0.0243 0.0013 0.0011 0.1852*** 
 (1.1977) (0.4564) (0.3862) (4.2276) 
Military experience  -0.0087 -0.0010 -0.0009 0.1100** 
 (-0.3866) (-0.3173) (-0.3066) (2.4608) 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8,502 9,186 9,186 8,822 
R-squared 0.887 0.274 0.181 0.257 
Panel B: The impact of geographic segment       Residual income                 Return on assets                                              Industry adjusted ROA                                         Market-to-book 
Foreign CEO -0.1508 -0.0369*** -0.0405*** -0.1924* 
 (-1.6163) (-2.6134) (-2.9397) (-1.6618) 
Geographic segment 0.0225* 0.0075*** 0.0078*** 0.0443* 
 (1.7509) (3.9516) (4.1217) (1.7989) 
Foreign CEO*Geographic segment 0.0949** 0.0197*** 0.0211*** 0.1296** 
 (2.0051) (2.7312) (3.0030) (2.1681) 
Firm size  0.9735*** 0.0032*** 0.0034*** -0.0891*** 
 (176.3291) (3.3417) (3.7598) (-8.7494) 
Leverage -2.0584*** -0.0208*** -0.0166** -1.6368*** 
 (-38.3506) (-2.7497) (-2.2744) (-15.2715) 
Capital expenditure  1.8807*** 0.6655*** 0.6055*** 5.8799*** 
 (10.2140) (19.9061) (18.6524) (13.0753) 
Stock return volatility -0.3577*** -0.0967*** -0.0872*** -0.2452*** 
 (-6.5471) (-6.9282) (-7.0008) (-4.5172) 
CEO age 0.0061 0.0100** 0.0095** -0.4022*** 
 (0.2135) (2.4271) (2.3513) (-6.5402) 
CEO tenure  0.0170** 0.0013 0.0016 0.0565*** 
 (2.0245) (1.1261) (1.4107) (3.4117) 
MBA  0.0190 0.0037* 0.0037** -0.0352 
 (1.3973) (1.9497) (1.9735) (-1.3111) 
Ivy League 0.0144 -0.0029 -0.0032 0.2599*** 
 (0.6971) (-1.0034) (-1.1013) (5.6683) 
Military experience  -0.0070 -0.0002 -0.0001 0.0897** 
 (-0.3104) (-0.0578) (-0.0407) (2.0029) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8,499 9,186 9,186 8822 





Foreign CEOs and management practices 
This table reports the OLS results of management practices on foreign CEOs and control variables. We create country dummy for good 
management practices equal to one if a foreign CEO has experience in any of the top three countries for monitoring practices in Bloom et al. 
(2012). The indicator for monitoring practices is total factor productivity. We create a country dummy for corporate governance equal to one if a 
foreign CEO has experience in any of the countries that score the highest anti-director right in Djankov et al. (2008) and zero otherwise. The 
indicator of corporate governance is earnings management. The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is total factor productivity and the 
dependent variable in columns (3) and (4) is earnings management. We include firm characteristics in columns (1) and (3). We include CEOs’ 
characteristics in columns (2) and (4). In all models, we include year and industry fixed effects, but coefficients are not reported. All variables are 
defined in Appendix A2. The t-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and firm clustering. The symbols ***, **, and * denote 
significance level at1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 Total factor productivity   Earnings management   
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Foreign CEO from high ranking management country 0.1459*** 0.1434***    
 (5.0084) (4.8052)    
      
      
Foreign CEO from high ranking corporate governance country   -0.0199*** -0.0213*** 
   (-4.5375) (-4.9701) 
Firm size  0.1126*** 0.1109*** -0.0042** -0.0044** 
 (16.0405) (15.4652) (-2.3689) (-2.3123) 
Leverage  -0.2073*** -0.1652*** -0.0499*** -0.0411** 
 (-3.4331) (-2.6119) (-2.6514) (-2.2013) 
Return on assets 0.5123*** 0.5111*** -0.0520 -0.0351 
 (4.1487) (4.0901) (-1.0080) (-0.6813) 
Capital expenditure -0.2140 -0.2253 -0.3045*** -0.3014*** 
 (-0.9380) (-0.9863) (-3.9409) (-3.9054) 
Stock return volatility -0.0346** -0.0369*** -0.0038 -0.0036 
 (-2.4165) (-2.6297) (-0.3320) (-0.3151) 
Market-to-book -0.0191** -0.0179** -0.0014 -0.0019 
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 (-2.2531) (-2.1339) (-0.4870) (-0.6516) 
R&D expenditure  -0.6762*** -0.6883*** -0.2043*** -0.1684*** 
 (-3.6786) (-3.7277) (-3.2165) (-2.6836) 
CEO age   0.0299   0.0027 
  (0.8271)   (0.2373) 
CEO tenure   0.0071   0.0041 
  (0.5844)   (1.4733) 
Female CEO  -0.0803   -0.0139 
  (-0.6269)   (-0.7637) 
MBA   0.0047   0.0051 
  (0.1946)   (0.9481) 
Ivy League  -0.0227   -0.0204* 
  (-0.4844)   (-1.8941) 
Military experience   -0.3718***   -0.0249 
  (-5.4846)   (-0.9294) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,263 1,248 1,266 1,251 









We examine whether individualism explains a portion of the variation we observe in firm’s 
capital structures. We find that firms managed by foreign CEOs from individualistic cultures 
have higher leverage. Firms managed by such CEOs are more likely to issue debt than equity 
and adjust their leverage at a faster speed. We document that firms managed by individualistic 
CEOs have shorter debt maturity. We extend the study to the US state level and find that firms 
managed by domestic CEOs born in individualistic states have higher leverage and shorter debt 
maturity. Overall, the results show that individualism has significant impact on a firm’s 
financing policies. 
JEL classification: F23, G41, G32 















Since the seminal work of Modigliani and Miller (1958), research has focused on firm, 
industry and market level determinants of capital structure (see, e.g, Baker & Wurgler, 2002; 
Bharath, Pasquariello & Wu, 2008; Frank & Goyal, 2009; Titman & Wessels, 1988). Recent 
studies, however, show that a significant portion of the disparity in capital structure decisions 
is driven by CEO characteristics9. In this chapter, we contribute to the stream of literature on 
capital structure by evaluating how the CEOs’ cultural background affects capital structure 
decisions. Unlike many CEO attributes that impact capital structure decisions, culture is largely 
given to individuals throughout their lifetime (Becke, 1996) and, therefore, examining such an 
intrinsic attribute of CEOs on capital structure decisions is important.  
The study follows the epidemiological approach of Fernández (2011) and Fernández 
and Fogli (2009) and assumes that when individuals migrate to other countries, they leave 
behind their external environment but carry with them their cultural beliefs, norms and values. 
Thus, this study differs from existing studies that examine the impact of national culture on 
capital structure decisions across countries that are characterized by the difficulty of separating 
the effects of national culture differences from institutional differences since national culture 
shapes institutional settings (La Porta et al., 1998; Licht, Goldschmidt & Schwartz, 2005; 
Williamson, 2000). Nielsen (2013, p. 374) notes that “the impact of culture on individual 
behaviour is acquired in their early childhood because at that time a person is most susceptible 
to learning and assimilation”. Evidence suggests that there is a lasting imprint of people’s 
childhood and formative years’ experience that will not change through subsequent experiences 
(Bernile, Bhagwat & Rau, 2017; Inglehart, 1985; Nielsen & Nielsen ,2013).  
 
9For example, Cronqvist, Makhija and Yonker (2012) examine how CEO’s personal leverage 
impacts firm financing policies. Baxamusa and Jalal (2016) find that firms managed by 
Catholic CEOs have lower leverage. 
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Culture is defined as “the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the 
members of one group or category of people from others” (Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov, 
(2010, p. 6). Recent studies have shown that national culture impacts economic outcomes 
(Anderson et al., 2011; Chen et al,. 2015; Chui, Kwok & Zhou, 2016; Chui, Lloyd & Kwok, 
2002; Chui, Titman & Wei, 2010; Eun, Wang & Xiao, 2015; Siegel, Licht & Schwartz, 2011; 
Zheng et al., 2012). In this chapter, we propose that the national culture of foreign CEOs has a 
significant impact on the capital structure decisions of their firms. This proposition stems from 
the fact that, when people are born and raised in society, they are exposed to the laws, customs, 
values, and organizational practices through formal and informal institutions (Hunter, 1988; 
Markus & Kitayama, 1994; Schwartz, 1994). North (1991) notes that the informal constraints 
that arise from culture have a more prevalent impact than formal laws and property rights in 
shaping people’s choices of economic outcomes. Consequently, we argue that the national 
culture of foreign CEOs could serve as an informal constraint on the capital structure decisions 
of their firms.  
This assertion follows Graham, Harvey and Puri (2015) in that one most important 
corporate decision that CEOs influence is the capital structure and that managerial traits are 
important for capital structure decisions (Graham, Harvey & Puri, 2013; Hackbarth, 2008). The 
upper echelons theory documents that top managers’ perception of situations and their 
interpretation are influenced by their experience, values and personalities (Hambrick, 2007; 
Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Since national culture influences economic outcomes and CEOs 
have greater influence on capital structure decisions, the distinct cultural values embedded in 
foreign CEOs’ national culture will impact their preferences and behaviours for firms’ capital 
structure decisions. Shaw (1990) notes that national culture influences the fundamental values 
and cognitive skills of individuals, which, in turn, shapes their decisions and strategic choices, 
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and that, independent of the talent and ability management accrues, values of their country of 
origin have a deep, lasting impact on their orientation (Nielsen & Nielsen, 2011).  
As a measure of cultural background, we focus on individualism versus collectivism 
because cross cultural studies argue that the individualism versus collectivism measure of 
Hofstede (2001) is the most significant determinant of cultural variation (Heine, 2007; Heine 
et al., 1999; Triandis, 2001). “Individualism pertains to societies in which the ties between 
individuals are loose: everyone is expected to look after himself” (Hofstede, Hofstede & 
Minkov, 2010, p.92). Individualistic cultures put more emphasis on self-actualization, 
autonomy, and the interests of an individual prevails over the interests of the group (Hofstede, 
2001). Kreiser et al. (2010) document that, in individualistic cultures, people make risky 
decisions based on their own judgement and are motivated to do this to demonstrate their 
autonomy. People from individualistic cultures are less vulnerable to social influence and, as 
such, are less likely to follow the opinions of others (Heine et al., 1999; Hofstede, Hofstede & 
Minkov, 2010; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). In contrast, “collectivism pertains to societies in 
which people from birth onward are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups, which 
throughout people’s lifetime continue to protect them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty” 
(Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov, 2010, p. 92). People from collectivistic cultures recognize 
themselves in terms of their relationships with in-groups, seek to accomplish their in-group’s 
goals, obey social rules and react emotionally (Triandis, 1994). 
Why would individualism impact the capital structure decisions of a firm? CEOs make 
financing decisions under uncertainty and, as such, the literature shows that managerial 
attitudes towards financial risk are important for the capital structure of their firms with a 
differences in risk attitudes occurring from gender, age, religion, political affiliation and the 
CEO’s personal risk taking (Baxamusa & Jalal, 2016; Cain & McKeon, 2016; Cronqvist, 
Makhija & Yonker, 2012; Faccio, Marchica & Mura, 2016; Hutton, Jiang & Kumar 2014; 
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Serlfing, 2014). We propose that the distinct values and preferences embedded in individualism 
versus collectivism can explain a CEO’s attitudes towards risk in financing policies of firms as 
individualism can influence a CEO’s incentives for debt financing as well as perceptions of the 
risk associated with debt financing (Breuer, Riesener & Salzmann, 2014; Hofstede, Hofstede 
& Minkov, 2010; Kreiser et al., 2010; Li et al., 2013). Individualism could also cause a firm’s 
capital structure to deviate from its industry peers because individualistic CEOs are less likely 
to mimic the corporate polices of their peers (Heine et al., 1999; Hofstede, Hofstede & Minkov, 
2010; Markus & Kitayama,1991). Thus, though all CEOs in US firms are subject to the same 
legal, social and institutional conditions, individual CEOs have cultural beliefs and values that 
are more likely to be different from other CEOs; these differences can influence their capital 
structure decisions10. 
Using a sample of S&P 1500 firms managed by foreign CEOs from 2000 to 2017 (1304 
firm-year observations), we empirically examine the impact of foreign CEOs cultural 
background on capital structure decisions. The results can be summarized as follows.  
First, we find that firms managed by foreign CEOs from individualistic cultures have 
higher leverage. We subject the results to various robustness tests using alternative measures 
of individualism (House et al., 2004; Schwartz, 1994; Tang & Koveos, 2008) and alternative 
measures of leverage (log (1+ total debt); book leverage less leases; book leverage less cash 
holdings) following Serfling (2016) but the results remain qualitatively the same. We also 
consider the moderating role of creditor rights. Creditor rights could serve as a formal 
institution more likely to impact a foreign CEO’s demand for debt financing since existing 
research shows that creditor rights reduce debt financing because managers fear of losing their 
jobs in a bankruptcy. We find that the moderating role of creditor rights does not take away the 
 
10 Evidence of culture on individual economic outcomes is provided by Nguyen, Hagendorff 




positive relationship between individualism and firm leverage. Additional analysis reveals that 
the presence of large institutional shareholders helps reduce the impact of individualism on 
leverage. This suggests that corporate governance helps reduce the tendency of individualistic 
CEOs to imprint their values and preferences on capital structure. 
Second, we find that firms managed by foreign CEOs from individualistic culture are 
more likely to issue debt than equity and, as such, adjust their leverage ratio towards the target 
leverage ratio at a faster speed than firms managed by foreign CEOs from collective cultures. 
Third, we find that individualism is important for the type of debt that firms hold. Specifically, 
we find that firms managed by foreign CEOs from individualistic cultures hold shorter maturity 
debt. The impact of individualism on short maturity debt is significant and economically 
important. The base line results are robust to the use of alternative measures of short maturity 
debt and an alternative measure of individualism from Tang & Koveos (2008). The result is 
also robust to controlling for CEO characteristics that could impact short deb maturity.  
Next, we carry out robustness tests on the impact of individualism on capital structure 
by extending the study to the state individualism versus collectivism measure of Vandello and 
Cohen (1999) in the US to provide a deeper understanding of individualism’s effect on capital 
structure decisions. We base the analysis on a recent study by Jiang, Qian and Yonker (2018) 
and Yonker (2017) who show that the state in which American CEOs were born impacts their 
corporate policies. We find that that firms managed by CEOs were born in individualistic states 
in the US have higher leverage and hold shorter maturity debt. Overall, the results show that 
individualism explains some of the variation in capital structure decisions across firms. 
One concern with this study is that firms may appoint a CEO based on his/her cultural 
background to take advantage of the CEO’s specific attributes to achieve a firm’s strategic 
purpose. This presents selection bias for the appointment of CEOs from individualistic cultures. 
We control for endogeneity in the study using three instrumental variables (IVs) that suggest a 
101 
 
possible causal relationship of individualism on capital structure. The results remain robust to 
the use of instrumental variables and propensity score matching when taking into account the 
potential self-selection bias of CEOs. 
The study contributes to the growing strand of literature on CEO characteristics and 
capital structure decisions. For example, Cronqvist, Makhija and Yonker (2012) find that a 
firm’s leverage is lower for CEOs who have lower personal home leverage. Baxamusa and 
Jalal (2016) document that firms managed by Catholic CEOs have lower leverage and are less 
likely to issue debt. Faccio, Marchica and Mura (2016) find that female CEOs have lower 
leverage. We add to these studies by showing that the cultural background of foreign CEOs has 
important implications for a firm’s capital structure decisions. 
The study also contributes to the literature on the impact of different cultural 
backgrounds on financing decisions. Though existing studies focus on the macro level, such as 
Chui, Lloyd and Kwok (2002), who conducted a cross country study and find that countries 
with higher cultural scores for mastery and conservatism have lower leverage. Chui, Kwok and 
Zhou (2016) show that cost of debt is lower for countries with high cultural values of 
emdeddedness. Zheng et al. (2012) find that debt maturity is shorter for firms in countries 
whose cultural values are higer for uncertainty avoidance, power distance and masculinity. We 
provide evidence at the micro level by showing that the cultural background of individual 
foreign CEOs matters in the financing decisions of their firms. 
The study also adds to the literature on the impact of foreign executives on corporate 
policies. Existing studies show that foreign executives from good corporate governance 
countries improve the corporate governance of their firms (Giannetti, Liao & Yu, 2015). Estélyi 
and Nisar (2016) show that firms with foreign directors have a higher operating performance. 
Masulis, Wang and Xie (2012) find that firms with foreign independent directors make better 
cross border acquisitions when the target firm and director are from same country. These 
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studies focused on foreign executives’ experience, we show that, in addition to their 
international experience, foreign CEOs’ cultural background impacts firms’ capital structure 
decisions. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 provides testable hypotheses. 
Section 3 describes the data and sample selection. Section 4 presents the empirical results and 
robustness tests. Section 5 concludes the study. 
2. Hypotheses development  
There are at least three ways in which individualism can impact the capital structure 
decisions by foreign CEOs. First, empirical evidence suggests that individualism relates to risk 
taking behaviour. For example, Kreiser et al. (2010) document that in individualistic cultures, 
people make risky decisions based on their own judgement and are motivated to do this to 
demonstrate their autonomy. Firms in individualistic cultures are associated with higher 
corporate risk taking, such as undertaking investment projects that have higher volatility in 
earnings and research and development (Li et al. 2013). Breuer, Riesener and Salzmann (2014) 
find that individualism has a positive association with the financial risk taking behaviour of 
individuals as well as investment in shares. Further, individualism relates to innovation and 
investment in R&D (Gorodnichenko & Roland, 2011; Shao, Kwok & Zhang, 2013; Taylor & 
Wilson, 2012), which is considered a risky investment. Hackbarth (2008) notes that managers 
risk perceptions are important for capital structure decisions. Since debt financing is riskier 
than equity financing because of the cost of financial distress, if individualism increases risk 
taking, then foreign CEOs from individualistic cultures may overlook the risks of debt 
financing. 
Secondly, people from individualistic cultures are less vulnerable to social influence 
and, as such, are less likely to follow the opinions of others (Heine al., 1999; Hofstede, 
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Hofstede & Minkov, 2010; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Beckmann, Menkhoff and Suto (2008) 
find that asset managers from individualistic cultures show less herding behaviour. Chang and 
Lin (2015) document that investors in individualistic cultures exhibit less herding behaviour in 
their trading. In the literature, less herding behaviour correlates with more risk taking 
behaviour. For example, Christoffersen and Stæhr (2019) suggest that more risk tolerant 
financial analysts show less herding behaviour and issue forecasts that differ from the 
consensus forecasts. Lütje (2009) documents that risk averse managers herd more than risk 
tolerant managers. Consistent with this view, Chevalier and Ellison (1999) find that young 
mutual fund managers herd more and take less risk because of their career concerns. Scharfstein 
and Stein (1990) find that the reputational concerns of managers make them herd more and 
reduce their risk tolerance by mimicking the investment behaviour of other managers. Since 
managerial traits are important for capital structure decisions (Graham, Harvey & Puri, 2013; 
Hackbarth, 2008) and managerial herding behaviour affects economic outcomes, the less 
herding behaviour of individualistic CEOs may result in their firms having a capital structure 
different from other firms. Since individualistic CEOs herd less, their firms’ capital structure 
may not have any relationship to their industry capital structure since they are less likely to 
mimic their peers’ behaviour.  
Thirdly, in individualistic cultures, “employees are economic persons who will pursue 
the employer’s interest if it coincides with their self-interest and task prevails over relationship, 
whereas in collective cultures, employees are members of in-groups who will pursue the in-
group’s interest and relationship prevails over task” (Hofstede, Hofstede & Minkov, 2010, p. 
124). Brett (2000) and Brett and Okumura (1998) suggest that people from collective cultures 
will sacrifice their personal self-interest for the interest of the group. This suggests that the 
concern for stakeholders is not very important in individualistic cultures compared with 
collective cultures since the individual’s interest prevails over the interest of the group. The 
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stakeholder theory of determinants of capital structure by Titman (1984) suggests that 
stakeholders (workers, customers and suppliers) of a firm bear the cost when a firm is liquidated 
and that the more important the stakeholders are to the firm, the lower the firm’s debt ratio. 
Consistent with Titman (1984), several studies show that firms that are concerned about their 
liquidation cost to their stakeholders have a lower debt ratio (Bae, Kang & Wang, 2011; 
Banerjee, Dasgupta & Kim, 2008; Kale & Shahrur, 2007; Titman & Wessels, 1988). Since 
people from individualistic cultures care about their interest more than the group, the cost of 
financial distress to stakeholders may be of less concern. Therefore, foreign CEOs from an 
individualistic culture may have a higher firm debt ratio. Based on the three channels discussed 
above, we formally state the first hypothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis 1 (H2): Firms managed by foreign CEOs from individualistic cultures 
have a higher debt ratio than firms managed by CEOs from collective cultures. 
Hovakimian, Hovakimian and Tehranian (2004) document that in a cash shortage, firms 
could issue either debt or equity, or both, to stay close to their preferred capital structure. Based 
on the first hypothesis, if individualistic CEOs prefer debt financing then firms managed by 
individualistic CEOs should have a higher probability of debt issuance than equity issuance 
when the firm needs external financing. This could result from the fact that individualistic 
CEOs may issue debt for risky positive NPV projects and overlook the risk of debt financing 
because that will satisfy their interest rather than that of stakeholders. Kreiser et al. (2010) 
document that, in individualistic cultures, people make risky decisions based on their own 
judgement and are motivated to do so to demonstrate their autonomy. The second hypothesis 
follows as: 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Firms managed by foreign CEOs from individualistic culture have 




Survey works by Graham and Harvey (2001) and Brounen, De Jong and Koedijk (2004) 
show that firms consider a target debt ratio when making financing decisions. Consistent with 
this evidence, Flannery and Rangan (2006) find empirical evidence that firms have a target 
capital structure and adjust it at a rate of over 30% per year. Flannery and Rangan (2006) further 
suggest that the observed capital structure of firms depends on the firm’s target ratio. To 
provide more evidence on the impact of individualism on capital structure decisions, we argue 
that, since individualistic CEOs take more risk, if their firm’s actual leverage is below the 
desired ratio, then individualistic CEOs with more risk taking behaviour will adjust their target 
leverage ratio faster through debt issuance than CEOs from collective cultures. The third 
hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Firms managed by individualistic CEOs adjust their target leverage 
ratio faster than firms managed by CEOs from collective cultures.  
Empirical evidence suggests that the capital structure of a firm goes beyond the mixture 
of debt-equity choices and that debt maturity should  also be considered because the maturity 
of debt has implications for growth opportunities (Barclay, Smith & Morellec, 2006; Barclay 
& Smith Jr, 1995; Billett, King & Mauer, 2007; Guedes & Opler, 1996; Johnson, 2003) and 
underinvestment Myers (1977). Short term debt is riskier than long term debt since short term 
debt exposes the firm to a credit supply shock, refinancing risk and liquidity risk because of 
frequent renegotiations (Custódio, Ferreira & Laureano, 2013; Diamond, 1991). In addition, 
firms that issue short term debt are frequently scrutinized and monitored by underwriters, 
creditors, and rating agencies (Datta, Iskandar‐Datta & Raman, 2005; Park, 2000; Stulz, 2001). 
Given the undiversified nature of managerial wealth in the firm, risk-averse CEOs may demand 
long term debt financing rather than short term debt to reduce the risk of their holdings in the 
firm. Prior studies (see, e.g., Brockman, Martin & Unlu, 2010; Chava & Purnanandam, 2010) 
show that managerial risk preferences are important for debt maturity. Breuer, Riesener and 
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Salzmann (2014) document that individualism has a positive association with financial risk 
such as the demand for risky assets. If managerial risk preferences affect debt maturity and 
short term debt maturity is riskier then individualistic CEOs are more likely to prefer short term 
debt maturity. Hence the fourth hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Firms managed by individualistic CEOs have relatively more short-
term debt than firms managed by CEOs from collective cultures. 
3. Data and sample 
Data on CEOs’ birth country, education and work experience are hand collected from 
Marquis Who’s Who biography online database, Notable Names Database (NNDB) and firms’ 
websites. To be included in the sample, a CEO must have been born outside the US and 
attended school in the home country. This allows us to properly assign them to their nationality 
and examine the direct impact of their national culture on capital structure decisions. The list 
of CEOs whose information was obtained from the Marquis Who’s Who database were taken 
from Compustat Execucomp. We obtain accounting and stock market data from the Compustat 
and Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) databases, respectively. We obtain 
individualism data from Geert Hofstede’s website11. We exclude foreign CEOs whose 
countries were not included in the study by Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov (2010). Following 
other studies on capital structure, we exclude utility and financial firms from the sample. The 
final sample consists of 1,304 firm-year observations from 2000 to 2017 for 234 unique foreign 
CEOs. The nationality mix of CEOs in the sample is presented in Appendix Table A. Most of 
the CEOs in our sample come from the United Kingdom, Canada and India. 
 




3.1 Summary statistics  
Table1 reports the descriptive statistics of the sample. Panel A summarises the CEOs’ 
characteristics. The mean (median) age is 63 (63). Firms managed by female CEOs represent 
0.5% of the sample and CEOs who are also chair of their firms form 54.1%. The mean (median) 
CEO tenure is 6.1 (4) years. CEOs who are founder of their firms represent 9.1% of the sample. 
The mean (median) individualism cultural index is 0.67 (0.7). Panel B summarises the firm 
characteristics. The mean (median) firm size is $8,939.5 ($2,089.3) million. The mean 
(median) market-to–book ratio is 1.7 (1.3). Firms hold mean (median) cash of 21.1% (15.1%). 
The mean (median) R&D expenditure is 5.3% (2.8%) and the mean (median) capital 
expenditure is 4% (3%). Panel C summarises the dependent variables. We measure book 
leverage as total debt scaled by total assets and market leverage as total debt scaled by the 
market value of the assets. The mean (median) book leverage is 20.6% (19.7%) and the mean 
(median) market leverage is 12.3% (9.8%). Debt issuers represent 19.6% and equity issuers 
represent 6% of the sample. The mean (median) of proportion of debt maturing within three 
years is 38.5% (30.6%). All variables are defined in Appendix Table B. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Baseline results 
We examine the impact of individualism on total debt by estimating the following 
regression model: 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑚)𝑗 + 𝛽2(𝐶𝐸𝑂  𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠)𝑗𝑡 +




where: “i” denotes the firm, “j” denotes the CEO, and “t” denotes the year. Total debt is 
measured by book leverage and market leverage. Book leverage is total debt scaled by total 
assets and market leverage is total debt scaled by market value of assets (Byoun, 2008; 
Cronqvist, Makhija & Yonker, 2012; Lemmon, Roberts & Zender, 2008). 
The main variable of interest is individualism, which we measure using the 
individualism index for each foreign CEO’s country of origin (Hofstede 2001; Hofstede, 
Hofstede & Minkov 2010). In all the estimated regression models, we control for major firm 
and CEO characteristics that have been found to impact the debt ratio. The firm characteristics 
we control for are: firm size, market-to-book, tangible assets, profit, cash holdings, R&D 
expenditure, capital expenditure, and industry median leverage (see, e.g., Frank & Goyal, 2009; 
Rajan & Zingales, 1995; Welch, 2004). We control for CEO age (Serfling, 2014), tenure, 
duality and whether a CEO is the founder of the firm to control for CEO power (Adams, 
Almeida & Ferreira, 2005; Chava, Kumar & Warga, 2009; Morse, Nanda & Seru, 2011). 
Table 2 presents the ordinary least square (OLS) results of firm total debt on 
individualism and the control variables discussed above. In Column (1), we regress book 
leverage on individualism holding all other factors constant but include two-digit industry and 
year fixed effects. We find the coefficient on individualism is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. This suggests that, all things being equal, firms managed by foreign 
CEOs from an individualistic culture have a higher debt ratio. We include firm characteristics 
in Column (2) and still find a positive relationship between individualism and book leverage. 
In Column (3), we include the industry median leverage as Frank and Goyal (2009) show that 
it is an important determinant of firm leverage. Inclusion of the industry median leverage does 
not remove the positive relationship between individualism and book leverage. Morse, Nanda 
and Seru (2011) and Adams, Almeida and Ferreira (2005) find that powerful CEOs have a 
significant impact on corporate policies. In Column (4), we include Chairman/CEO and 
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Founder CEO dummies to control for CEO power (Adams, Almeida & Ferreira 2005; Morse, 
Nanda & Seru 2011). We also include other CEO characteristics in Column (4) and still find 
the coefficient of individualism to be positive and statistically significant12. As an alternative 
measure of leverage13, we regress market leverage on individualism in Column (5). We find 
the coefficient on individualism is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. Overall, 
the results presented in Table 2 are consistent with the hypothesis H (1) that firms managed by 
foreign CEOs from individualistic cultures have a higher debt ratio14.  
Individualism has been related to overconfident behaviour (Chui, Titman & Wei, 2010; 
Ferris, Jayaraman & Sabherwal, 2013; Heine, Lehman, et al., 1999; Markus & Kitayama, 
1991). To ensure that the results are not driven by overconfident behaviour, we regress 
individualism on the overconfidence measure based on CEOs’ compensation as in Campbell 
et al. (2011) and predict the residual from the regression. We then estimate leverage on the 
residual from the regression to examine the portion of individualism not explained by 
overconfidence on firm leverage. We find the coefficient is positive and statistically significant 
at the 1% level.This suggests that individualism goes beyond overconfidence. The result for 
the residuals on firm leverage is shown in Appendix Table D.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
12 We use the alternative measures of individualism by Tang and Koveos (2008), Schwartz 
(1994) and House et al. (2004) and get results consistent with Hofstede (2001). The results are 
available upon request. 
13 Following Serfling (2016), we measure leverage as:  
(i) log (1+ total debt); 
(ii) book leverage less leases; and  
(iii) book leverage less cash holdings.  
 
14 We find that the impact of individualism on firm leverage is negative if the firm is 
managed by a female CEO. Appendix C shows the results. 
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4.1.2 The moderating role of creditor rights on individualism and leverage  
Creditor rights can serve as a formal institution that can impact foreign CEOs’ demand 
for debt financing. This explanation is motivated by the finding in Acharya, Amihud and Litov 
(2011) that in countries with better creditor rights, firms take fewer risks because managers are 
afraid of losing their job through bankruptcy filing. Chava and Roberts (2008) and Nini, Smith 
and Sufi (2009) document that strong creditor rights in the form of restrictive debt covenants 
and enforcement of debt covenant violations decreases investment. Similarly,, Favara et al. 
(2017) show that strong creditor rights decrease firm risk taking across countries. Cho et al. 
(2014) find that strong creditor protection reduces the extent to which firms issue and finance 
projects with debt. Acharya and Subramanian (2009) and Acharya, Sundaram and John (2011) 
document that strong creditor rights reduce innovation in high tech industries and lower the use 
of financial leverage. These studies suggest that creditor rights are important in debt financing 
across countries because managers fear losing their jobs through bankruptcy. Since theory 
suggests that foreign CEOs have been shaped by the formal and informal institutions of their 
home countries, we test whether the baseline results hold when we control for creditor rights 
for each foreign CEO’s country of origin. We also test whether the effect of individualism on 
leverage remains for CEOs from better creditor rights countries. We measure creditor rights 
using Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer’s (2007) creditor rights index that aggregates different 
creditor rights in a country following Bae and Goyal (2009), Cho et al. (2014), and Favara et 
al. (2017). The results are presented in Table 3. 
In Table 3, Column (1), we include creditor rights controlling for industry and year 
fixed effects. We find the coefficient on individualism to be positive and statistically significant 
at the 1% level, which is consistent with the results in Table 2. This suggests that the inclusion 
of creditor rights does not take away the positive relationship between individualism and 
leverage. We find the coefficient on the creditor rights is negative and statistically significant 
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at 1% which suggests that foreign CEOs from better creditor rights countries have lower 
leverage. This result is consistent with prior studies that document low debt financing with 
creditor rights for the reason that managers are afraid of losing their jobs through bankruptcy. 
The results in Column (1) are consistent with the theory that foreign CEOs’ decision making 
is shaped by their country of origin. In Column (2), we include GDP growth to control for 
economic development in the foreign CEO country of origin because Tang and Koveos (2008) 
suggest that the economic development of a country could impact national culture. We still 
find a positive relationship between individualism and leverage. Thus, controlling for creditor 
rights and economic growth does not change the results. We include firm characteristics in 
Column (3) but the results remain the same. In Column (4), we include CEOs’ characteristics, 
but these do not change the positive relationship we find between individualism and leverage. 
In Column (5), we interact individualism with creditor rights to test the strength of the impact 
of individualism on a firm’s leverage for foreign CEOs who come from better creditor rights 
countries. The main variable of interest in Column (5) is the interaction of individualism and 
creditor rights. We find that the coefficient on the interaction term is positive and statistically 
significant at 1%. This suggests that firms managed by foreign CEOs who come from 
individualistic cultures and better creditor rights countries have higher leverage. The results 
suggest that the impact of individualism on leverage is stronger than the impact of creditor 
rights, which is consistent with what North (1991) notes that the informal constraints that arise 
from culture have a more prevalent impact than formal laws and property rights in shaping 
people’s choices in economic outcomes. 





4.2 Channels through which individualistic CEOs impact capital structure  
4.2.1 Individualism and security issuance  
In previous sections, we find that firms managed by foreign CEOs from individualistic 
cultures are more levered. Such firms can have a higher leverage by retiring equity and issuing 
more debt. In this section, we investigate the extent to which individualism impacts a firm’s 
likelihood of debt and equity issuance to test the second hypothesis that firms managed by 
individualistic CEOs have a higher probability of issuing debt than equity. A firm is considered 
as debt issuer if net debt issuance scaled by total assets is greater than 0.05 and an equity issuer 
if net equity issuance scaled by total assets is greater than 0.05. A firm is also considered as 
debt issuer if net debt issuance scaled by market value of assets is greater than 0.03 and equity 
issuer if net equity issuance scaled by market value of assets is greater than 0.03. We create 
indicator variables for these two thresholds and use both in the analysis. The 0.05 and 0.03 
thresholds for debt and equity issuing are chosen to focus on significant debt and equity issues 
when firms need external financing for corporate investment (Chang, Dasgupta & Hilary, 2006, 
2009; Goh et al., 2017; Hovakimian, Hovakimian & Tehranian, 2004; Hovakimian, Opler & 
Titman, 2001; Huang & Ritter, 2018; Leary & Roberts, 2005). Net debt issuance is measured 
as long term debt issuance (Compustat item DLTIS) minus long term debt reduction (DLTR) 
plus current debt changes (DLCCH). Alternatively, we measure net debt issuance as the change 
in book value of total debt. Both measures are used in the analysis. We measure net equity 
issuance as the sale of common and preferred stock (Compustat item SSTK) minus the 
purchase of common and preferred stock (PRSTKC). The definition of net debt issuance and 
net equity issuance follow prior studies (Chang, Dasgupta & Hilary, 2006; Hovakimian, 
Hovakimian & Tehranian, 2004; Leary & Roberts, 2005). 
We estimate logit models to examine the impact of individualism on the likelihood of 
a security issue. The results are presented in Table 4. Column (1) reports the marginal effect of 
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individualism on the likelihood of a debt issue. The dependent variable is a dummy of one if 
net debt issue scaled by total assets is greater than 0.05 and zero otherwise. We find the 
coefficient on individualism is positive and statistically significant at 5%. This suggests that 
firms managed by individualistic CEOs have a higher probability of issuing debt. A unit 
increase in individualism increases a firm’s probability of debt issue by 1.8%. The results are 
economically significant. The marginal effect of individualism on net debt issuance scaled by 
market value of assets is presented in Column (2). We consistently find a positive relationship 
between individualism and net debt issuance. As an alternative measure of debt issue, Column 
(3) presents the marginal effect of individualism on a dummy variable that equals one if the 
annual change in book value of debt is greater than 0.05 and zero otherwise. We find the 
coefficient on individualism is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. Overall, the 
results suggest that firms managed by individualistic CEOs have a higher probability of issuing 
debt. The marginal effect of individualism on equity issue is present in Column (4). We find 
the coefficient on individualism is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level. This 
suggests that firms managed by individualistic CEOs are less likely to issue equity. The results 
are consistent with the first hypothesis that firms managed by individualistic CEOs have more 
debt (and proportionally less equity). 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
4.2.2 Individualism and partial adjustment of leverage  
To test the third hypothesis regarding the speed of adjustment for firms managed by 
individualistic CEOs, we use the partial adjustment model of Flannery and Rangan (2006). We 
group the sample into high individualism for firms whose CEO’s country score is above the 
median individualism index, and low individualism for firms whose CEO’s country score is 
below the median individualism index, and estimate a dynamic capital structure model for each 
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group and compare their speed of adjustment. We use the following procedure. First, the target 
leverage is estimated as follows: 
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡
∗ =  𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡−1  + 𝑉𝑖                    (2)  
where: 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡
∗  is a target or optimal leverage of the firm; vector  𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 contains one year lagged 
leverage determinants used in Table 2 Column (4); and 𝑉𝑖 is firm fixed effect. Second, we 
estimate the partial adjustment model following Flannery and Rangan (2006) to obtain the 
dynamic adjustment in leverage ratios as follows: 
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 − 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡−1   =   λ(𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡
∗ - 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡−1   ) + ∈𝑖𝑗𝑡           (3)        
where: Yijt –Yijt-1  is the actual change in a firm’s leverage; 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡
∗ - Yijt-1 is the distance between 
the firm’s leverage and its target leverage; and λ measures the speed of adjustment to the 
target leverage ratio. We substitute Equation (2) into (3) to obtain the following model15: 
   𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 =   (λ 𝛽)𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 + (1 − λ) 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡−1    + λ𝑉𝑖 + ∈𝑖𝑗𝑡        (4)            
We estimate Equation (4) using Blundell and Bond’s (1998) two-step GMM (BB) and 
the bias-corrected least squares dependent variables estimator (LSDVC) of Bruno (2005) and 
Kiviet (1995). The estimation approach follows prior studies (such as Cho et al.,  2014; 
Faulkender et al., 2012; Gungoraydinoglu & Öztekin, 2011; Hanousek & Shamshur,  2011 and  
Öztekin & Flannery, 2012). We use two methods in the analysis because Flannery and Hankins 
(2013) suggest the two approaches give better estimates. The results of the dynamic panel 
estimates are shown in Table 5. Column (1) presents the results for high individualism using 
Blundell and Bond (1998). We find that, the adjustment speed towards the target leverage for 
firms managed by high individualistic CEOs is 29.66% whereas the adjustment speed for firms 
managed by low individualistic CEOs using the same approach is 26.08% as shown in Column 
(3). The coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level. Columns (2) and (4) show the 
 
15 The procedure for obtaining Equation (4) is shown in Appendix Table E. 
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results for high individualism and low individualism respectively using the LSDVC. We find 
that the adjustment speed for high individualism is 34.03% and low individualism is 28.08% 
with both coefficients statistically different from zero at the 1% significance level. Overall, the 
two approaches provide consistent results that firms managed by highly individualistic CEOs 
adjust their leverage faster towards their target leverage. In terms of economic significance, 
firms managed by highly individualistic CEOs adjust their target leverage 5.95% faster than 
firms managed by low individualistic CEOs as shown by the LSDVC (Flannery & Hankins, 
2013 suggest the LSDVC is the most accurate of seven methods). 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
4.2.3 Individualism and debt maturity 
In this section, we test the fourth hypothesis that firms managed by individualistic 
CEOs have shorter debt maturity. We measure short maturity debt (ST3) as the proportion of 
debt maturing within three years (Billett, King & Mauer, 2007; Brockman, Martin & Unlu, 
2010; Dang & Phan, 2016; Johnson, 2003). As an alternative measure, we consider the 
proportion of debt that is due within two (ST2) and five years (ST5) as in previous studies on 
debt maturity (Billett, King & Mauer, 2007; Brockman, Martin & Unlu, 2010; Custódio, 
Ferreira & Laureano, 2013; Dang & Phan, 2016; Datta, Iskandar‐Datta & Raman, 2005; 
Johnson, 2003). Following prior studies on debt maturity, in the analysis, we control for firm 
size, firm size squared, abnormal earnings, asset maturity, asset volatility, market-to-book, 
R&D expenditure, firm leverage, term structure of interest rates, CEO age, CEO tenure, 
Founder CEO, and Chairman CEO. The results are shown in Table 6. 
In Table 6, Column (1), we estimate the main measure of short term debt (ST3) on 
individualism firm characteristics and term structure of interest rates. We find the coefficient 
is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. This suggests that firms managed by 
individualistic CEOs hold debt with shorter maturity. We include CEOs’ characteristics, 
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creditor rights and GDP growth in Column (2), but the results remain unchanged. In Column 
3, as an alternative measure of short term debt, we regress the proportion of debt maturing 
within two years (ST2) on individualism. We find the coefficient on individualism is positive 
and statistically significant at the 5% level, which is consistent with the initial finding in 
Column (2). Column (4) shows the results for the proportion of debt maturing within five years 
(ST5) on individualism. We find a positive relationship between short term maturity and 
individualism. The results suggest that individualism’s positive impact on debt maturity is 
robust to debt maturity measures. In Column (5), we follow Dang and Phan (2016) and 
Custódio, Ferreira and Laureano (2013) and estimate a Tobit regression of short term debt on 
individualism since the measure of short term debt is censored at 0 and 1(thus the OLS results 
might be biased and inconsistent). The obtained results are consistent with the OLS estimates. 
Apart from the main variable of interest, estimates of most of the control variables are 
consistent with prior studies. Whited (1992) shows that because a small firm’s tangible assets 
are smaller than their future investment opportunities, small firms’ access to long term debt is 
restricted. Smith Jr and Warner (1979) suggest that smaller firms are more likely to face severe 
agency problems and may use short term debt to mitigate such concerns. In all the models, we 
find a significant negative relationship between firm size and short maturity debt. We also find 
a positive relationship between firm size squared and short maturity debt which is consistent 
with Diamond (1991) who reports a non-monotonic relationship between credit quality and 
short maturity debt. High uncertainty in R&D result in high information asymmetry, therefore 
firms that spend more on R&D use short term debt (Custódio, Ferreira & Laureano, 2013). We 
find a positive relationship between R&D and short maturity debt. The results are thus 
consistent with prior studies. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
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4.3 Endogeneity  
The OLS analysis above assumes that CEOs are randomly selected into firms. This 
might not be true since a firm’s demand for certain CEO attributes might compel the firm to 
choose one CEO over another. For example, a firm may appoint a foreign CEO from an 
individualistic culture to take advantage of specific attributes to fulfil the firm’s strategy. Thus, 
the demand for the special skills of a CEO and firm strategy might lead to their selection 
(Greve, Biemann & Ruigrok, 2015; Magnusson & Boggs, 2006; Masulis, Wang & Xie, 2012). 
Therefore, the appointment of foreign CEOs from individualistic cultures presents selection 
bias. In addition, Nash and Patel (2019) suggest that measurement of national culture may 
present problems because national culture may be correlated with other omitted variables. To 
mitigate these concerns, first we use propensity score matching to deal with the issue of 
selection bias. Secondly, we use instrumental variables and employ two-stage least squares 
models to address endogeneity. 
4.3.1 Propensity score matching 
Propensity score matching is an effective method to alleviate endogeneity concerns in 
CEO and firm matching (Angrist & Pischke, 2009; Armstrong, Ittner & Larcker, 2012; 
Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). Propensity score matching requires the treatment group to be 
matched with a control group that has similar characteristics and similar values of propensity 
score as the treatment group. The treatment group in the study are firms with high individualism 
measured as a dummy variable that equals to one if the individualism score is greater than the 
median score in the sample and zero otherwise. We first estimate a probit model to predict the 
selection of individualistic CEOs using firm and CEO characteristics (Conyon et al., 2018; 
Malmendier & Tate, 2009). The results are reported in Appendix Table F. We then use the 
propensity score of the probit estimates to match the firms. We use a nearest neighbour 
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algorithm with a caliper 0.001 to match the firms, restricting the observations to be on common 
support to obtain the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT). The matched sample 
consists of 260 firms managed by highly individualistic CEOs and 260 firms managed by low 
individualistic CEOs. ATT measures the difference in firm leverage between firms managed 
by highly individualistic CEOs and a comparable firms managed by low individualistic CEOs 
with similar propensity scores.  
The average treatment effect of high individualistic CEOs on book leverage and market 
leverage is presented in Table 7. Comparing the means of the unmatched sample, firms 
managed by highly (low) individualistic CEOs have a mean book leverage of 0.219 (0.184) 
and mean market leverage of 0.126 (0.113). The differences in leverage across the two types 
of firm are significant at the 1% level. We find that, after matching, the mean book leverage 
for firms managed by highly individualistic CEOs reduces to 0.211 and market leverage is 
0.137. After the matching, the difference between firm leverage for highly individualistic CEOs 
and low individualistic CEOs is still positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. The 
results suggest that the positive relationship between firm leverage and individualistic CEOs 
remains after taking into account CEO selection bias. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
4.3.2. Instrumental variable approach 
We use the two-stage least squares estimation technique to deal with endogeneity in the 
OLS models. We identify IVs that do not have any direct impact on capital structure decisions 
except indirectly through individualism. The first instrumental variable is a measure of the 
prevalence of the S-allele in the serotonin transporter gene 5-HTTLPR that makes people more 
sensitive to social stress (Chiao & Blizinsky, 2010). The second IV is a measure of the 
prevalence of the G-allele in the functional polymorphism (A118G) in the μ-opioid receptor 
gene that makes people more sensitive to social rejection (Way & Lieberman, 2010). Chiao 
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and Blizinsky (2010) and Way and Lieberman (2010) find that large population of collective 
cultures have the S-allele and G-allele. Therefore, the motivation for using these two genetic 
measures as instruments for the individualism/collectivism cultural dimension is based on the 
fact that collective cultures shield individuals from social stress and social rejection by 
integrating individuals into strong cohesive groups that provide psychological support. The 
third IV is the prevalence of pathogens in a particular geographic area (Fincher et al., 2008). 
The argument for linking pathogens and individualism/collectivism is based on the fact that 
cultures prone to the presence of pathogens develop more collective values as defence 
mechanisms to deal with the pathogen’s prevalence (Fincher et al., 2008; Murray & Schaller, 
2010). Fincher et al. (2008) find a strong negative relationship between individualism and the 
presence of pathogens. Data on these three IVs are from Nash and Patel (2019). We use each 
of these IVs separately in the equations below and also combine each of the S-allele and G-
allele with the prevalence of pathogens to estimate the impact of individualism on capital 
structure. We estimate the following two stage least squares model: 
Stage 𝟏: 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑚 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝐼𝑉 ) + 𝛽2(𝐶𝐸𝑂  𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠) +
𝛽3(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠) + 𝛽4 (𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠) +∈               (5)      
Stage 𝟐: 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑚 ) +
𝛽2(𝐶𝐸𝑂  𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠) + 𝛽3(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠) + 𝛽4 (𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠) +∈   (6) 
We perform the Stock and Yogo (2005) weak instrument test to assess the strength of 
the IVs. We also perform Sargan’s (1958) over identification test of a combination of the IVs. 
The Cragg–Donald F-statistics from the first stage regression for each IV is greater than any of 
the Stock and Yogo’s (2005) critical F-values for weak instruments. The Sargan (1958) test is 
not significant for a combination of the IVs. This shows that the instruments in the first stage 
regression are strong. The results are reported in Table 8. 
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Table 8, Column (1) is the first stage results of Equation (5). The coefficient for the S-
allele is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. This is consistent with Chiao & 
Blizinsky (2010) who find a strong positive relationship between the S-allele and collectivism. 
Column (2) is the second stage results for the predicted value of individualism on leverage. We 
find the coefficient on the instrumented individualism is positive and statistically significant at 
the 1% level, which is consistent with the results in Table 2 using the OLS estimation. In 
Column (4), we combine the S- allele and pathogens as IVs. Column (5) gives the first stage 
result for the G-allele; the second stage for leverage is shown in Column (6). We find the 
individualism coefficient is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. Column (7) is 
the first stage result for the combination of the G-allele and pathogens. The second stage result 
for leverage in Column (8) shows a positive, statistically significant relationship between 
individualism and leverage. We present the first stage result for pathogens in Column (9). The 
second stage result for leverage is in Column (10). We find the individualism coefficient is 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. Overall, the second stage results using 
alternative instrumental variables provide consistent estimates in line with the OLS estimates. 
We present two-stage least square regression for short term debt maturity in Table 9. The 
coefficient of the instrumented individualism is positive and statistically significant, which is 
consistent with the OLS results in Table 6. The results in Tables 8 and 9 suggest that the impact 
of individualism on capital structure decisions is robust to the use of instrumental variables16. 
[Insert Tables 8 and 9 here] 
 
16 It may be the case that culture is associated more with uncertainty than with risk-taking. 
We therefore control for uncertainty avoidance cultural measure in the baseline regression. 
The results remain qualitatively the same. Results are shown in Appendix G. 
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4.4 Robustness checks 
4.4.1 Evidence of individualism on leverage and debt maturity at the state level in the US 
To ensure that the results are robust, we exploit the US state-level variation in 
individualism. In the study by Hofstede (2001), the US is ranked highest on the individualism 
index. However, Vandello and Cohen (1999) show that US regions vary in the individualism 
versus collectivism measure. Vandello and Cohen (1999) note that the study of intra-nation 
variation in individualism versus collectivism provides more understanding to the study of 
individualism. Their study was based on an eight-itemised index where higher scores relate to 
higher collectivism and lower scores relate to higher individualism. The first three items relate 
to family structure and living arrangements and the next five items relate to social, political, 
religious and economic practices17. Jiang, Qian and Yonker (2018) and Yonker (2017) show 
that the state in which American CEOs were born impacts their corporate policies. In this 
section, we examine the impact of individualism at US state level on leverage and debt maturity 
structure for US born CEOs. Following Chen et al. (2015), we measure state individualism as 
minus one times the collectivism index, where a higher value indicates higher individualism, 
to make the interpretation consistent with that by Hofstede (2001). As in the previous analyses, 
we collect the birthplace, education, and work experience of the American born CEOs from 
Marquis Who’s Who biography online, NNDB, and corporate websites. The list of CEOs is 
from Compustat Execucomp. We exclude financial and utility firms. The sample consists of 
7,077-year observations from 2000 to 2017 for 1,222 unique domestic CEOs. Appendix Table 
H gives the state where the domestic CEOs in the sample were born.  
We estimate firm leverage on state individualism and control variables as in Table 2 to 
test whether firms managed by CEOs born in individualistic states in the US have higher 
 
17 See Vandello and Cohen (1999) for a detailed explanation of survey questions. 
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leverage. We report the results in Table 10. In Column (1), we estimate book leverage on state 
individualism controlling for firm and CEO characteristics. We find the coefficient on the state 
individualism is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. This suggests that firms 
managed by US CEOs born in individualistic states have higher leverage. This result is 
consistent with the results in Table 2 where we find a positive relationship between firm 
leverage and individualism for foreign CEOs. The results provide evidence supporting 
Vandello and Cohen (1999) about variation in US state individualism and collectivism. For 
robustness, we regress market leverage on state individualism in Column (2) and find 
consistent results. In Column (3), we control for state median leverage since the state in which 
the firm is located can also impact its leverage. We still find a positive relationship between 
state individualism and firm leverage. We control for state population and civilian labour force, 
which may correlate with state individualism in Column (4). The results remain positive and 
statistically significant. Therefore, the results in Table 10 provide further evidence of the 
impact of individualism on firm leverage.  
[Insert Table 10 here] 
4.4.2 State individualism and debt maturity  
Next, we examine debt maturity and state individualism and report the results in Table 
11. The main measure of debt maturity is the proportion of debt maturing with three years 
(ST3). In Column (1), we regress the proportion of debt maturing within three years on state 
individualism and control variables. The coefficient of state individualism is positive and 
statistically significant at the 5% level. This suggests that firms managed by CEOs born in US 
individualistic states have shorter debt maturity. This result is consistent with the results 
obtained for firms managed by foreign CEOs from individualistic countries. In Column (2), we 
control for CEOs’ and states’ characteristics, but the results remain the same. In Column (3), 
we regress the proportion of debt maturing within two years on state individualism. We find 
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the coefficient on state individualism is positive and statistically significant at 5%. Column (4) 
shows that the relationship between the proportion of debt maturing within five years and state 
individualism is insignificantly positive. Overall, the results in Table 11 indicate that firms 
managed by CEOs born in individualistic US states have shorter debt maturity, particularly 
debt maturing within three years. 
[Insert Table 11 here] 
4.5 Alternative explanation: -Herding behaviour of individualistic CEOs and leverage 
The positive relationship between individualism and firm leverage can be explained by 
herding behaviour of CEOs since managerial herding impacts CEOs’ decisions. For example, 
Scharfstein and Stein (1990) find that the reputational concerns of managers make them herd 
more by mimicking the investment behaviour of other managers. Tse and Tucker (2010) show 
that managers’ herding behaviour results in peer effects in timing their earnings warnings. 
Therefore, higher leverage for firms managed by individualistic CEOs can be because of 
industry peer effects since Frank and Goyal (2009) show that the industry median leverage is 
an important determinant of a firm’s leverage with a positive relationship. In this section, we 
provide evidence that our results are not driven by industry effects. Heine et al. (1999), 
Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov (2010), and Markus and Kitayama (1991) suggest that people 
from individualistic cultures are less vulnerable to social influence and, as such, are less likely 
to follow the opinions of others. Beckmann, Menkhoff and Suto (2008) find that asset managers 
from individualist culture show less herding behaviour. Chang and Lin (2015) document that 
investors in individualist cultures exhibit less herding behaviour in their trading. We predict 
that if individualism shows less herding behaviour, then the capital structure decisions of 
individualist CEOs are less likely to follow their industry peers. We test this prediction using 




We report the results on the herding behaviour of individualist CEOs on firm leverage 
in Table 12. In Column (1), we estimate the impact of individualism and industry median 
leverage on firm leverage. We find the individualism coefficient is positive and statistically 
significant, which is consistent with the initial results. We also find the coefficient on the 
industry median leverage is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. This is 
consistent with Frank and Goyal (2009) who show the industry median leverage is an important 
determinant of a firm’s leverage. When we interact individualism with the industry median 
leverage in Column (2), there is no significant relationship with firm leverage. This suggests 
that the leverage of firms managed by individualist CEOs does not have any significant 
relationship with their industry leverage. This result provides evidence of less herding 
behaviour by individualist CEOs and, therefore, the positive relationship between 
individualism and firm leverage is not explained by industry peer effects. 
[Insert Table 12 here] 
4.6 Impact of institutional block holders 
The tendency for individualist CEOs to impact the capital structure decisions of their 
firms can result in sub-optimal choices for the firm. This tendency for managers to imprint their 
preferences on the firm can be reduced through corporate governance mechanisms. For 
example, Agrawal and Mandelker (1990), Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) and Demsetz (1983) show that large institutional ownership in a firm leads to better 
monitoring of managers. We test whether the presence of institutional ownership reduces the 
impact of individualism on leverage. We obtain the data on institutional ownership from 
Thomson Reuters Institutional Holding (13F) data base. We use the two measures of 
institutional ownership as in Chen, Harford and Li (2007). These measures are ownership 
controlled by top 5 institutional investors and ownership controlled by block holders (defined 
as holdings by institutional investors with at least 5% of the shares). We then interact each of 
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these measures with individualism and examine the impact on firm leverage. The results are 
shown in Table 13. 
Table 13, Column (1) presents the results of the interaction of individualism and top 5 
institutional ownership. The interaction term is negative and statistically significant. This 
suggests that the presence of large institutional investors helps reduce the impact of 
individualism on a firm’s leverage. Column (2) gives the results of the interaction of block 
holders and individualism. The coefficient of the interaction term is negative and statistically 
significant at 5%. Overall, the results in Table 13 show that large institutional shareholders 
monitor individualistic CEOs. Their monitoring role reduces individualist CEOs’ tendency to 
imprint their preferences on capital structure. 
[Insert Table 13 here] 
5. Conclusion 
We study the impact of individualism on the capital structure decisions of firms 
managed by foreign CEOs. We argue that the values and preferences embedded in 
individualism could serve as an informal constraint on capital structure decisions of firms 
managed by individualist CEOs. We hypothesise that firms managed by foreign CEOs from 
individualistic cultures have high leverage. The hypothesis is based on the fact that 
individualism relates to risk taking behaviour and this could reduce the risk of debt financing. 
Also, people from individualistic cultures show less herding behaviour and, therefore, firms 
managed by individualistic CEOs’ capital structure may deviate from their industry peers. 
Furthermore, in individualistic cultures, the interest of the individual prevails over the interest 
of the group and this could impact the stakeholder theory of capital structure. Consistent with 
the prediction, we find that firms managed by foreign CEOs from individualistic cultures have 
higher leverage than firms managed by CEOs from collective cultures. We also find that firms 
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managed by individualist CEOs have a higher probability of issuing debt than equity and adjust 
their target leverage at faster than firms managed by foreign CEOs from collective cultures. 
We then examine the impact of individualism on the type of debt firms hold. We find 
that firms managed by individualist CEOs hold shorter debt maturity. We extend the study to 
US state level and find that firms managed by CEOs born in individualistic states have higher 
leverage and shorter debt maturity. Overall, this study provides evidence on the impact of 
CEOs’ cultural background on capital structure decisions. We use three instrumental variables 
and propensity score matching to test the robustness of our results because of CEO selection 
bias and find consistent results. 
Our study contributes to the capital structure literature by showing that CEOs cultural 
background should be considered in estimating regression models for a firm’s capital structure. 
The study also shows that, in addition to foreign executives’ international experience, their 
cultural background has a significant impact on capital structure. An implication from the 
results is the suggestion that, in appointing foreign executives, policy makers should not only 
consider their international experience but also their cultural background since cultural 
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Appendix Table A: Foreign CEOs’ nationality mix 
 
This table presents the nationality mix of CEOs in the sample. CEO nationality is obtained 
from Marquis Who’s Who database, NNDB and company websites. 
 
Nationality Frequency Percent Cum. Percent 
Argentine 13 1 1 
Australian 95 7.29 8.28 
Belgian 9 0.69 8.97 
Brazilian 8 0.61 9.59 
British 240 18.4 27.99 
Canadian 130 9.97 37.96 
Chinese 6 0.46 38.42 
Colombian 1 0.08 38.5 
Croatian 17 1.3 39.8 
Danish 32 2.45 42.25 
Dutch 31 2.38 44.63 
Egyptian 3 0.23 44.86 
Filipino 1 0.08 44.94 
French 52 3.99 48.93 
German 56 4.29 53.22 
Greek 20 1.53 54.75 
Hong Kong 14 1.07 55.83 
Indian 168 12.88 68.71 
Iranian 9 0.69 69.4 
Irish 37 2.84 72.24 
Israeli 44 3.37 75.61 
Italian 51 3.91 79.52 
Jamaican 5 0.38 79.91 
Kenyan 10 0.77 80.67 
Lebanese 14 1.07 81.75 
Malaysian 6 0.46 82.21 
Mexican 12 0.92 83.13 
New Zealander 17 1.3 84.43 
Norwegian 7 0.54 84.97 
Pakistani 10 0.77 85.74 
Russian 12 0.92 86.66 
South African 58 4.45 91.1 
Spanish 14 1.07 92.18 
Swedish 23 1.76 93.94 
Swiss 36 2.76 96.7 
Taiwanese 34 2.61 99.31 
Turkish 9 0.69 100 
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Appendix Table B: Variables definition 
Variable    Definition and data source(s)       
CEO age   Natural logarithm of age of the CEO. Source: Execucomp. 
CEO tenure Natural logarithm of the number of years the CEO has held the 
role in the firm. Source: Execucomp. 
Female CEO Dummy variable equals one for female CEOs (zero otherwise).  
Source: Execucomp. 
Chairman/CEO Dummy variable equals one if the CEO is the Chair of the Board 
(zero otherwise). Source: Execucomp. 
Founder CEO  Dummy equals one if the CEO is also a founder of the firm (zero 
otherwise). Source: Execucomp. 
Individualism   Relates to integration of individuals into groups. A higher score 
    indicates high degree of individualism. Source: Hofstede (2001). 
State individualism                 Minus one times the collectivism –individualism index of  
  Vandello & Cohen (1999).   
Firm size    Log of total assets of the firm. Source: Compustat. 
Book leverage Long term debt plus debt in current liabilities divided by the 
book value of total assets. Source: Compustat. 
Market leverage  Long term debt plus debt in current liabilities divided by market 
value market value of assets. Source: Compustat. 
Debt issue  Long term debt issuance (Compustat item DLTIS) minus long 
term debt reduction (DLTR) minus current debt changes 
(DLCCH)  for firms that report format codes 1 to 3 and DLTIS-
DLTR+DLCCH for firms reporting format code 7 scale by total 
assets. Source: Compustat. 
Debt issuer  Dummy equals one if debt issue is greater than or equal to 0.05 
(zero otherwise). 
Equity issue  Sale of common and preferred stock (Compustat item SSTK) 
minus purchase of common and preferred stock (PRSTKC). 
Source: Compustat. 
Short maturity debt (ST3) Debt in current liabilities (Compustat item DLC) plus debt 
maturating in second year (Compustat item DD2) plus debt 
maturing in third year (Compustat item DD3) scaled by total debt 
(Long term debt plus debt in current liabilities)   
Short maturity debt (ST2) Debt in current liabilities (Compustat item DLC) plus debt 
maturating in second year (Compustat item DD2) scaled by total 
debt. 
Short maturity debt (ST5) Debt in current liabilities (Compustat item DLC) plus debt 
maturating in second year  (Compustat item DD2) plus debt 
maturing in third year(Compustat item DD3) plus debt maturing 
in fourth year (DD4) plus debt maturing in fifth year (DD5) 




Cash holding Cash and marketable securities normalised by total asset. 
Source: Compustat. 
Abnormal earnings The ratio of the difference between the income before 
extraordinary items, adjusted for common or ordinary stock 
(capital) equivalents (IBADJ) for time t and t-1 over the market 
                                    value of equity used to calculate earnings per share  
                                    (PRCC_F x CSHPRI). Source: Compustat. 
Assets volatility   Standard deviation of the stock return during the fiscal year 
    times market value of equity (CSHO x PRCC_F) divided by 
    market value of assets (AT+CSHOxPRCC_F-CEQ). Source: 
    Compustat 
Assets  maturity Ratio of property, plant and equipment (PPEGT) over 
depreciation and amortization (DP) times the proportion of 
property , plant and equipment in total assets(PPEGT/AT, plus 
the ratio of current assets (ACT) over the cost of goods sold 
(COGS) times the proportion of current assets in total assets 
(ACT/AT). Source: Compustat.  
Capital expenditures  Firm capital expenditure divided by book value of asset.  
    Source: Compustat. 
R&D expenditure  Firm R&D expenditure divided by total assets.  
    Source: Compustat. 
Market-to -book Ratio of market value of assets (AT+CSHOxPRCC_F) to total 
assets (AT) Source: CRSP and Compustat. 
Return on equity Net income divided by total equity. Source: Compustat. 
Tangible assets    Property, plant and equipment divided by book value of assets. 
Source: Compustat. 
Profit Net income divided by total assets. Source: Compustat. 
Term structure  The difference between the yield on 10-year government bond 
and the yield on 6-month government bond. Source: Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
Creditor rights  The extent to which creditors are protected in a country. High 
scores indicate better protection. Source: Djankov, McLiesh and 
Shleifer (2007). 
S-allele Country level measure of genetic variation in the serotonin 
transporter gene (SLC6A4). Source: Nash and Patel (2019). 
G-allele Country-level measure of the genetic variation in a μ-opioid 
receptor gene. Source: Nash and Patel (2019). 
Pathogens Country-level measure of the relative presence of pathogens in 
local ecology. Source :(Nash & Patel 2019) 
GDP growth  Annual growth of GDP of foreign CEO country of origin: World 
Bank. 
Top 5  Ownership controlled by five largest institutional shareholders. 
Block holder Holding by institutions with at least 5% shares. 
Overconfidence  Dummy equals one if a CEO holds stocks that are more than 67% 
in the money (zero otherwise). The measure follows Campbell 
et al. (2011). 
State population Population of the state in which an American CEO was born. 
Source: US Census Bureau American Community Survey. 
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State civilian labor force Civilian labor force of the state in which an American CEO was 
born. Source: US Census Bureau American Community Survey. 
High individualism Dummy equals one if the individualism score is greater than the 
median score in the sample (zero otherwise).  
Uncertainty avoidance The extent to which people feel uncomfortable with uncertainty 





Appendix Table C: interaction of female CEOs with individualism 
This table presents the results of the interaction of individualism with female CEOs on firm 
leverage. 
   
  (1) (2) 
Individualism 0.0646*** 0.0230*** 
 (2.9476) (2.6015) 
Female CEO 0.1135 0.1741 
 (1.1788) (1.5920) 
Individualism*Female CEO  -0.3369*** 
  (-3.2236) 
Firm Size  0.0253*** 0.0256*** 
 (8.1889) (8.1607) 
Market-to-book -0.0004 -0.0002 
 (-0.0538) (-0.0229) 
Tangible assets 0.0025 0.0019 
 (0.0601) (0.0455) 
R&D expenditure  -0.3232*** -0.3014*** 
 (-2.8437) (-2.6465) 
Capital expenditure  0.1384 0.1352 
 (0.8020) (0.7902) 
Profit  -0.2511*** -0.2484*** 
 (-3.4376) (-3.4519) 
Cash holdings -0.0630 -0.0725* 
 (-1.5004) (-1.7735) 
Industry median leverage 0.7545*** 0.7492*** 
 (14.1543) (14.0200) 
CEO age -0.0059 -0.0116 
 (-0.2607) (-0.5292) 
CEO tenure  -0.0111* -0.0115* 
 (-1.6704) (-1.7073) 
Founder CEO  -0.0256 -0.0248 
 (-1.3091) (-1.2603) 
Chairman/CEO 0.0143 0.0131 
 (1.5186) (1.3775) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 1,284 1,284 










Appendix Table D: OLS regression of residual from the regression of overconfidence on 
individualism and leverage 
This table presents the results of the residuals from the regression of overconfidence on 
individualism on firm leverage. 
 Leverage 
Residual from regression of overconfidence on individualism 0.0790*** 
 (3.0117) 




R&D expenditure  -0.1519 
 (-1.3533) 
Firm profit  -0.2753*** 
 (-3.5251) 
Tangible assets -0.0225 
 (-0.4615) 
Capital expenditure 0.1033 
 (0.5283) 
Cash holdings -0.1294*** 
 (-3.0859) 
Industry median leverage 0.6753*** 
 (11.1601) 
CEO age  -0.0085 
 (-0.3454) 
CEO tenure  -0.0014 
 (-0.1977) 




Year fixed effects Yes 

















∗ =  𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡−1  + 𝑉𝑖                                                               (2)  
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 − 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡−1   =   λ(𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡
∗ - 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡−1) + ∈𝑖𝑗𝑡 .                                  (3)       
Substitute (2) into (3):  
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 − 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡−1   =   λ (𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡−1  + 𝑉𝑖  - 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡−1) + ∈𝑖𝑗𝑡. 
Opening the bracket:  
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 − 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡−1   =   λ𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡−1  +  λ𝑉𝑖  -  λ𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡−1    + ∈𝑖𝑗𝑡. 
Grouping like terms: 
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  (λ𝛽)𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡−1     -  λ𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡−1     +  λ𝑉𝑖 + ∈𝑖𝑗𝑡. 
































Appendix Table F 
Determinants of individualist CEOs  
This table reports the determinants of individualistic CEOs. The dependent variable is a 
dummy which equals one if the individualism score is greater than the median score in the 
sample (zero otherwise). We include year and industry fixed effects in the model, but 
coefficients are not reported. All variables are defined in Appendix B. The z-statistics are in 













 High individualism 




R&D expenditure  2.9404*** 
 (3.6645) 
Capital expenditure  -0.2752 
 (-0.2574) 
CEO age  -0.7346*** 
 (-3.7724) 
CEO tenure  0.2665*** 
 (4.9472) 
Year fixed effect  Yes  
Industry fixed effect  Yes  
Observations 1,198 




Appendix Table G:  Individualism and firm leverage, control for uncertainty avoidance 
This table presents the results of the impact of individualism on firm leverage controlling for 




Uncertainty avoidance  0.0029 
 (0.1094) 




R&D expenditure  -0.2139** 
 (-1.9658) 
Firm profit  -0.2394*** 
 (-3.4049) 
Tangible assets 0.0221 
 (0.6526) 
Cash holdings  -0.1114*** 
 (-2.7963) 
Industry median leverage  0.7125*** 
 (13.7527) 
CEO age  -0.0305 
 (-1.3283) 
CEO tenure  -0.0043 
 (-0.6557) 




Female CEO 0.1161 
 (1.1134) 
MBA  -0.0029 
 (-0.2784) 
Ivy League education -0.0323 
 (-1.2662) 
Military experience  0.3760*** 
 (3.4130) 
Year fixed effects Yes 












Appendix Table H: States included in the study for American born CEOs 
 





Alabama 51 0.72 51 0.72 
Arkansas 82 1.16 133 1.88 
Arizona 38 0.54 171 2.42 
California 371 5.24 542 7.66 
Colorado 50 0.71 592 8.37 
Connecticut 72 1.02 664 9.38 
Delaware 14 0.2 678 9.58 
Florida 114 1.61 792 11.19 
Georgia 130 1.84 922 13.03 
Hawaii 1 0.01 923 13.04 
Idaho 21 0.3 944 13.34 
Illinois 422 5.96 1366 19.3 
Indiana 252 3.56 1618 22.86 
Iowa 226 3.19 1844 26.06 
Kansas 105 1.48 1949 27.54 
Kentucky 143 2.02 2092 29.56 
Louisiana 104 1.47 2196 31.03 
Maine 29 0.41 2225 31.44 
Maryland 110 1.55 2335 32.99 
Massachusetts 382 5.4 2717 38.39 
Michigan 216 3.05 2933 41.44 
Minnesota 176 2.49 3109 43.93 
Mississippi 85 1.2 3194 45.13 
Missouri 141 1.99 3335 47.12 
Montana 42 0.59 3377 47.72 
Nebraska 88 1.24 3465 48.96 
Nevada 36 0.51 3501 49.47 
New Hampshire 55 0.78 3556 50.25 
New Jersey 290 4.1 3846 54.35 
New Mexico 35 0.49 3881 54.84 
New York 967 13.66 4848 68.5 
North Carolina 132 1.87 4980 70.37 
North Dakota 43 0.61 5023 70.98 
Ohio 296 4.18 5319 75.16 
Oklahoma 113 1.6 5432 76.76 
Oregon 57 0.81 5489 77.56 
Pennsylvania 373 5.27 5862 82.83 
South Dakota 55 0.78 5917 83.61 
Tennessee 151 2.13 6068 85.74 
Texas 331 4.68 6399 90.42 
Utah 93 1.31 6492 91.73 
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Vermont 11 0.16 6503 91.89 
Virginia 153 2.16 6656 94.05 
Washington 189 2.67 6845 96.72 
West Virginia 19 0.27 6864 96.99 
Wisconsin 204 2.88 7068 99.87 







 Table 1 
Summary statistics  
This table presents the summary statistics for the study’s sample. Panel A reports the summary statistics of CEOs’ characteristics. Firm 
characteristics are presented in Panel B and a summary of dependent variables is shown in Panel C. Data on CEOs’ characteristics are from 
Marquis Who’s Who database, NNDB and company websites. Firm level data are from Compustat and CRSP. The individualism measure is from 
Hofstede (2001) and Hofstede, Hofstede & Minkov (2010). All variables are defined in Appendix Table B. 
 
Variable No. obs. Mean Median Std dev. Min Max 
Panel A: CEO characteristics              
CEO age  1304 63.035 63 7.746 42 87 
CEO tenure  1304 6.141 4.05 6.077 0 32.8 
Female CEO  1304 0.005 0 0.068 0 1 
Chairman/CEO 1304 0.541 1 0.499 0 1 
Founder CEO  1304 0.091 0 0.288 0 1 
MBA 1304 0.309 0 0.462 0 1 
Individualism 1304 0.665 0.710 0.209 0.130 0.90 
Panel B: Firm characteristics          
Firm size ($Mil) 1304 8939.5 2089.3 23605.5 10.2 284421 
Market-to-book 1303 1.667 1.329 1.232 0.051 7.080 
Cash holdings 1304 0.211 0.151 0.186 0.001 0.754 
R&D expenditure 1304 0.053 0.028 0.065 0 0.259 
Tangible asset 1304 0.206 0.159 0.182 0.002 0.864 
Firm profit  1304 0.039 0.057 0.111 -0.404 0.273 
Capital expenditure 1304 0.040 0.030 0.039 0 0.230 
Panel C: Dependent variables         
Book leverage  1300 0.206 0.197 0.167 0 0.820 
Market leverage  1300 0.123 0.098 0.115 0 0.616 
Debt issuer book value 1304 0.196 0 0.397 0 1 
Debt issuer market value 1304 0.123 0 0.328 0 1 
Equity issue 1304 0.060 0 0.237 0 1 




Individualism and firm leverage 
This table presents OLS results of the impact of individualism on firm leverage. Firm 
leverage is measured by the sum of long term debt and debt in current liabilities over assets. 
Individualism is the individualism cultural dimension of Hofstede (2001). Column (1) 
presents result of only individualism on book leverage, where book leverage is firm 
leverage scaled by total assets. We control firm characteristics in Column (2). Industry 
median leverage is included in Column (3). We include CEO characteristics in column (4). 
We present the results of individualism on market leverage in Column (5), where market 
leverage is firm leverage scaled by market value of assets. We include year and two digit 
SIC industry fixed effects in all the models, but coefficients are not reported. All variables 
are defined in Appendix Table B. The t-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for 
heteroscedasticity and firm clustering. The symbols ***, ** and * denote significance level 
at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
  
    Book leverage    Market leverage  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Individualism 0.0728*** 0.0451** 0.0538** 0.0561*** 0.0315** 
 (2.9963) (2.0071) (2.5226) (2.6505) (2.3411) 
Firm size   0.0324*** 0.0288*** 0.0232*** 0.0105*** 
  (11.6413) (10.8350) (7.4907) (5.8587) 
Market-to-book  0.0028 0.0003 -0.0016 -0.0339*** 
  (0.3908) (0.0413) (-0.2270) (-12.2269) 
R&D expenditure   -0.3467*** -0.2922*** -0.2199** -0.2382*** 
  (-3.1751) (-2.8292) (-2.0174) (-4.1552) 
Profit   -0.3564*** -0.2645*** -0.2410*** -0.1806*** 
  (-4.8143) (-3.6037) (-3.3784) (-5.9753) 
Tangible assets  0.0122 -0.0181 -0.0054 0.0518** 
  (0.2700) (-0.4282) (-0.1315) (2.0597) 
Capital expenditure  0.0898 0.1319 0.1646 0.0270 
  (0.4943) (0.7650) (0.9986) (0.3056) 
Cash holding   -0.0890** -0.0803* -0.1098*** -0.0484** 
  (-2.0549) (-1.9468) (-2.8183) (-2.4783) 
Industry median leverage   0.7606*** 0.7137*** 0.4368*** 
   (14.5338) (13.8011) (12.4196) 
CEO age    -0.0293 -0.0254** 
    (-1.2896) (-2.2881) 
CEO tenure     -0.0039 0.0010 
    (-0.6033) (0.2894) 
Female CEO    0.1176 -0.0052 
    (1.1284) (-0.1537) 
Founder CEO    -0.0565*** -0.0331*** 
    (-3.4865) (-3.4133) 
Chairman/CEO    0.0120 -0.0002 
    (1.2567) (-0.0308) 
MBA     -0.0031 -0.0072 
    (-0.3087) (-1.2655) 
Ivy League education    -0.0335 -0.0003 
    (-1.3130) (-0.0212) 
Military experience     0.3777*** 0.0987*** 
    (3.4718) (3.3132) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,300 1,299 1,299 1,284 1,284 






The impact of creditor rights on individualism and firm leverage 
This table presents OLS results of the impact of individualism on firm leverage considering 
creditor rights. Firm leverage is measured as the sum of long term debt and debt in current 
liabilities over book value of assets. Individualism is the individualism cultural dimension of 
Hofstede (2001). Creditor rights are the creditor rights score obtained from Djankov, McLiesh 
and Shleifer (2007). Column (1) presents result of individualism controlling for creditor rights on 
book leverage, where book leverage is firm leverage scaled by total assets. We control for GDP 
growth in Column (2). Firm characteristics are included in Column (3). We control for CEO 
characteristics in Column (4), where market leverage is firm leverage scaled by market value of 
assets. In Column (5), we interact   individualism with creditor right. We include year and two 
digit SIC industry fixed effects in all the models, but coefficients are not reported. All variables 
are defined in Appendix Table B. The t-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for heteroscedasticity 
and firm clustering. The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively. 
      
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Individualism 0.1021*** 0.1259*** 0.1009*** 0.1186*** 0.0494 
 (3.8379) (3.7509) (3.7465) (4.3990) (1.4797) 
Creditor rights -0.0130*** -0.0152*** -0.0105** -0.0114*** -0.0248*** 
 (-2.7386) (-3.1411) (-2.4406) (-2.6584) (-3.9877) 
GDP growth  0.0013 0.0010 0.0011 0.0014 
  (0.7007) (0.6214) (0.6723) (0.8580) 
Individualism*Creditor rights     0.0642*** 
     (3.2870) 
Firm size    0.0286*** 0.0241*** 0.0235*** 
   (10.6317) (7.6591) (7.5199) 
Market-to-book   0.0012 0.0003 0.0009 
   (0.1695) (0.0469) (0.1260) 
R&D expenditure    -0.2828*** -0.2977*** -0.2844** 
   (-2.6833) (-2.6392) (-2.5429) 
Profit    -0.2602*** -0.2427*** -0.2456*** 
   (-3.4895) (-3.3003) (-3.4044) 
Tangible assets   0.0043 0.0232 0.0214 
   (0.0969) (0.5283) (0.4983) 
Capital expenditure   0.0893 0.0944 0.0332 
   (0.5205) (0.5489) (0.1958) 
Cash holdings    -0.0653 -0.0473 -0.0647 
   (-1.5740) (-1.1184) (-1.5370) 
Industry median leverage   0.7761*** 0.7800*** 0.7806*** 
   (14.7807) (14.4534) (14.5010) 
CEO age     0.0068 0.0102 
    (0.2987) (0.4447) 
CEO tenure     -0.0128* -0.0151** 
    (-1.8470) (-2.1485) 
Founder CEO    -0.0335* -0.0266 
    (-1.6834) (-1.3224) 
Chairman/CEO    0.0162* 0.0154 
    (1.6576) (1.5833) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,300 1,249 1,248 1,233 1,233 







Individualism and security issuance 
This table presents the marginal effects of logit regression of the impact of individualism 
on debt issuance. Debt issuance is measured as: Long term debt issuance (Compustat item 
DLTIS) minus long term debt reduction (DLTR) plus current debt changes (DLCCH). Debt 
issuer is a dummy for one and zero otherwise if debt issuance scaled by total assets is 
greater than 0.05 or debt issuance scaled by market value of assets is greater than to 0.03. 
Individualism is the individualism cultural dimension of Hofstede (2001). Column (1) is 
the marginal effect of individualism on debt issuer scaled by total assets. Column (2) shows 
the result of debt issuance scaled by market value of assets. Column (3) is the marginal 
effect of individualism on change in book leverage in book leverage from year t-1 to year 
t. Column (4) is the marginal effect of individualism on equity issuance. Equity issuance is 
measured as: sale of common and preferred stock (Compustat item SSTK) minus purchase 
of common and preferred stock (PRSTKC). We include year and two digit SIC industry 
fixed effects in all the models, but coefficients are not reported. All variables are defined 
in Appendix Table B. The t-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and 
firm clustering. The symbols ***, ** and, * denote significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively. 
   Debt issue    Equity issue 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Individualism 0.0178** 0.0147** 0.0175** -0.0990** 
 (2.1794) (2.0146) (2.0303) (-1.9735) 
Firm size  0.0114 -0.0047 0.0151* -0.0239*** 
 (1.2755) (-0.6766) (1.7449) (-3.1570) 
Market-to-book -0.0108 -0.0780*** -0.0234* 0.0101 
 (-0.8956) (-4.4543) (-1.8455) (1.6441) 
R&D expenditure  -0.4902* -0.5143** -1.2564*** -0.0137 
 (-1.7569) (-2.3219) (-4.0323) (-0.0938) 
Profit  -0.1562 0.0162 -0.6000*** -0.3217*** 
 (-1.1514) (0.1446) (-5.0305) (-4.4530) 
Tangible assets -0.1382 -0.1558 -0.1282 0.1696** 
 (-0.9847) (-1.4374) (-0.9847) (2.3529) 
Capital expenditure  1.6748*** 1.2985*** 1.0641** 0.1739 
 (3.9681) (3.5295) (2.4936) (0.6638) 
Cash holdings -0.0046 0.1230 0.2296** -0.0421 
 (-0.0483) (1.5350) (2.5003) (-0.7842) 
Industry median leverage 1.0776*** 0.8576*** 1.6380*** -0.4655*** 
 (4.9153) (4.5618) (7.1858) (-3.6093) 
CEO age  -0.0756 -0.0845* -0.0112 -0.1320 
 (-1.4007) (-1.7490) (-0.2067) (-1.5666) 
CEO tenure  0.0149 0.0045 0.0016 -0.0076 
 (0.8879) (0.3151) (0.0993) (-0.7432) 
Founder CEO -0.0055 0.0032 0.0013 -0.0609* 
 (-0.1243) (0.0805) (0.0273) (-1.7113) 
Chairman/CEO 0.0484* 0.0163 0.0042 -0.0583*** 
 (1.7204) (0.6711) (0.1525) (-3.0540) 
Creditor rights  -0.0087 0.0002 -0.0051 0.0135* 
 (-0.7738) (0.0162) (-0.4748) (1.9542) 
GDP growth 0.0110** 0.0036 0.0062 -0.0009 
 (2.2764) (0.8383) (1.2586) (-0.2594) 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 1,209 1,165 1,051 1,006 





Individualism and speed of adjustment  
This table presents the results of the partial adjustment model with firm fixed effects as in 
Flannery and Rangan (2006). Firms are grouped into high individualism if the CEO’s country 
score for individualism is above the median score in the sample and low individualism if the 
CEO’s country score is below the median score. The dependent variable is book leverage defined 
as long term debt plus debt in current liabilities scaled by total assets. Individualism is the 
individualism cultural dimension of Hofstede (2001). Columns (1) and (3) are estimated using 
Blundell & Bond (1998) method.  Columns (2) and (4) present the results using the least squares 
dependent variables estimator. We include year fixed effect in all models.  All variables are 
defined in Appendix Table B. The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance level at 1%, 5%, 
and 10% respectively. 
 
  High individualism   Low individualism   
 BB LSDVC BB LSDVC 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lag leverage  0.7034*** 0.6597*** 0.7392*** 0.7192*** 
 (6.9571) (15.7208) (10.9805) (14.6115) 
Firm size  0.1058** 0.0082 0.1387*** 0.0495*** 
 (2.1031) (0.5825) (3.7835) (3.1916) 
Market-to-book -0.0126* -0.0157*** -0.0159 -0.0117* 
 (-1.8650) (-2.6284) (-1.5657) (-1.8524) 
R&D expenditure  -0.2960 -0.0194 0.3236 0.0097 
 (-0.9747) (-0.0954) (1.0371) (0.0496) 
Profit -0.3291*** -0.1748*** -0.2828*** -0.1159* 
 (-3.6516) (-3.9108) (-4.1708) (-1.8356) 
Capital expenditure  0.3147* 0.2436 0.1020 0.2092 
 (1.8760) (1.5562) (0.6156) (1.2022) 
Industry median leverage  0.5931*** 0.4145*** 0.4686*** 0.3980*** 
 (5.3964) (6.9710) (4.8569) (5.7380) 
Cash holdings  0.1203 -0.0278 0.0195 0.0459 
 (1.3591) (-0.5721) (0.2366) (0.9406) 
CEO age 0.0257 0.0255 -0.0133 -0.0483 
 (0.7026) (0.1759) (-0.1813) (-0.5022) 
CEO tenure  -0.0044 0.0089 -0.0011 0.0054 
 (-0.5130) (0.7356) (-0.1193) (0.5966) 
Observations 533 536 490 494 
Number of firms 94 94 88 88 




Individualism and debt maturity 
This table presents the results of the impact of individualism on debt maturity. We measure 
short debt maturity (ST3) as the proportion of debt maturing within year three. Individualism 
is the individualism cultural dimension of Hofstede (2001). Column (1) include firm 
characteristics. Column (2) include CEO characteristics. We present the results of 
individualism on proportion of debt maturing in year two (ST2) in Column (3). Column (4) is 
the OLS results of individualism on the proportion of debt maturing in year five (ST5). We 
show the Tobit regression result of individualism on ST3 in Column (5). We include year and 
two digit SIC industry fixed effects in all the models, but coefficients are not reported. All 
variables are defined in Appendix Table B. The t-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for 
heteroscedasticity and firm clustering. The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance level at 
1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
 ST3 ST3 ST2 ST5 ST3 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Individualism 0.0147** 0.0290*** 0.0173** 0.0495*** 0.0275*** 
 (2.5085) (3.3706) (2.2296) (5.6338) (2.7227) 
Firm size  -0.4486*** -0.4354*** -0.4477*** -0.2834*** -0.3493*** 
 (-7.8859) (-7.4780) (-7.8517) (-5.0881) (-6.7028) 
Firm size squared 0.0245*** 0.0235*** 0.0249*** 0.0133*** 0.0184*** 
 (7.2167) (6.7768) (7.3984) (4.0513) (6.0650) 
Market-to-book 0.0029 0.0075 0.0072 -0.0216* 0.0098 
 (0.2591) (0.6794) (0.6881) (-1.9526) (0.9548) 
R&D expenditure 0.3990* 0.4670* 0.5428** 0.2662 0.8220*** 
 (1.8262) (1.9076) (2.2300) (1.0842) (3.1794) 
Abnormal earnings  -0.0139*** -0.0143*** -0.0149*** -0.0071 -0.0134*** 
 (-2.7990) (-2.9698) (-2.8199) (-1.5478) (-3.0525) 
Leverage -0.4922*** -0.5031*** -0.5038*** -0.2690*** -0.5346*** 
 (-6.2462) (-6.3937) (-6.6047) (-3.0399) (-7.4579) 
Asset maturity 0.0011 0.0006 0.0005 -0.0010 0.0014 
 (0.6838) (0.3673) (0.3245) (-0.5114) (0.8702) 
Asset volatility -0.1723* -0.1928** -0.1225 0.0467 -0.1887** 
 (-1.8918) (-1.9937) (-1.2990) (0.4864) (-2.2563) 
Term structure  0.1166** 0.1223** 0.0444 0.1200** 0.1356*** 
 (2.1335) (2.1742) (0.8735) (2.2723) (2.6426) 
CEO age   0.0550 0.0463 0.0951* -0.0378 
  (1.0878) (0.9646) (1.7633) (-0.7463) 
CEO tenure   -0.0376** -0.0335** -0.0227 -0.0270* 
  (-2.5182) (-2.3787) (-1.4727) (-1.9622) 
Chairman/CEO  0.0444* 0.0357* 0.0609** 0.0237 
  (1.8827) (1.7203) (2.4939) (1.0514) 
Founder CEO  0.0755* 0.1004** 0.0379 0.0497 
  (1.6497) (2.3011) (0.8615) (1.1131) 
Creditor right   -0.0102 -0.0047 -0.0322*** -0.0051 
  (-0.9853) (-0.5033) (-2.9743) (-0.5372) 
GPD growth  0.0034 0.0009 0.0163*** -0.0001 
  (0.8372) (0.2367) (3.9459) (-0.0232) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,062 1,015 1,015 1,015 1,015 




Propensity score matching  
The table presents the impact of individualism on book leverage and market leverage based on 
propensity scores. The treated variable is high individualism which equals one if the 
individualism score is above the median score in the sample and zero otherwise. The average 

































Difference S.E. t-stat 
Book leverage Unmatched 0.219 0.184 0.035 0.009 3.77*** 
  ATT 0.211 0.173 0.038 0.014 2.77** 
Market 
leverage  Unmatched 0.126 0.113 0.013 0.006 2.13** 
  ATT 0.137 0.113 0.024 0.011 2.26** 
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                 Table 8 
Endogeneity: The instrumental variable approach  
This table reports the two stage least squares regression using instrument variables for individualism. Column (1) is the first stage results using 
the S-allele as the IV. Column (2) is the second stage of the regression for leverage. Column (3) is the first stage results for a combination of S-
allele and prevalence of pathogens as IVs. Column (4) is the second stage of the regression for leverage. Column (5) is the first stage results 
using G-allele as the IV. Column (6) is the second stage for leverage. Column (7) is the first stage using a combination of the g-allele and 
pathogens as IVs. Column (8) is the second stage results for leverage. Column (9) is the first stage results using pathogen as the IV. Column 
(10) is the second stage results for leverage. We include year and industry fixed effects in all the models, but coefficients are not reported. All 
variables are defined in Appendix Table B. The t-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and firm clustering. We report the 
first stage Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistics and the Stock–Yogo weak ID test critical values for the Craig-Donald Wald F-statistics. The symbols 
***, **, and * denote significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 
S-allele Leverage S-allele+pathogens Leverage G-allele Leverage G-allele+pathogens Leverage Pathogens Leverage 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
S-allele -0.0101***  -0.0046***        
 (-10.9632)  (-5.2131)        
Pathogens   -0.1094***    -0.0008  -0.1697***  
   (-12.6089)    (-0.1281)  (-31.3659)  
G-allele     -2.4798***  -2.4731***    
     (-38.2772)  (-30.7962)    
Individualism  0.2298***  0.2225***  0.1607***  0.0718**  0.1278*** 
  (2.9983)  (3.8136)  (2.9173)  (2.3147)  (3.7296) 
Firm size  0.0045* 0.0260*** 0.0151*** 0.0260*** 0.0151*** 0.0229*** 0.0150*** 0.0227*** 0.0077** 0.0246*** 
 (1.6524) (7.7805) (5.4586) (7.8052) (5.4586) (6.4536) (5.3745) (6.4366) (2.1381) (8.0223) 
Market -to-book 0.0076** 0.0031 0.0145*** 0.0031 0.0145*** 0.0057 0.0146*** 0.0038 0.0184*** -0.0008 
 (2.0425) (0.7549) (4.7386) (0.7591) (4.7386) (1.3494) (4.7020) (0.9094) (4.4705) (-0.2173) 
R&D expenditure  0.2022** -0.3178*** 0.2162*** -0.3170*** 0.2162*** -0.2820*** 0.2164*** -0.2697*** 0.5329*** -0.4223*** 
 (2.4531) (-3.1242) (2.8897) (-3.1225) (2.8897) (-2.7881) (2.8915) (-2.7361) (4.9328) (-4.5802) 
Profit  -0.0338 -0.2994*** 0.0181 -0.3000*** 0.0181 -0.3006*** 0.0183 -0.2977*** 0.0921* -0.2699*** 
 (-0.7454) (-6.0749) (0.5042) (-6.1150) (0.5042) (-5.8506) (0.5070) (-6.0581) (1.9201) (-6.1886) 
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Tangible assets -0.0610 -0.0632 -0.0775** -0.0636 -0.0775** -0.0752 -0.0769* -0.0800 -0.0034 0.0063 
 (-1.5055) (-1.3151) (-2.0014) (-1.3264) (-2.0014) (-1.4861) (-1.9286) (-1.5939) (-0.0734) (0.1377) 
Cash holdings  -0.0697** -0.0769** -0.0727*** -0.0777** -0.0727*** -0.1291*** -0.0725*** -0.1515*** -0.1978*** -0.0337 
 (-2.3508) (-2.3211) (-2.8309) (-2.3833) (-2.8309) (-3.6657) (-2.7928) (-4.6407) (-5.9729) (-1.1193) 
capital expenditure 0.0911 0.1503 -0.3810** 0.1513 -0.3810** 0.1134 -0.3819** 0.1142 -0.3591** 0.0777 
 (0.6541) (0.9219) (-2.3148) (0.9294) (-2.3148) (0.6514) (-2.2923) (0.6621) (-2.0605) (0.4918) 
Industry median leverage  -0.0336 0.7234*** 0.0012 0.7227*** 0.0012 0.6953*** 0.0014 0.6866*** -0.0171 0.7496*** 
 (-0.6867) (10.6591) (0.0244) (10.6851) (0.0244) (10.0428) (0.0281) (10.0296) (-0.2998) (12.7486) 
CEO age  -0.1016*** -0.0355 -0.0674*** -0.0363* -0.0674*** -0.0313 -0.0674*** -0.0486** -0.0615*** 0.0022 
 (-4.8073) (-1.5743) (-4.0545) (-1.6540) (-4.0545) (-1.4514) (-4.0244) (-2.3622) (-2.9250) (0.1186) 
CEO tenure  0.0282*** -0.0125* 0.0179*** -0.0122* 0.0179*** -0.0012 0.0178*** -0.0010 0.0181*** -0.0138** 
 (4.8874) (-1.9252) (3.6923) (-1.9514) (3.6923) (-0.1972) (3.6750) (-0.1665) (3.0031) (-2.5425) 
Founder CEO  0.0096 -0.0715*** 0.0005 -0.0715*** 0.0005 -0.0861*** 0.0006 -0.0789*** 0.0123 -0.0293* 
 (0.5206) (-3.8604) (0.0521) (-3.8615) (0.0521) (-5.1012) (0.0580) (-4.8456) (0.6269) (-1.9353) 
Chairman/CEO -0.0262*** 0.0059 -0.0352*** 0.0056 -0.0352*** 0.0059 -0.0351*** 0.0054 -0.0492*** 0.0190** 
 (-2.6545) (0.5640) (-4.0278) (0.5467) (-4.0278) (0.5554) (-3.9970) (0.5274) (-4.8483) (2.0618) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CragG-donal Wald F-stat 254.167  277.658  1710.279  854.27  757.849  
10% maximal Iv  19.93 19.93 19.93 19.93 19.93 19.93 19.93 19.93 19.93 
15% maximal IV  11.59 11.59 11.59 11.59 11.59 11.59 11.59 11.59 11.59 
Over identification p-value   0.8837    0.2869    
Observations 932 932 932 932 959 959 993 993 1,255 1,255 










Endogeneity: The instrumental variable approach for short debt maturity  
This table reports the two stage least squares regression for short debt maturity using the G-
allele and S-allele as instruments for individualism. Column (1) is the first stage results for the 
S-allele. Column (2) is the second stage result of individualism on ST3. Column (3) is the first 
stage result for the G-allele. Column (4) is the second stage results for ST3. We include year 
and industry fixed effects in all the models, but coefficients are not reported. All variables are 
defined in Appendix Table B. The t-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for heteroscedasticity 
and firm clustering. We report the first stage Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistics and the Stock –
Yogo weak ID test critical values for the Craig-Donald Wald F-statistics.  The symbols ***, 
**, and * denote significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
 First stage 2nd stage First stage 2nd stage 
S-allele short debt maturity G-allele short debt maturity 
          
S-allele -0.0105***    
 (-11.1976)    
G-allele   -1.8380***  
   (-19.3043)  
Individualism  0.0806***  0.0642*** 
  (3.0965)  (3.9186) 
Firm size  -0.0449** -0.4107*** -0.0557*** -0.3515*** 
 (-2.2427) (-7.1204) (-4.0039) (-6.0433) 
Firm size squared 0.0030** 0.0213*** 0.0038*** 0.0176*** 
 (2.4455) (6.0002) (4.5992) (4.9408) 
Market-to-book 0.0031 -0.0023 -0.0031 0.0109 
 (0.9697) (-0.2161) (-1.1713) (1.0439) 
R&D expenditure 0.1110 0.4646* -0.0260 0.4174* 
 (1.5831) (1.9137) (-0.3750) (1.8070) 
Abnormal earnings 0.0024 -0.0162 0.0021** -0.0126 
 (1.5545) (-1.5664) (2.1090) (-1.1242) 
Asset maturity 0.0005 0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0003 
 (0.9046) (0.1210) (-0.4727) (-0.1674) 
Asset volatility 0.0029 -0.2283** 0.0390 -0.1333 
 (0.1016) (-2.3799) (1.6379) (-1.3400) 
Leverage 0.0613** -0.5696*** 0.0917*** -0.6192*** 
 (2.4520) (-6.4171) (4.2543) (-7.6095) 
CEO age -0.1037*** 0.0612 -0.0656*** 0.0593 
 (-4.5251) (0.8941) (-4.0647) (1.0949) 
CEO tenure  0.0272*** -0.0551*** 0.0147*** -0.0555*** 
 (4.4785) (-3.3437) (3.4880) (-3.6341) 
Chairman/CEO -0.0210** 0.0951*** -0.0226*** 0.0792*** 
 (-2.1180) (3.5542) (-2.8290) (3.0883) 
Founder CEO 0.0046 0.1279** 0.0128 0.0497 
 (0.2458) (2.2870) (1.1175) (1.0650) 
Creditor right 0.0645*** -0.0679*** 0.0397*** -0.0325*** 
 (15.7222) (-3.0783) (13.9441) (-2.6177) 
GDP growth -0.0090*** 0.0076 -0.0137*** 0.0151* 
164 
 
 (-2.9408) (0.9986) (-4.1166) (1.8581) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cragg-Donald F-stat 124.159  504.338  
10% maximal IV 16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38 
15% maximal IV 8.96 8.96 8.96 8.96 
Observations 762 762 795 795 










































State individualism and firm leverage 
This table presents OLS results of the impact of state individualism on firm leverage. Firm 
leverage is measured as the sum of long term debt and debt in current liabilities. State 
individualism is the individualism cultural dimension of Vandello and Cohen (1999). Column 
(1) presents the results of state individualism on book leverage, where book leverage is firm 
leverage scaled by total assets. We present the results for market leverage in Column (2). State 
in which the firm is headquartered median leverage is included in Column (3). We include state 
population and civilian labour force in Column (4). We include year and two digits SIC 
industry fixed effects in all the models, but coefficients are not reported. All variables are 
defined in Appendix Table B. The t-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for heteroscedasticity 
and firm clustering. The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively. 
     
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
State individualism 0.0661*** 0.0520*** 0.0540*** 0.0479*** 
 (2.8991) (3.3947) (3.5489) (3.1065) 
Firm size  0.0209*** 0.0117*** 0.0122*** 0.0124*** 
 (16.3694) (12.7226) (13.4909) (13.6194) 
Market-to-book -0.0165*** -0.0311*** -0.0305*** -0.0302*** 
 (-7.5080) (-24.1698) (-23.9199) (-23.6920) 
Tangible assets  -0.0126 0.0150 0.0078 0.0077 
 (-0.8056) (1.3885) (0.7415) (0.7222) 
Profit  -0.1861*** -0.2179*** -0.2214*** -0.2262*** 
 (-6.0272) (-10.8675) (-11.2217) (-11.4200) 
Cash holdings  -0.2355*** -0.1165*** -0.0996*** -0.0983*** 
 (-14.4223) (-11.9654) (-10.1054) (-9.9226) 
R&D expenditure  0.1099* -0.1127*** -0.0511 -0.0486 
 (1.8736) (-3.3141) (-1.5070) (-1.4319) 
Industry median leverage  0.5672*** 0.4058*** 0.3801*** 0.3807*** 
 (13.1527) (13.9728) (13.2949) (13.2706) 
CEO ae  -0.0142* -0.0072 -0.0068 -0.0044 
 (-1.8386) (-1.3467) (-1.2808) (-0.8329) 
CEO tenure  -0.0028 -0.0013 -0.0012 -0.0015 
 (-1.1515) (-0.7887) (-0.7234) (-0.8929) 
Chairman/CEO -0.0037 -0.0021 -0.0028 -0.0035 
 (-0.8664) (-0.7412) (-1.0019) (-1.2378) 
Founder CEO  0.0163** 0.0117** 0.0077* 0.0083* 
 (2.0387) (2.4906) (1.6936) (1.8147) 
State median leverage    0.2392*** 0.2249*** 
   (12.5448) (11.3973) 
State population    0.0316 
    (1.0316) 
State civilian labour force     -0.0367 
    (-1.1590) 
Year fixed effect  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry fixed effect  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 6,897 6,889 6,889 6,875 





State individualism and debt maturity 
This table presents the results of the impact of state individualism on debt maturity. We 
measure debt maturity (ST3) as the proportion of debt maturing within year three. State 
individualism is the individualism cultural dimension of Vandello and Cohen (1999). Column 
(1) presents an OLS result of state individualism on ST3. Column (2) includes CEO and state 
characteristics. We present the results of state individualism on proportion of debt maturing 
within two years (ST2) in Column (3). Column (4) is the OLS results of state individualism on 
the proportion of debt maturing within five years (ST5). We include year and two digit SIC 
industry fixed effects in all the models, but coefficients are not reported. All variables are 
defined in Appendix Table B. The t-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for heteroscedasticity 
and firm clustering. The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively. 
     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ST3 ST3 ST2 ST5 
State individualism 0.1119** 0.1175** 0.1122** 0.0254 
 (2.1441) (2.2110) (2.3375) (0.4371) 
Firm size  -0.3635*** -0.3581*** -0.3310*** -0.2586*** 
 (-14.6502) (-14.2852) (-13.8427) (-10.0308) 
Firm size square  0.0202*** 0.0199*** 0.0187*** 0.0129*** 
 (14.0249) (13.6878) (13.5387) (8.5737) 
Market-to-book 0.0088* 0.0084* 0.0098** -0.0017 
 (1.8654) (1.7532) (2.1883) (-0.3556) 
Leverage -0.4073*** -0.3981*** -0.3923*** -0.2288*** 
 (-14.0150) (-13.3738) (-14.8746) (-6.8416) 
R&D expenditure -0.0040 0.0204 0.0745 -0.1774 
 (-0.0302) (0.1480) (0.5825) (-1.1780) 
Abnormal earnings  -0.0055 -0.0055 -0.0060 -0.0062 
 (-1.3485) (-1.3050) (-1.4000) (-1.1797) 
Asset maturity  -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0015** 
 (-0.8286) (-0.8752) (-0.8259) (-2.5601) 
Asset volatility 0.0912** 0.1179** 0.1133*** 0.1797*** 
 (2.0113) (2.5367) (2.5894) (3.6644) 
Term structure  -0.0636*** -0.0542** -0.0752*** 0.0571** 
 (-2.8038) (-2.3395) (-3.6994) (2.1629) 
CEO age   0.0177 0.0060 0.0049 
  (0.9215) (0.3485) (0.2304) 
CEO tenure   -0.0050 -0.0002 -0.0057 
  (-0.8797) (-0.0374) (-0.9162) 
Chairman/CEO  0.0242** 0.0227*** 0.0048 
  (2.5038) (2.6169) (0.4631) 
Founder CEO   0.0273 0.0199 0.0282 
  (1.2703) (1.0200) (1.2477) 
State median leverage   -0.0497 -0.0328 -0.1357* 
  (-0.7498) (-0.5364) (-1.9481) 
State population  0.1312 0.1244 0.1222 
  (1.2368) (1.3218) (1.0796) 
State civilian labour force   -0.1431 -0.1353 -0.1335 
  (-1.3086) (-1.3961) (-1.1436) 
Year fixed effect Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry fixed effect  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 5,748 5,635 5,635 5,635 
R-squared 0.197 0.200 0.219 0.167 
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Table 12  
Impact of individualism on herding behaviour and leverage  
This table presents the results of the impact of individualism on CEO herding behaviour and 
leverage. Column (1) presents the OLS results of individualism and industry median leverage 
on firm leverage. Column (2) is the result of the interaction of individualism and industry 
median leverage on firm leverage. We include year and industry fixed effects in all the models, 
but coefficients are not reported. All variables are defined in Appendix Table B. The t-statistics 
in parentheses are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and firm clustering. The symbols ***, **, 
and * denote significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) 
Individualism 0.1193*** 0.1026** 
 (4.4144) (2.2753) 
Industry median leverage 0.7792*** 0.7171*** 
 (14.3983) (4.8374) 
Individualism*Industry median leverage  0.0896 
  (0.4678) 
Firm size 0.0239*** 0.0240*** 
 (7.6334) (7.6590) 
Market-to-book 0.0008 0.0008 
 (0.1037) (0.1042) 
R&D expenditure  -0.2929*** -0.2925*** 
 (-2.5834) (-2.5800) 
Tangible assets 0.0394 0.0402 
 (1.0990) (1.1146) 
Profit  -0.2418*** -0.2424*** 
 (-3.3010) (-3.3052) 
Cash holdings  -0.0482 -0.0486 
 (-1.1299) (-1.1419) 
CEO age  0.0060 0.0071 
 (0.2572) (0.3042) 
CEO tenure  -0.0130* -0.0131* 
 (-1.8911) (-1.8956) 
Chairman/CEO 0.0161* 0.0157 
 (1.6499) (1.6289) 
Founder CEO -0.0329* -0.0323 
 (-1.6740) (-1.6317) 
Creditor rights -0.0114*** -0.0116*** 
 (-2.6608) (-2.6784) 
GDP growth 0.0010 0.0010 
 (0.6330) (0.6229) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 1,233 1,233 






Impact of institutional block holders   
This table presents the results of the impact of large institutional shareholders on individualism 
and book leverage. We include year and industry fixed effects in all the models, but coefficients 
are not reported. All variables are defined in Appendix Table B. The t-statistics in parentheses 
are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and firm clustering. The symbols ***, **, and * denote 
significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
              Book leverage 
(1) (2) 
Individualism 0.2274*** 0.1845*** 
 (3.4472) (3.5466) 
Top 5 institutional ownership 0.0391**  
 (2.5366)  
Individualism *Top 5 institutional ownership -0.0615***  
 (-2.6386)  
Block holder  0.1167*** 
  (3.1338) 
Individualism* Block holder  -0.1216** 
  (-2.3685) 
Firm size  0.0278*** 0.0330*** 
 (8.2367) (8.5656) 
Market-to-book 0.0006 0.0001 
 (0.0885) (0.0143) 
R&D expenditure  -0.3105** -0.3433*** 
 (-2.5509) (-2.8471) 
Tangible assets 0.0461 0.0132 
 (1.1531) (0.3369) 
Profit -0.3421*** -0.2811*** 
 (-4.5760) (-3.3543) 
Cash holdings -0.0846* -0.0640 
 (-1.8523) (-1.4115) 
CEO age -0.0204 -0.0061 
 (-0.8384) (-0.2807) 
CEO tenure  -0.0108 -0.0095 
 (-1.5292) (-1.2869) 
Chairman/CEO 0.0088 0.0116 
 (0.8688) (1.0990) 
Founder CEO -0.0338* -0.0292 
 (-1.6995) (-1.5397) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 1,229 1,169 










We study the impact of foreign CEOs on mergers and acquisitions (M&As). We find that firms 
managed by foreign CEOs are more likely to engage in M&As. We document that firms 
managed by foreign CEOs are more likely to acquire targets in high-tech industries, targets 
operating in different industries, and overseas targets. We also find that announcement returns 
for firms managed by foreign CEOs are lower. Overall, the results show that foreign CEOs 
have a significant impact on M&A outcomes. 
 
JEL classification: F23, G31, G34 







In a globalization world, the demand for foreign executives has become increasingly 
important. Foreign executives have access to networks and foreign knowledge in other markets 
that are valuable for a firm’s strategic decisions and outcomes (see, e.g. Adams, Hermalin & 
Weisbach, 2010; Giannetti, Liao & Yu, 2015)18. Prior literature has focused on the impact of 
foreign executives, mainly board of directors, on corporate policies. For example, Masulis, 
Wang and Xie (2012) document that firms with foreign independent directors are associated 
with better cross border acquisitions when the target firm and the foreign directors are from the 
same home region. Estélyi and Nisar (2016) document that firms with foreign nationals on their 
board have a positive operating performance and Schmid and Dauth (2014) find that the 
appointment of top managers with international experience impacts stock prices. Yet the impact 
of foreign CEOs is rarely explored in the literature. This study examines how foreign CEOs 
impact mergers and acquisitions (M&As). 
Foreign CEOs bring to their position institutional knowledge of countries and regions 
other than the firm’s home country. As such, foreign CEOs provide firms with both social 
capital (foreign networks) and human capital (foreign knowledge of other markets). This 
experience is valuable because it cannot be substituted or imitated (Barney, 1991; Carpenter, 
Sanders & Gregersen, 2001; Daily, Certo & Dalton, 2000) and, therefore, their strategic focus 
and orientation may be different from domestic CEOs. Graham, Harvey and Puri (2015) 
document that compared with other corporate policies, CEOs have a major influence on M&As. 
The resource dependency theory notes that firm performance depends on a bundle of unique 
 
18  The impact of foreign executives on firm strategic outcomes may differ for firms that have 
long standing dealings with foreign countries. Due to data limitation, this additional analysis 




resources at its disposal (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, 2003) of which foreign CEOs’ international 
experience is very important. 
The decision to engage in M&As requires choices such as whether to acquire, what to 
acquire, when to acquire and for how much to acquire. Since the outcomes of these choices are 
uncertain, a CEO’s personal preferences, experience and personality traits may play a role 
(Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2011; Malhotra, Zhu & Reus, 2015). Furthermore, M&As are 
important corporate investments because they involve huge sums of money and, therefore, have 
the potential to destroy shareholder value (Moeller, Schlingemann & Stulz, 2005). We 
hypothesize that foreign CEOs’ international experience would significantly impact strategic 
choices in M&As, which will subsequently impact acquirer returns. 
In additon to their general international experience, the country of origin of foreign 
CEOs can significantly affect M&A outcomes since a CEO’s birth place has been documented 
as impacting M&As. For example, Jiang, Qian and Yonker (2018) find that, in the US, CEOs 
are more likely to acquire targets in the state of the CEO’s childhood home than targets further 
away from that state and these acquisitions are followed by negative acquirer returns for small 
private targets, but positive returns for large public targets. Similarly, Chung, Green and 
Schmidt (2018) document that CEOs are more likely to acquire targets close to their birthplace 
and this generates negative acquirer returns. These studies suggest that home bias acquisitions 
by foreign CEOs can significantly impact acquirer returns. By examining the international 
experience of foreign CEOs on M&As, this study provides a new perspective for the M&A 
literature by showing that the international experience of CEOs should be considered in 
regression models for M&A outcomes. 
We empirically test the impact of foreign CEOs on M&As using an S&P 1500 sample 
of 12,524 firm-years from 2000 to 2017 of which 1,692 firm years are managed by foreign 
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CEOs. Consistent with our prediction, the results reveal that foreign CEOs significantly impact 
M&As. The results can be summarised as follows. 
First, we find that foreign CEOs are significantly more likely to do M&As. When we 
control for CEO and firm characteristics that can significantly impact acquisition propensity, 
the probability that firms managed by foreign CEOs undertake M&As in a fiscal year is 2.5 
percentage points higher. Second, we find that foreign CEOs do not only impact acquisition 
propensity but also the type of acquisition. Specifically, we find that firms managed by foreign 
CEOs prefer targets operating in high-tech industries and ones operating in different industries. 
We also find that firms managed by foreign CEOs are more likely to do cross border 
acqusisitions. The impact of foreign CEOs on these types of acquisition is significcant and 
economically important. 
Third, we examine the impact of M&As undertaken by foreign CEOs on shareholders’ 
value and find that announcement returns for firms managed by foreign CEOs are negative. 
The results are robust to controlling for deal, firm and CEO characteristics that can impact 
acquirer returns. Our results suggest that, compared with domestic CEOs, firms managed by 
foreign CEOs generate more negative acquirer returns with announcement returns being 0.8 
percentage points lower than domestic CEOs. We next examine the channels through which 
the negative acquirer returns for firms managed by foreign CEOs occur by regressing the 
acquirer 3-day returns by sub-samples of acquisition type (diversified, cross border, high-tech 
and home target). We find that the negative acquirer returns for firms managed by foreign 
CEOs occurs when foreign CEOs undertake diversified and home target acquisitions. The 
result for diversified acquisitions is consistent with prior studies that diversified acquisitions 
generate negative acquirer returns because of a diversification discount (Laeven & Levine, 
2007; Moeller & Schlingemann, 2005; Morck, Shleifer & Vishny, 1990). The result for home 
target acquisitons is consitent with Chung, Green and Schmidt (2018) and Jiang, Qian and 
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Yonker (2018) who find that CEO home bias acqusisitions generate negative acquirer returns 
and attribute this to agency problems such as CEO private benefit. We also consider the 
geographic segments of firms and find some evidence that foreign CEOs that manage 
geographically diversified firms generate positive abnormal returns in M&As. Overall, the 
results show that foreign CEOs have a significant impact on M&A outcomes. 
One concern with the study is that firms may appoint a foreign CEO to take advantage 
of their international skill set to achieve the firm’s strategic purpose(s). This presents selection 
bias for the appointment of foreign CEOs. We control for endogeneity in the study using the 
foreign born population in the state in which the firm is headquartered and geographic distance 
between foreign CEO’s country and the US as instruments for the supply of foreign CEOs. We 
also conduct propensity score matching to control for selection bias; the results remain 
unchanged. 
The study makes several contributions to the M&A literature. First, the study 
contributes to the growing strand of finance literature that documents the impact of CEO 
characteristics on M&As. For example, Yim (2013) documents that younger CEOs are more 
likely to do M&As and these are followed by negative but insignificant acquirer returns. 
Acquirer announcement returns are positive when the acquiring firm CEO has expertise in the 
target firm’s industry (Custódio & Metzger, 2013). Chung, Green and Schmidt (2018) find that 
CEO home bias acquisitions generate negative acquirer returns. We contribute to these studies 
by showing that foreign CEOs significantly impact M&As. 
Secondly, our study contributes to the literature on the impact of foreign executives on 
M&As. Masulis, Wang and Xie (2012) analyse the benefit and cost of foreign independent 
directors and find that firms with foreign independent directors do better in cross border 
acquisitions when the target country is same as the foreign director. Giannetti, Liao and Yu 
(2015) document that foreign directors are more likely to do cross border acquisitions. These 
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studies focus on the board of directors, but we focus on the impact of foreign CEOs on 
acquisitions. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a literature review. Section 
3 describes the data and sample selection method. Section 4 presents the empirical results and 
Section 5 concludes the study. 
2. Literature review 
The upper echelons theory suggests that managerial experience has a significant effect 
on strategic choices (Hambrick, 2007; Hambrick & Mason, 1984). In support of this theory, 
the literature shows that international experience impacts executives’ decisions in strategic 
choices and enhances their ability to process complex information in a dynamic environment 
(Athanassiou & Nigh, 2002; Carpenter, Sanders & Gregersen, 2001). Consistent with that view, 
Carpenter, Pollock and Leary (2003), Herrmann and Datta (2005) and Tihanyi et al. (2000) 
find that managers’ international experience relates to firm diversification strategies. Similarly, 
the literature documents that firms’ international expansion strategy positively  relates to the 
appointment of foreign executives (Estélyi & Nisar, 2016; Nielsen & Nielsen, 2010) because 
foreign executives may have foreign networks that could help the firm participate in 
international markets (Daily, Certo & Dalton, 2000; Roth, 1995). Herrmann and Datta (2002, 
2006) and Nielsen and Nielsen (2011) find that international  experience impacts managers’ 
choices of foreign entry mode. Giannetti, Liao & Yu (2015) show that directors’ international 
experience increases cross border acquisitions. These studies show that the international 
experience of foreign CEOs would significatntly impact their strategic choices in M&As such 
as acquisition type, target selection and payment method. Consequently, we propose that these 
strategic choices of foreign CEOs would significantly impact acquirer returns. 
The literature provides several explanations why there are variations in M&A 
outcomes. Some studies focus on firm characteristics, such as Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz 
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(2004) who document that large firms engage in big acquisitions that result in large losses to 
shareholders whereas small firms deal with small acquisitions with small gains to shareholders. 
They conclude that acquisitions do not provide value for acquirer shareholders since the losses 
for the large firms far outweigh the gains for small firms. Li, Qiu and Shen (2018) find that 
acquirers with more organizational capital perform better in M&As. Fich, Nguyen and Officer 
(2018) show that acquirers gain in large M&A deals when the target firm is smaller than the 
acquirer and when the acquiring firm has a high valuation. Lee, Mauer and Xu (2018) find that 
human capital relatedness between the acquirer and the target firm generates positive acquirer 
returns in diversified acquisitions. Another stream of research examines the impact of CEOs’ 
attributes on M&As. Malmendier and Tate (2008) show that overconfident CEOs are more 
likely to engage in M&As at any time, with negative announcement returns of 90 basis points 
compared with 12 basis points for other CEOs. Male executives undertake more acquisitions 
with announcement returns approximately 2% lower than acquisitions made by female 
executives (Huang & Kisgen, 2013). Aktas et al. (2016) find that acquirer returns are negative 
for firms whose CEOs are narcissists. 
We propose that, in addition to their general international experience, the specific 
country of origin of foreign CEOs matters for acquirer returns. For example, Masulis, Wang 
and Xie (2012) find that firms with foreign independent directors are associated with better 
cross border acquisitions when the target firm and the foreign directors are from the same home 
region. Chung, Green and Schmidt (2018) find that CEOs are more likely to do home bias 
acquisitions, and this generate negative acquirer returns. Jiang, Qian and Yonker (2018) find 
that, in the US, CEOs are more likely to acquire targets in the state of the CEO’s childhood 
home than targets further away from that state. These acquisitions are followed by negative 
acquirer returns for small private targets, but positive returns for large public targets. Therefore, 
home bias acquisitions undertaken by foreign CEOs can significantly impact acquirer returns. 
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3. Sample selection 
Data on the CEOs’ country of birth, education and work experience are hand collected 
from Marquis Who’s Who biography online database, Notable Names Database (NNDB), as 
well as companies’ websites. The list of CEOs whose information is obtained from Marquis 
Who’s Who database are taken from Compustat Execucomp. We obtain accounting and stock 
market data from Compustat and the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) databases, 
respectively. Our final sample consists of 12,524 firm-year observations from 2000 to 2017 
with 2,136 unique CEOs. The nationality mix of CEOs in our sample is presented in Appendix 
Table A. The majority of foreign CEOs in the sample come from the United Kingdom, Canada 
and India.  
We collect data on M&As from the Securities Data Company (SDC). Transactions announced 
from 2000 to 2017 are considered. The criteria for selection are as follows: 
• The bidder must be a US publicly traded firm. 
• The transaction value must be greater than or equal to $1million. 
• Bidder should have less than a 10% initial stake in the target firm and wish to seek over 
50% of the target after the transaction. 
• Deals labelled as bankruptcy acquisitions, liquidations self-tender, leveraged buyouts, 
privatizations, repurchases, restructuring, reverse takeovers and going private 
transactions are excluded. 
• Targets are US and non-US public, private or subsidiary firms. 
• The bidder should have accounting data available in Compustat and stock data in CRSP. 
3.1 Summary statistics 
Table1 reports the summary statistics of the sample. Panel A shows that firms managed 
by foreign CEOs form 13.6% of the sample. The mean (median) age is 65 (65). Firms managed 
by female CEOs represent 2.6% of the sample and CEOs who are chair of their firms form 
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63.4%. We find that 11.4% of the CEOs in our sample have Ivy League education and 9.3% 
have military experience. Panel B summarises the firm characteristics. Mean (median) firm 
size is $25,056 (2,956) million. Firms hold a mean (median) cash of 14.8% (8.6). Firms exhibit 
mean (median) Tobin’s Q of 1.93 (1.52). The mean (median) R&D expenditure is 2.5% (0.0%) 
Panel C provides summarises the deal characteristics. The mean (median) deal value is 
$788.2 ($131.7) million. The mean (median) relative size is 10.6% (3.6%). The largest 
proportion of the targets are private (40.7%) followed by subsidiary targets (38.2%) and public 
targets (20.5%). Diversified acquisitions are 43.6% of the deals in the sample. Hostile deals 
represent 0.2% and for tender offers 5.3%. The mean (median) premium is 38.8% (32.8%) and 
mean (median) acquirer 3-day CAR is 0.2% (0.2%).  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
In Table 2, we compare the means of CEO, firm-level and deal characteristics for 
domestic and foreign CEOs. Panel A shows that the average foreign CEO is over 63 years old 
but are younger than domestic CEOs. Foreign CEOs have a longer tenure and are less likely to 
hold the dual position of CEO and Chair of the Board. In Panel B, we show that firms managed 
by foreign CEOs are relatively smaller than firms managed by domestic CEOs. Firms managed 
by foreign CEOs hold more cash than firms managed by domestic CEOs. Using Tobin’s Q as 
a measure of firm performance, foreign CEOs perform better than domestic CEOs. Foreign 
CEOs invest more in R&D and less in capital expenditure. We see that firms managed by 
foreign CEOs are more likely to do M&As. Panel C, Table 2, presents the deal characteristics, 
revealing several differences between M&A deals undertaken by foreign and domestic CEOs. 
Firms managed by foreign CEOs do more cross border and high-tech acquisitions. Foreign 
CEOs undertake fewer pure stock deals. Firms managed by foreign CEOs pay a higher 
premium and earn lower announcement returns. Overall, Table 2 provides initial insights into 
the strategic choices of foreign CEOs in M&As that are consistent with our prediction. 
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However, these differences may be because of to time trends, firm characteristics and CEO 
characteristics that may correlate with the appointment of foreign CEOs by firms. In the next 
section, we test the impact of foreign CEOs on M&As by multivariate analysis. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
4. Empirical results 
To examine the impact of foreign CEOs on M&As’ outcomes, we estimate the 
following regression model: 
𝑍𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛  𝐶𝐸𝑂)𝑗 + 𝛽2(𝐶𝐸𝑂  𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠)𝑗 + 𝛽3(𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠) +
𝛽4(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 )𝑖 + 𝛽5 (𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 )𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽6 (𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 )𝑖𝑡 + ∈𝑖𝑗𝑡                 (1) 
where: “i” denotes the firm; “j” denotes the CEO; “t” denotes year; and Z denotes the 
following seven M&A outcomes: 
(I) Acquisitiveness of foreign CEOs measured by three parameters (acquisition propensity, 
acquisition frequency and acquisition size).  
(II) Cross-border acquisitions measured as dummy equal to one if the target firm is outside the 
US and zero otherwise.  
(III) A diversified acquisition measured as dummy equal to one if the acquirer and the target 
are operating in industries with different a 2-digit SIC code and zero otherwise.  
  
(IV) High-tech acquisitions measured as a dummy equal to one if the acquirer and the bidder 
are operating as technology firms and zero otherwise.  
(V) Home bias acquisitions measured as a dummy equal to one if the target nation is same as 
CEO’s country of origin and zero otherwise.  
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(V1) Acquisition premium measured as the ratio of the offer price to the target market value 
one week before the deal announcement.  
(VII) Acquirer returns measured as the 3-day CAR. 
Foreign CEO is the main variable of interest and is measured as a dummy equal to one 
if the CEO was born outside the US and/or has a bachelor’s degree in the home country and/or 
foreign work experience and zero otherwise. In all the estimated regression models, we follow 
prior studies on M&As and control for deal, firm and CEO characteristics that have been shown 
to impact M&A outcomes. The deal characteristics we control for are: relative size, whether 
the deal is diversified, hostile or tender, the target listing status, and payment method. We 
control for firm size, Tobin’s Q, leverage and Cash holdings. We also control for CEO age, 
gender, military experience, MBA degree, tenure, and Ivy League education. All variables are 
defined in Appendix Table B. 
4.1 Foreign CEOs and acquisitiveness 
Our univariate results in Table 2 show that the acquisition propensity for firms managed 
by foreign CEOs is significantly higher by 3.8%. We conduct further analysis into this initial 
result by estimating multivariate regression models. First, for acquisition propensity measured 
as a dummy equal to one if a firm engaged in M&As in a fiscal year and zero otherwise, we 
estimate a logit model. Second, we estimate a Poisson regression model for acquisition 
frequency measured as the number of M&As made by a firm in a fiscal year. Third, for 
acquisition size measured as the natural logarithm of the acquisition value, we estimate an 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model. Table 3 reports the results of these three 
regression estimates.  
Table 3, Column (1) reports the marginal effect of foreign CEOs and firm control variables on 
a firm’s propensity to engage in M&As in a fiscal year. The coefficient on foreign CEO is 
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positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. This suggests that firms managed by 
foreign CEOs are more likely to undertake M&As in a fiscal year, which is consistent with our 
initial results in Table 2. Specifically, a foreign CEO increases the likelihood of M&As in a 
year by 2.4 percentage points. In Table 3, Column (2), we include CEO characteristics, but the 
results remain positive and statistically significant at 5%. In Table 3, Column (3), we include 
CEO compensation because Harford and Li (2007) show that CEOs have different incentives 
to undertake M&As and capital expenditure because of the uncertainty and information 
asymmetry surrounding M&As. The inclusion of CEO compensation does not remove the 
positive relationship between foreign CEOs and acquisition propensity. Overall, the results in 
Columns (1) to (3) show that firms managed by foreign CEOs have a higher likelihood of 
undertaking M&As. 
Apart from the main variable of interest, we find that most control variables in Column 
(3) are consistent with prior studies. Firms with free cash flow are more likely to do M&As 
(Jensen 1986). We find a positive relationship between free cash flow and acquisition 
propensity. Acquisition propensity increases with firm size (Malmendier & Tate, 2008). We 
find firm size is positive in all models. Firms with more cash flow commitments, as shown in 
dividend yield, and firms with a net loss are less likely to do M&As (Bauguess & Stegemoller, 
2008). We find the loss dummy and dividend yield to be negative and statistically significant 
(see Table 3, Column (2)). Yim (2013) finds that younger CEOs are more acquisitive. We find 
an inverse relationship between a CEO’s age and acquisition propensity. CEOs are more likely 
to undertake M&As later during their tenure with a firm (Yim, 2013). The tenure coefficient is 
positive and statistically significant. The results are thus consistent with prior studies. Table 3, 
Columns (4) and (5) report the results for number of acquisitions and acquisition size, 
respectively, but we find no significant relationship between foreign CEOs and these two 
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measures of firm acquisitiveness. These results suggest that the impact of foreign CEOs on 
firm acquisitiveness is significant only for acquisition propensity. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
4.2 What types of acquisitions do foreign CEOs undertake? 
In the previous section, we find that firms managed by foreign CEOs are more likely to 
do M&As. In this section, we examine the impact of foreign CEOs on M&As type because the 
literature shows that international experience impacts a manager’s strategic choices. The nature 
of the M&As data allows us to examine the impact of foreign CEOs on specific aspects of 
M&As decisions such as the choice of target. More so, the type of acquisition foreign CEOs 
undertake can significantly impact acquirer returns. For example, the market’s reaction to high-
tech acquisitions is positive because of synergies perceived by investors (Higgins & Rodriguez 
2006; Humphery-Jenner 2014; Kohers & Kohers 2004). Diversified acquisitions have been 
found to generate negative acquirer returns because of diversification discount (Laeven & 
Levine 2007; Moeller & Schlingemann 2005). Eckbo and Thorburn (2000) and Moeller and 
Schlingemann (2005) document poor performance for acquirers in cross border acquisitions. 
4.2.1 Cross border acquisitions 
First, we consider cross border acquisitions. Masulis, Wang and Xie (2012) and Adams, 
Hermalin and Weisbach (2010) note that foreign executives’ international experience is 
important for firms’ foreign acqusitions because these executives have access to networks and 
foreign knowledge in other markets that are valuable for a firm’s international expansion 
strategy. In addition, cross border acquisitions compared with domestic acquisitions have a lot 
of uncertainties because of unfamiliar cultural values and institutional settings of the target 
firm’s country (Anderson et al., 2011; Mantecon, 2009). International experience gives 
managers more confidence, decreased uncertainty in terms of cultural differences and country 
risk of the foreign targets (Andrade, Mitchell & Stafford, 2001; Carpenter, Pollock & Leary, 
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2003; Herrmann & Datta, 2005; Tihanyi et al., 2000) which can increase their likelihood of 
engaging in cross boder deals. For example, Giannetti, Liao and Yu (2015) document that 
foreign directors are more likely to do cross border acquisitions. Carpenter, Pollock and Leary 
(2003), Herrmann and Datta (2005) and Tihanyi et al. (2000) find that managers’ international 
experience relates to a firm’s international diversification strategies. Our descriptive statistics 
in Table 2 show that foreign CEOs are more likely to do cross border acquisitions.  
We empirically test the impact of foreign CEOs on cross border acquisitions using a 
logit model that estimates the likelihood of cross border acquisitions of firm i in year t. Cross 
border acquisition is a dummy equal to one if the target firm is outside the US and zero 
otherwise. The results are presented in Table 4. Column (1) reports the marginal effect of a 
foreign CEO on cross border acquisitions holding all other factors constant. The coefficient of 
the foreign CEO dummy is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. This suggests 
that, all things being equal, firms managed by foreign CEOs are more likely than firms 
managed by domestic CEOs to undertake cross border acquisitions. In Table 4, Column (2), 
we include firm controls, year, and industry fixed effects. We find that the coefficient estimate 
for the foreign CEO dummy is positive (0.054) and statistically significant at 5%. We include 
CEO characteristics in Table 4, Column (3), and still find a positive, statistically significant 
relationship between the foreign CEO dummy and cross border acquisitions. This result 
suggests that firms managed by foreign CEOs are 4.9 percentage points more likely to make 
cross border acquisitions than firms managed by domestic CEOs. The results are consistent 
with prior studies that relate managers’ international experience to cross border acquisitions.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
4.2.2 Home bias acquisitions 
Given that firms managed by foreign CEOs are more likely to engage in cross border 
acquisitions as shown in Table 4, it is possible that foreign CEOs tend to acquire international 
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targets located in their home country. This prediction is based on existing studies that CEOs 
are more likely to show home bias in their investments (Chung, Green & Schmidt, 2018; Jiang, 
Qian & Yonker, 2019). We investigate that prediction in this section. We define home bias 
acquisition as a dummy equal to one if the target country is same as the CEO’s country of 
origin and zero otherwise. Table 5 reports the logit results of the estimates. Column (1) is the 
marginal effect of foreign CEOs on home bias acquisitions holding all other factors constant 
but includes year and industry fixed effects. The coefficient on foreign CEOs is negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. This suggests that, all things being equal, firms managed 
by foreign CEOs are less likely to acquire targets in their home country. In Table 5, Column 
(2), we include firm characteristics and still find a negative relationship between foreign CEOs 
and home biased acquisitions. We include CEO characteristics in Table 5, Column (3), and the 
result remains unchanged. These results suggest that foreign CEOs do not show home bias 
investment behaviour when they undertake cross border acquisitions. The results contrast with 
Jiang, Qian and Yonker (2018) and Chung, Green and Schmidt (2018) who find that CEOs are 
more likley to make home bias acquisitions. We interpret this result as foreign CEOs’ tolerance 
for uncertainty since Anderson et al. (2011) and Beugelsdijk and Frijns (2010) show that 
individuals who show high levels of tolerance for ambiguity do not show home bias in their 
investments. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
4.2.3 Diversified acquisitions 
Prior literature argues that firms make diversified acquisitions to reduce risk. This is 
because diversification reduces the idiosyncratic risk of a firm and, as such, reduces risk for 
the CEO given the undiversified nature of their holdings in the firm (Amihud & Lev, 1981; 
Gormley & Matsa, 2016; May, 1995). However, one can argue that though diversification 
reduces the idiosyncratic risk of a firm, there are several reasons to suggest that one CEO would 
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engage in diversified acquisitions less than another. This is because diversified acquisitions 
encompass mangerial talent and expertise that may not be found within the existing firm. There 
could also be a high degree of information asymmetry associated with targets operating in 
different industries. Thus the increased complexity of diversified acqusition may cause a CEO 
to acquire firms in the industry with which they are already familiar. Athanassiou and Nigh 
(2002) and Carpenter, Sanders and Gregersen (2001) suggest that international experience 
enhances executives’ ability to process complex information in a dynamic environment. 
Therefore, it is possible that foreign CEOs’ international experience would impact diversified 
acquisitions. 
To test the impact of foreign CEOs on diversified acquisitions, we run a logit 
regression. Diversified acquisition is defined as a dummy equal to one if the acquirer and the 
target firm operate in industries with different 2-digit SIC code and zero otherwise. We report 
the results in Table 6. Column (1) reports the marginal effect of foreign CEOs and firm controls 
on diversified acquisitions. The coefficient of foreign CEO is positive (0.050) and statistically 
significant at 5%. This suggests that firms managed by foreign CEOs are more likely to make 
diversified acquisitions than firms managed by domestic CEOs. We include CEOs’ 
characteristics in Table 6, Column (2), and still find the coefficient of foreign CEO to be 
significantly positive at the 5% level. The results suggest that a unit increase in the appointment 
of a foreign CEO increases a firm’s likelihood of diversified acquisitions by 5 percentage 
points. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
4.2.4 High-tech acquisitions 
The literature suggests that the acquisition of external technologies is complementary 
to a firm’s internal R&D to enhance its innovative capability (Cassiman & Veugelers, 2006; 
Chesbrough, 2006). Ahuja and Katila (2001) note that R&D intensive firms can increase their 
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knowledge base by either engaging in a series of internal projects or the acquisition of external 
technologies. Bena and Li (2014) show that acquisition likelihood is higher when both the 
acquirer and target operate as technology firms. In our univariate results in Table 2, we find 
that firms managed by foreign CEOs spend more on R&D and, therefore, it is possible that 
foreign CEOs would engage in high-tech acquisitions for their firm’s innovative capabilities. 
We examine the impact of foreign CEOs on high-tech acquisitions by estimating a logit 
regression. High-tech acquisition is a binary dummy defined as equal to one if both the acquirer 
and the target operate as technology firms and zero otherwise. The definition of high-tech 
acquisition follows Harford, Humphery-Jenner and Powell (2012) and Masulis, Wang & Xie 
(2007). We present the results in Table 7. 
 Column (1), reports the marginal effect of foreign CEOs on high-tech acquisitions 
holding all other factors constant. The coefficient estimate of foreign CEO is positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. This suggests that, all things being equal, firms managed 
by foreign CEOs have a higher likelihood of undertaking high-tech acquisitions. We include 
firm controls, industry, and year fixed effects in Column (2), and still find the coefficient of 
foreign CEO is positive (0.053) and statistically different from zero at 1% significance. We 
control for CEO characteristics in Column (3), but the results remain positive (0.067) and 
statistically significant at 1%. The positive relationship between foreign CEOs and high-tech 
acquisitions is consistent with our univariate results in Table 2, where we find that firms 
managed by foreign CEOs spend more on R&D. The multivariate results also show a positive, 
significant relationship between R&D expenditure and high-tech acquisitions. These results are 
consistent with studies that suggest the acquisition of external technologies as relevant to a 
firm’s innovation capabilities.  
[Insert Table 7 here] 
186 
 
4.3 Foreign CEOs and acquirer returns 
In the previous section, our analysis revealed the statistically significant impact of 
foreign CEOs on M&A type. However, it is not clear whether this impact helps increase 
shareholder value. In this section, we analyse the impact of foreign CEOs on shareholders’ 
value by estimating an OLS regression of the acquirer’s stock price reaction to M&A 
announcements. In the analysis, we use acquirer 3-day CAR, which we calculate from day -1 
to +1, where the announcement day is zero (i.e., t = 0). The acquirer 3-day CAR is calculated 
using the market model over days -210 to -11. We control for the deal, firm, and CEOs’ 
characteristics discussed in Section 4. Table 8 reports the results of the estimates. Column (1) 
presents the relationship between acquirer returns and foreign CEOs, holding all other factors 
constant but including year and industry fixed effects. We find the coefficient of foreign CEO 
is negative (-0.0076) and statistically significant at the 1% level. The result is consistent with 
the descriptive statistics in Table 2 and suggests that, all things being equal, acquirer returns 
for firms managed by foreign CEOs are lower. In Table 8, Column (2), we control for deal 
characteristics that can impact acquirer returns but the coefficient of foreign CEO is still 
negative and statistically significant but at the 5% level. Table 8, Column (3), controls for firm 
characteristics and the results remain unchanged. We control for CEO characteristics in Table 
8, Column (4), and find the coefficient of the foreign CEO is negative (-0.008) and statistically 
different from zero at 5% significance. Our results suggest that, compared with domestic CEOs, 
firms managed by foreign CEOs have lower acquirer returns. The acquirer returns are 0.8 
percentage points lower than for domestic CEOs19.  
 We find that most of the control variables in Table 8 have estimates similar to the 
results of existing studies. For example, Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2004) document 
 




that large firms engage in large acquisitions that result in large losses to shareholders. We find 
the coefficient of size is significantly negative in all specifications. The diversification dummy 
is also negative and significant throughout the models. Diversified acquisitions generate 
negative acquirer returns (Laeven & Levine, 2007; Moeller & Schlingemann, 2005). Draper 
and Paudyal (2006) show that public acquisitions financed with stock destroy value. We find 
that the interaction of public target and payment, including stock, generates negative returns. 
Our results are therefore consistent with prior studies. 
[Inset Table 8 here] 
4.4 Channels through which foreign CEOs impact acquirer returns. 
4.4.1 Acquisition type 
To test the channel through which foreign CEOs impact acquirer returns, we group the 
M&As sample into sub-samples based on whether an acquisition is diversified, high-tech, cross 
border or home bias. We then examine the impact of foreign CEOs on the acquirer 3-day CAR 
for each of acquisition type. The results for the sub-sample analysis are reported in Table 9. 
Column (1) presents the results of the impact of foreign CEOs on acquirer 3-day CAR for 
diversified acquisitions. We find the coefficient of foreign CEO is negative and statistically 
significant at the 5% level. This suggests that firms managed by foreign CEOs generate 
negative acquirer returns when they undertake diversified acquisitions. This result is consistent 
with prior studies that document negative acquirer returns for diversified acquisitions. Columns 
(2) and (3) present the results for high-tech and cross border acquisitions, respectively, but we 
find no significant relationship between foreign CEOs and acquirer returns for these two types 
of acquisition. Column (4), is the results for home bias acquisitions. We find the coefficient of 
foreign CEO is negative and statistically significant at the 10% level. This suggests that foreign 
CEOs generate negative acquirer returns when they make home bias acquisitions. The result 
for home bias acquisitions is consistent with Chung, Green and Schmidt (2018) and Jiang, Qian 
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and Yonker, (2019) who find that CEO home bias acquisitions generate negative acquirer 
returns because of CEO private benefits.  
[Insert Table 9 here] 
4.4.2 Method of payment and target selection 
Empirical evidence shows that the method of payment and target selection impact 
acquirer returns in M&As. The literature shows that, compared with cash financed acquisitions, 
stock financed acquisitions generate negative acquirer returns (Andrade, Mitchell & Stafford, 
2001; Heron & Lie, 2002; Huang & Walkling, 1987; Travlos, 1987). This negative return 
associated with stock financed acquisitions has been generally attributed to the signalling effect 
suggested by Myers and Majluf (1984) that managers issue stock when their firm is overvalued. 
The literature on target listed status shows that acquirers of private targets generate positive 
abnormal returns (Chang, 1998; Faccio, McConnell & Stolin, 2006; Fuller, Netter & 
Stegemoller, 2002; Moeller, Schlingemann & Stulz, 2004). The reason for the positive outcome 
for private targets relates to the less market liquidity effect associated with private targets which 
results in a lower premium being paid by the acquirer (Fuller, Netter & Stegemoller, 2002; 
Officer, 2007). Draper and Paudyal (2006) note that private benefits to acquiring managers are 
less for private targets and, as such, the acquiring firm does not overpay for private targets, 
which results in positive acquirer returns. The interaction of method of payment and target 
status also impacts acquirer returns. For example, Chang (1998) and Fuller, Netter and 
Stegemoller (2002) find that stock acquisitions of private targets generate positive acquirer 
returns. They attribute this to the monitoring role that the merged firm would enjoy from the 
private target.   
We test this channel on acquirer returns for firms managed by foreign CEOs by 
estimating the regression of sub-samples of pure cash deals, pure stock deals, private targets, 
public targets, private target pure cash, private target pure stock, public target pure cash or 
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public target pure stock deals. The results are shown in Table 10. Column (1) presents the 
regression results of the impact of foreign CEOs on acquirer 3-day CAR for pure cash deals. 
Column (2) is the result for pure stock deals. Column (3) is the result for private targets. 
Column (4) is the results for public targets. Column (5) is the result for cash acquisition of 
private targets. Column (6) is the results for stock acquisition of private targets. Column (7) is 
the result for cash acquisition of public targets. Column (8) is the result for stock acquisition 
of public targets. In all the columns, we do not find any significant impact of foreign CEOs on 
acquirer returns for these sub-samples. Table 10’s results suggest that the negative acquirer 
returns for firms managed by foreign CEOs is not because of the method of payment and target 
selection. 
[Insert Table 10 here] 
4.4.3 Acquisition premium 
A high premium for quality deals can generate positive announcement returns (Higgins 
& Rodriguez, 2006; Humphery-Jenner, 2014; Kohers & Kohers, 2004). However, firms that 
over pay for an aqcuisition because of managerial hubris (Malmendier & Tate, 2008; Roll, 
1986) and private benefits (Grinstein & Hribar, 2004; Harford, Humphery-Jenner & Powell, 
2012; Morck, Shleifer & Vishny, 1990) destroy value. In addition, firms can pay a higher 
premium for acquisitions to serve their strategic purpose (Kim, Haleblian & Finkelstein, 2011). 
We examine the impact of foreign CEOs on the acquisition premium by conducting an 
OLS regression of premium, defined as the ratio of offer price to the target market value one 
week before the deal announcement, on foreign CEOs. The sample size in this analysis reduces 
because data are available for only public targets. The results are presented in Table 11. Column 
(1) presents the relationship between foreign CEOs and the acquisition premium, holding all 
other factors constant, but includes year and industry fixed effects. We find the coefficient on 
the foreign CEO is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. This suggests that, 
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compared with domestic CEOs, firms managed by foreign CEOs pay a higher premium in 
acquisitions. Column (2) includes deal characteristics that can impact the acquisition premium, 
but the results remain positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. We include firm 
controls in Column (3) and still find the coefficient of foreign CEO is positive (12.8%) and 
statistically different from zero at 5% significance. Column (4) includes CEO characteristics; 
but the coefficient on the foreign CEO dummy becomes even stronger, being positive and 
statistically significant at 1%. Overall, our results show that acquisition premiums for firms 
managed by foreign CEOs are higher.  
[Insert Table 11 here] 
4.4.4 The impact of geographic segment. 
We now consider the geographic segment of the firms. Our basis for this analysis is that 
since foreign CEOs come from diversified countries, firms that operate in diversified 
geographic segments would gain more from their international experience. To test this 
prediction, we interact geographic segment with foreign CEO and estimate the impact on the 
acquirer 3-day CAR. The results are shown in Table 12. 
Table 12, Column (1), gives the results for the interaction of foreign CEOs and 
geographic segment. We find the coefficient of foreign CEO is negative and statistically 
significant at 5%, which is consistent with our results in Table 8. However, we find that the 
interaction term is positive and statistically significant at 10%. This suggests that even though 
firms managed by foreign CEOs generate negative acquirer returns, the impact on acquirer 
returns is positive when the firm is geographically segmented. Given that the average 
geographic segment of firms managed by foreign CEOs is 1.818, the average impact on 
acquirer returns is -0.8% (-0.0250+(0.0092*1.818) = -0.008). However, a foreign CEO who 
manages a firm with three geographic segments generates a positive return of 0.3% 
(0.0250+(0.0092*3) =0.0026). We control for deal characteristics in Column (2) and still find 
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a positive, and statistically significant relationship between the interaction term and acquirer 
returns. In Column (3), we include firm and CEO characteristics, but the results remain 
unchanged. This result suggests that shareholders of firms that are geographically segmented 
benefit from acquisitions made by foreign CEOs.  
[Insert Table 12 here] 
4.5 Endogeneity  
4.5.1 Propensity score matching  
A major concern with our results is that foreign CEOs manage firms that differ from 
firms managed by domestic CEOs as shown in the univariate analysis in Table 2. This makes 
the appointment of a foreign CEO endogenous to firm-level characteristics and, therefore, 
could bias our coefficient estimates for foreign CEO in our models. We use propensity score 
matching to evaluate the impact of foreign CEOs on M&As to address this issue. Propensity 
score matching is a method for estimating treatment effects to reduce bias in a non-randomised 
sample (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). It is an effective method to alleviate the endogeneity 
concern of CEO and firm matching when we observe predictable firm characteristics (Angrist 
& Pischke, 2009; Armstrong, Wettner & Larcker, 2012). Propensity score matching requires 
the treatment group to be matched with a control group that has similar characteristics and 
similar values of the propensity score as the treatment group. The treatment group in our study 
is foreign CEOs and the control group (comparison) is domestic CEOs.   
The procedure for the matching is as follows: first, we estimate a probit model to predict 
the selection of foreign CEOs using firm and CEO characteristics. Second, the propensity 
scores of the probit estimates are used to match firms managed by foreign and domestic CEOs. 
In the matching, we use a nearest neighbour algorithm with a caliper of 0.0001 with no 
replacement to match firms restricting the observations to be on common support to obtain the 
average treatment effect on the treated (ATT). The matched sample consists of 1,291 firms 
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managed by foreign CEOs and 1,291 firms managed by domestic CEOs. ATT measures the 
difference in M&A outcomes between firms managed by foreign CEOs and comparable firms 
managed by domestic CEOs with similar propensity scores.  
The average treatment effect of foreign CEOs on M&A outcomes is presented in Table 
13. We find that tThe unmatched sample shows a significant difference in means for M&A 
outcomes for firms managed by foreign CEOs and domestic CEOs. After the matching, the 
difference in M&A outcomes still exists and each difference is significantly different from 
zero. For example, the unmatched difference in means for M&A propensity is 3.8% higher for 
foreign CEOs, the matched sample is 4% higher and statistically significant at the 5% level. 
The unmatched difference in means for acquirer 3-day CAR is -0.005. After matching, the 
difference in means is -0.013 and statistically significant at 5%. The results suggest that after 
considering CEO selection bias, the impact of foreign CEOs on M&A outcomes is still 
significant. 
[Insert Table 13 here] 
4.5.2 Instrumental variable approach  
The OLS analysis used assumes that CEOs are randomly selected into firms. This 
might not be true in our case since firms’ demand for certain CEO attributes might compel 
them to choose one CEO over another. For example, a firm may appoint a foreign CEO to 
take advantage of an international skill set to serve the firm’s strategic purposes. For instance, 
if a firm wants to expand its operations abroad, it might hire a foreign CEO because of their 
cross-cultural and international experience. Thus, the demand for special skills in a CEO and 
a firm’s strategy might lead to their selection (Greve, Biemann & Ruigrok, 2015; Magnusson 
& Boggs, 2006; Masulis, Wang & Xie, 2012).  
We use two-stage least squares estimation to deal with endogeneity in the study. We 
use two instrumental variables that do not have a direct impact on M&A outcomes except 
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indirectly through foreign CEOs. The first instrumental variable is based on the geographic 
proximity to the US. We argue that countries closer to the US are more likely to migrate to the 
US and therefore the supply of foreign CEOs could be influenced by geographic proximity. 
We therefore use geographic distance measured in kilometres as our first instrumental variable 
for the supply of foreign CEOs20. Our second instrumental variable identification is based on 
Knyazeva, Knyazeva and Masulis (2013) who argue that the supply of corporate directors 
depends on the local availability of qualified prospective directors and therefore they use the 
local director pool as an instrumental variable for board composition. Consistent with this 
argument, Bernile, Bhagwat and Yonker (2018) use the supply of non-local potential directors 
residing one non-stop flight away from the firm headquarters as an instrumental variable for 
board diversity. Based on these studies, we use the number of foreign born (immigrants) as a 
percentage of total population of the state in which the firm is headquartered as an instrumental 
variable for foreign CEO21. We estimate the following two-stage least squares model: 
Stage 𝟏: 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝐶𝐸𝑂 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑠) + 𝛽2(𝐺𝑒𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 ) +
𝛽3(𝐶𝐸𝑂  𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠) + 𝛽4(𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠) + 𝛽5(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑙𝑠) +
𝛽6 (𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡) + 𝛽7 (𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡) +∈                                 (2) 
Stage 𝟐: 𝑀&𝐴 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝐶𝐸𝑂) +
𝛽2(𝐶𝐸𝑂  𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠) + 𝛽3(𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠) + 𝛽4(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑙𝑠) +
𝛽5 (𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡) + 𝛽7 (𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡) +∈                              (3) 
We perform Stock and Yogo (2005) weak instrument test to assess the strength of our 
instrumental variables. We find that the Craig–Donald F-statistic from the first stage regression 
is greater than any of the Stock and Yogo (2005) critical F-values for weak instruments. We 
 
20
 We measure geographic distance in kilometres between a CEO’s country of origin and the 
US based on latitude and longitude. 
21 Data on number of foreign born for each state are from the US Census Bureau American 
Community survey. Data are available for 2000 and 2005 to 2017. We interpolate to obtain 
data for 2001 to 2004. 
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also perform the Sargan (1958) over identification test of the two instruments and find that they 
are not overly identified with a p-value of 0.2972. This suggests that our instruments are 
acceptable for use in the two-stage least square regression. The results are reported in Table 
14. Column (1) is the first stage results of the probit estimates of Equation (2). We find that the 
coefficient of geographic distance is positive and statistically significant at 1%. This suggests 
that geographic proximity to the US could be determinant of the supply of foreign CEOs.  
Column (2) is the second stage results of equation (3) for M&A propensity. We find 
the coefficient of M&A propensity is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level, which 
is consistent with our initial results in Table 3. Column (3) is the second stage result for cross 
border acquisitions. We find a positive and statistically significant relationship between foreign 
CEO instrumented and cross border acquisitions, which is consistent with our results in Table 
4. Column (4) is the second stage results for home bias acquisitions. The estimate for the 
foreign CEO dummy is negative and statistically significant at 1% level, which is consistent 
with the results in Table 5. Column (5) is the second stage results for diversified acquisitions. 
We find the coefficient is positive but statistically insignificant. Column (6) is the second stage 
results for high-tech acquisitions. We find the coefficient on the foreign CEO instrumented is 
positive and statistically significant at the 5% level, which is consistent with our results in 
Table 7.   
We present the two stage results for acquisition premium and acquirer 3-day CAR in 
Table 15. Column (1) is the first stage results of the probit estimate of Equation (5). Column 
(2) is the second stage results for acquisition premium. We find that the coefficient of foreign 
CEO instrumented is positive and statistically significant at 1%, which is consistent with our 
initial results in Table 11 using OLS. Column (4) is the second stage results for acquirer 3-day 
CAR. We find a negative relationship between the foreign CEO instrumented variable and 
acquirer 3-day CAR, which is consistent with our initial results in Table 8 using OLS. 
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Moreover, the estimated coefficients of the remaining control variables are consistent with the 
OLS estimates. Overall, the results from the two-stage least squares regression suggest that 
firms managed by foreign CEOs are associated with higher M&As propensity, high-tech 
acquisitions, cross border acquisitions, a higher premium, and negative acquirer returns. 
[Insert Tables 14 & 15 here] 
5. Conclusion  
This chapter examines the impact of foreign CEOs on M&As of publicly traded US 
firms from 2000 to 2017. Following the literature that international experience impacts 
managers’ strategic choices, we examine the impact of foreign CEOs on firms’ M&As 
decisions. Further, we examine the value implications of M&As undertaken by foreign CEOs. 
Our results provide new evidence on why there are variations in acquisition outcomes. 
We find that foreign CEOs are more likely to engage in M&As than domestic CEOs. 
The results are robust to controlling for standard M&A determinants as well as year and 
industry fixed effects. Our analysis also examines the impact of foreign CEOs on the type of 
acquisition and find  that foreign CEOs prefer targets operating in high tech industries whose 
valuation depends on future developments in unproven and unexplored fields, and targets 
operating in different 2-digit SIC code industries that could have a high degree of information 
asymmetry. We also find that firms managed by foreign CEOs are more likely to acquire 
foreign targets. 
We analyse the market’s reaction to M&A announcements by foreign CEOs and find 
that announcement returns are negative. We next examine the channels through which a foreign 
CEO impacts acquirer returns. The results show that the negative returns exist in diversified 
and home bias acquisitions. We also find that the acquisition premium for firms managed by 
foreign CEOs is higher. We conduct additional analyses and find that foreign CEOs who 
managed geographically diversified firms generate positive returns even though the evidence 
196 
 
is weak. This suggests that shareholders of geographically diversified firms benefit from 
M&As made by foreign CEOs. The implication of this result is that not all firms benefit from 
the appointment of foreign CEOs and, therefore, policy makers should consider the geographic 
segment(s) of their firms when hiring a foreign CEO. 
Using instrumental variables for foreign CEOs and propensity score matching, our 
results are robust to alternative explanations of CEO and firm matching. Overall, our study 
shows that foreign CEOs are important determinants of a firm’s strategic choices that 
subsequently impact acquirer returns. Our study’s results imply that the general and country 
specific international experience of CEOs should be accounted for when estimating regression 
models for acquirer returns. Our study contributes to the takeover literature by highlighting the 
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Appendix Table A: CEO Nationality mix 
This table presents nationality mix of CEOs in our sample. CEO nationality are obtained 
from Marquis Who’s Who database, NNDB and company websites. 
 
Nationality Frequency Percent Cum. percent 
American 10832 86.49 86.49 
Argentine 13 0.1 86.59 
Australian 104 0.83 87.42 
Austrian 7 0.06 87.48 
Belgian 9 0.07 87.55 
Brazilian 8 0.06 87.62 
British 262 2.09 89.71 
Canadian 175 1.4 91.11 
Chilean 4 0.03 91.14 
Chinese 32 0.26 91.39 
Colombian 3 0.02 91.42 
Croatian 17 0.14 91.55 
Cuban 12 0.1 91.65 
Cypriot 1 0.01 91.66 
Czech 3 0.02 91.68 
Danish 32 0.26 91.94 
Dutch 36 0.29 92.22 
Egyptian 3 0.02 92.25 
Filipino 1 0.01 92.25 
French 74 0.59 92.85 
German 59 0.47 93.32 
Greek 26 0.21 93.52 
Hong Kong 14 0.11 93.64 
Hungarian 11 0.09 93.72 
Indian 228 1.82 95.54 
Iranian 43 0.34 95.89 
Irish 37 0.3 96.18 
Israeli 54 0.43 96.61 
Italian 55 0.44 97.05 
Jamaican 5 0.04 97.09 
Japanese 5 0.04 97.13 
Kenyan 10 0.08 97.21 
Lebanese 14 0.11 97.33 
Malaysian 6 0.05 97.37 
Mexican 25 0.2 97.57 
New Zealander 32 0.26 97.83 
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Norwegian 13 0.1 97.93 
Pakistani 10 0.08 98.01 
Polish 17 0.14 98.15 
Russian 12 0.1 98.24 
Singaporean 4 0.03 98.28 
South African 58 0.46 98.74 
South Korean 7 0.06 98.79 
Spanish 14 0.11 98.91 
Swedish 23 0.18 99.09 
Swiss 48 0.38 99.47 
Taiwanese 34 0.27 99.74 
Turkish 13 0.1 99.85 
Venezuelan 6 0.05 99.9 













Appendix Table B: Defintions of the variables 
Variable    Definition and data source(s)   
Foreign CEO Dummy variable for one (zero otherwise) if a CEO has 
nationality other than American and/or bachelor’s degree in 
home country and/or foreign work experience. Source: Marquis 
Who’s Who, NNDB, firm website.      
CEO Age   Natural logarithm of age of the CEO. Source: Execucomp. 
CEO Tenure Natural logarithm of the number of years the CEO has held the 
role in the firm. Source: Execucomp 
Female  Dummy variable equals one for female CEOs (zero otherwise).   
Source: Execucomp. 
MBA  Dummy variable equals one if the CEO has received an MBA 
degree (zero otherwise). Source: Marquis Who’s Who, NNDB, 
firm web. 
Ivy League   Dummy variable equals one if the CEO has Ivy League  
    education, (zero otherwise). Source: Marquis Who’s Who,  
    NNDB, firm website. 
Military Experience   Dummy variable equals one if the CEO has Military experience 
    (zero otherwise). Source: Marquis Who’s Who database. 
Chairman/CEO Dummy variable equals one if the CEO is the Chairman Of the 
board (zero otherwise). Source: Execucomp 
Foreign born in state People residing in the states who were not US citizens at birth. 
Source: US Census Bureau American Community Survey.  
Geographic distance Distance in kilometres between a CEO’s country of origin and 
the US based on latitude and longitude.   
Size     Log of total assets of the acquiring firm. Source: Compustat. 
Leverage   Long term debt plus short term debt divided by the book value 
     of the acquirer‘s total assets. Source: Compustat. 
Cash    Cash and marketable securities normalised by total assets.  
    Source: Compustat. 
Tobin’s Q    Market value of assets divided by the book value of assets,  
               where market value of assets is equal to the book value of  
    assets plus market value of common stock minus book value of  
    common minus balance sheet deferred taxes. Source: CRSP and 
    Compustat. 
Capital expenditures  Firm capital expenditure divided by book value of assets.  
    Source: Compustat. 
R&D expenditure  Firm R&D expenditure divided by book value of asset.  
    Source: Compustat. 
Geographic segment  Number of geographic segments firm operates.  
Source: Compustat. 
Run–up    Market-adjusted buy- and -hold returns of the acquirer’s stock  
    over a 200-day window (-210,-11). Source: CRSP. 
Deal value    Value of the transaction in US$ million. Source: SDC. 
Relative Size    Deal value divided by the market value of the acquiring 
    firm’s equity 10 days before the deal announcement  
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    Source: SDC and CRSP. 
Hostile Deals   Dummy variable equals one if the deal is hostile or unsolicited 
    (zero otherwise). Source: SDC. 
Tender offers   Dummy variable equals one if the deal is tender offer (zero  
    otherwise). Source: SDC. 
Private Target   Dummy variable equals one for acquisition of private firms 
 (zero otherwise). Source: SDC. 
Public Target   Dummy variable equals one for acquisition of public firms  
    (zero otherwise). Source: SDC 
Subsidiary Target  Dummy variable equals one for acquisition of subsidiary firms 
    (zero otherwise). Source: SDC. 
Pure cash deals  Dummy variable equals one for deals fully financed with cash 
 (zero otherwise). Source: SDC. 
Pure stock deals  Dummy variable equals one if deal is fully financed with stock 
 (zero otherwise). Source: SDC. 
Pmt. Incl. stock  Dummy variable equals one if the deal is either partially or 
 fully financed with stock (zero otherwise). Source: SDC. 
CAR (-1, +1)    Cumulative abnormal returns of the acquiring firm’s stock  
in the 3-day event window (-1, +1) where 0 is the announcement 
day. The returns are calculated using the market model 
parameters estimated over the period staring 210 days and ending 
11 days before the announcement. The model parameters are 
estimated using CRSP value weighted index. 
Takeover Premium  A ratio of the offer price to the target market value one week 
    before the deal announcement. Source: SDC. 
Diversified acquisition Dummy variable equals one if the acquirer and the target are 
    operating in different industries with different 2-digit SIC code 
    (zero otherwise). Source: SDC. 
Cross border acquisition Dummy variable equals one if the target is a non-US firm.  
    (zero otherwise). Source: SDC. 
Payment method  Dummy variable equals one if the deal was purely paid with 
    cash (zero otherwise). Source: SDC. 
High-tech acquisitions Dummy equals one if both the acquirer and the target are high 
tech firms with SIC codes 3571, 3572, 3575, 3577, 3578, 
3661,3663, 3669, 3674, 3812, 3823, 3825, 3826, 3827, 3829, 
3841, 3845, 4812, 4813, 4899, 7370, 7371, 7372, 7374, 7375, 
7378, 7379, (zero otherwise). 
Home bias acquisitions Dummy equals one if target country is same as CEO country 












Summary statistics of the sample 
This Table presents summary statistics for the full sample in our study. Panel A reports the 
summary statistics of CEO characteristics. Firm characteristics are presented in Panel B. Panel 
C reports the summary statistics of merger and acquisition transactions of US firms from 2000-
2017. Data on CEO characteristics are from Marquis Who’s Who database and Execucomp. 
Firm level data are from Compustat and CRSP. M&As data are from Thomson Financial SDC 
database. All variables are defined in Appendix Table B. 
 
Variable No. obs. Mean Median Std dev. Min Max 
Panel A: CEO characteristics        
Foreign CEO 12524 0.136 0 0.343 0 1 
CEO age 12519 65.230 65 8.462 32 96 
CEO tenure  12524 5.865 3.9 6.210 0 32.8 
Female CEO  12524 0.026 0 0.159 0 1 
MBA  12524 0.322 0 0.467 0 1 
Ivy league 12524 0.114 0 0.318 0 1 
Military experience  12524 0.093 0 0.290 0 1 
Chairman/CEO 12524 0.634 1 0.482 0 1 
Panel B: firm characteristics        
Firm size($mil) 12524 25056.9 2956.2 120750.2 5.049 2264909 
Leverage  12468 0.227 0.209 0.184 0 0.820 
Tobin's Q 12072 1.929 1.520 1.204 0.798 7.478 
Cash holdings 12104 0.148 0.086 0.163 0.001 0.754 
R&D expenditure  12524 0.025 0 0.048 0 0.259 
Capital expenditure  11938 0.042 0.031 0.042 0 0.230 
M&A propensity 12524 0.227 0 0.419 0 1 
Panel C: Deal characteristics        
Deal value (%Mil) 2843 788.2 131.7 3065.2 1.000 67285.7 
Relative size  2743 0.106 0.036 0.185 0 1.115 
Tender offer  2843 0.053 0 0.224 0 1 
Hostile deal 2843 0.002 0 0.049 0 1 
Diversifying acquisition 2843 0.436 0 0.496 0 1 
Cross border acquisition 2843 0.237 0 0.426 0 1 
Public target 2843 0.205 0 0.404 0 1 
Private target  2843 0.407 0 0.491 0 1 
Subsidiary target 2843 0.382 0 0.486 0 1 
High tech acquisition 2843 0.239 0 0.426 0 1 
Pure cash deal 1915 0.602 1 0.490 0 1 
Pure stock deal 1915 0.081 0 0.273 0 1 
Premium (%) 536 38.764 32.800 35.752 -33.950 217.430 




Summary statistic for sub samples  
This table compares the summary statistics of the domestic and foreign CEO sub samples in our study. Panel A presents differences in means of 
CEO characteristics. Panel B reports differences in means of firm characteristics. Differences in the means of the M&A transactions are shown in 
Panel C. ***, **, and * represent significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The definitions of the variables are presented in Appendix 
Table B.  
      Domestic CEOs (1)         Foreign CEOs (2)     (1)-(2) 
 No. obs.    Mean Median Std.dev.     Min           Max No. obs. Mean Median Std.dev.       Min          Max diff means 
Panel A: CEO characteristics                            
CEO age 10818 65.448 65 8.462 32 96 1692 63.889 64 8.322 42 92 1.614*** 
Female CEO 10823 0.029 0 0.168 0 1 1692 0.008 0 0.087 0 1 0.021*** 
CEO tenure  10823 5.786 3.800 6.173 0 32.8 1692 6.390 4.2 6.431 0 32.8 -0.604*** 
Chairman/CEO 10823 0.647 1 0.478 0 1 1692 0.556 1 0.497 0 1 0.091*** 
MBA 10823 0.325 0 0.468 0 1 1692 0.303 0 0.460 0 1 0.022 
Ivy League 10823 0.122 0 0.328 0 1 1692 0.061 0 0.240 0 1 0.0615*** 
Military experience 10823 0.106 0 0.308 0 1 1692 0.009 0 0.094 0 1 0.0974*** 
Panel B: Firm characteristics                            
Size ($Mil) 10823 25797 3104 120709 5 2264909 1692 20435.06 2278.932 121258.2 10.231 2187631 5361.94* 
Cash holdings 10427 0.138 0.078 0.155 0.001 0.754 1668 0.212 0.146 0.191 0.001 7.478 -0.074*** 
Tobin's Q 10401 1.905 1.490 1.206 0.798 7.478 1662 2.082 1.718 1.183 0.798 7.478 -0.177*** 
Capital expenditure 10262 0.043 0.032 0.043 0 0.230 1667 0.037 0.026 0.039 0 0.230 0.007*** 
R&D expenditure 10823 0.021 0 0.045 0 0.259 1692 0.048 0.022 0.064 0 0.259 -0.026*** 
M&A dummy 10823 0.222 0 0.416 0 1 1692 0.260 0 0.439 0 1 -0.038*** 
Panel C: Deal characteristics                           
Deal value ($mil) 2402 767.987 135.000 2892.546 1 67285.700 440 899.840 120 3879.174 1 59515.02 -131.853 
Relative size  2318 0.106 0.036 0.187 0 1.115 424 0.101 0.036 0.178 0.0003 1.115 0.005 
Tender offer  2402 0.051 0 0.220 0 1 440 0.061 0 0.240 0 1 -0.010 
Hostile deal 2402 0.002 0 0.046 0 1 440 0.005 0 0.067 0 1 -0.002 
Diversifying acquisition 2402 0.437 0 0.496 0 1 440 0.432 0 0.496 0 1 0.005 
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Cross border acquisition 2402 0.227 0 0.419 0 1 440 0.295 0 0.457 0 1 -0.069*** 
Public target 2402 0.209 0 0.407 0 1 440 0.186 0 0.390 0 1 0.023 
Private target 2402 0.402 0 0.490 0 1 440 0.434 0 0.496 0 1 -0.032 
Subsidiary target 2402 0.383 0 0.486 0 1 440 0.373 0 0.484 0 1 0.010 
High-tech acquisition 2402 0.213 0 0.410 0 1 440 0.380 0 0.486 0 1 -0.166*** 
Pure cash deal 1598 0.596 1 0.491 0 1 316 0.630 1 0.484 0 1 -0.034 
Pure stock deal 1598 0.087 0 0.282 0 1 316 0.051 0 0.220 0 1 0.036** 
Premium (%) 460 37.068 30.945 35.216 -33.950 217.430 76 49.026 39.96 37.464 -1.33 217.43 -11.958*** 















Foreign CEOs and Acquisitiveness 
This table presents regression estimates for foreign CEOs and other control variables on a firm’s acquisitiveness. Column (1) reports the logit 
regression and marginal effects of foreign CEOs and firm control variables on acquisition propensity. Column (2) presents the marginal effect 
of foreign CEOs and firm controls on acquisition propensity. We include CEO compensation in Column (3). Column (4) reports the Poisson 
regression estimates of foreign CEOs and other control variables on acquisition frequency. Column (5) reports the OLS results of foreign CEOs 
and other controls on acquisition size. We include year and 2-digit SIC code industry fixed effects in all the models, but the coefficients are 
not reported. All variables are defined in Appendix Table B. The t/z-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and acquirer 
clustering. The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
M&A propensity M&A propensity M&A propensity M&A frequency  M&A size  
Foreign CEO 0.0236** 0.0259** 0.0250** -0.0417 -0.0370 
 (2.2111) (2.3840) (2.2917) (-1.5292) (-0.4344) 
Firm size  0.0324*** 0.0321*** 0.0259*** 0.0371*** 0.4860*** 
 (12.4320) (11.9919) (7.8921) (5.1682) (19.6010) 
Tobin's Q -0.0036 -0.0056 -0.0046 0.0120 0.0513 
 (-1.0018) (-1.5213) (-1.1961) (1.0144) (1.4444) 
Free cash flow 0.1795*** 0.1738*** 0.1743*** -0.0219 1.3022*** 
 (3.2945) (3.1671) (3.1676) (-0.1324) (2.6906) 
Leverage 0.0248 0.0225 0.0158 0.0158 1.0677*** 
 (1.0169) (0.9142) (0.6349) (0.2300) (4.5902) 
Loss dummy -0.0804*** -0.0795*** -0.0779*** -0.0061 -0.1135 
 (-6.2849) (-6.1595) (-6.0057) (-0.1695) (-1.1009) 
Dividend yield  -0.9387*** -0.8414*** -0.8111*** -2.1841** 0.9191 
 (-3.7714) (-3.4767) (-3.3701) (-2.3600) (0.4400) 
R&D expenditure 0.3359*** 0.2819*** 0.2818*** 0.0056 1.4672* 
 (3.3279) (2.7472) (2.7248) (0.0205) (1.8290) 
Capital expenditure -0.6314*** -0.6297*** -0.6132*** 0.2618 -3.5750*** 
 (-4.6488) (-4.6111) (-4.4760) (0.5139) (-3.1181) 
CEO age   -0.0729*** -0.0730*** -0.0365 -0.0864 
  (-4.3727) (-4.3344) (-0.7455) (-0.6671) 
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Female CEO  -0.0276 -0.0277 -0.0265 -0.0505 
  (-1.0053) (-1.0060) (-0.4034) (-1.2094) 
CEO tenure   0.0091* 0.0111** 0.0089 0.3927** 
  (1.8135) (2.1621) (0.5916) (2.0506) 
MBA   0.0154* 0.0140* -0.0484** 0.0039 
  (1.8588) (1.6815) (-2.1351) (0.0594) 
Ivy League education  0.0347*** 0.0362*** 0.0259 -0.0250 
  (2.9321) (3.0597) (0.8335) (-0.2915) 
Military experience   0.0095 0.0090 0.0359 -0.2157** 
  (0.6850) (0.6461) (0.8743) (-2.1303) 
CEO portfolio delta    -0.0056 0.0047 -0.0482* 
   (-1.5381) (0.2917) (-1.9336) 
CEO portfolio vega    -0.0155 0.1180 -0.6605* 
   (-0.3277) (0.7716) (-1.8427) 
CEO total compensation   0.0137*** 0.0003 0.0642*** 
   (3.2399) (0.0327) (2.6469) 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 11,860 11,670 11,634 2,643 2,643 








Foreign CEOs and cross border acquisitions 
The table presents the results of the logistic estimates of foreign CEOs and cross border 
acquisitions. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the target nation is outside the 
U.S. and zero otherwise. Column (1) presents the marginal effect of foreign a CEO on cross 
border acquisitions holding all other factors constant. Column (2) includes firm controls. Colum 
(3) controls for CEO characteristics. All models include year and 2-digit SIC code industry 
fixed effects, but coefficients are not reported. The z-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for 
heteroscedasticity and acquirer clustering. The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance level 
at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Foreign CEO 0.0638*** 0.0537** 0.0493** 
 (3.0984) (2.3424) (2.1016) 
Firm size   0.0395*** 0.0391*** 
  (7.4106) (7.2099) 
Tobin's Q  0.0184** 0.0179* 
  (1.9948) (1.9122) 
Free cash flow  -0.3591*** -0.3545*** 
  (-2.7721) (-2.7174) 
Leverage  -0.0990 -0.1129* 
  (-1.6064) (-1.8216) 
Loss dummy  -0.0257 -0.0265 
  (-0.8266) (-0.8377) 
Dividend yield  -1.8753*** -1.7512** 
  (-2.6435) (-2.5056) 
R&D expenditure  -0.1623 -0.2227 
  (-0.6509) (-0.8871) 
Capital expenditure   0.3171 0.2908 
  (0.9737) (0.8820) 
CEO age    -0.0119 
   (-0.3291) 
Female CEO   -0.0246 
   (-0.3342) 
CEO tenure    0.0207* 
   (1.8460) 
MBA    0.0023 
   (0.1221) 
Ivy league    -0.0008 
   (-0.0318) 
Military experience   -0.0203 
   (-0.6173) 
Year fixed effects No Yes  Yes  
Industry fixed effects  No  Yes  Yes  
Pseudo R-squared 0.003 0.073 0.074 







Foreign CEOs and home bias acquisitions 
The table presents the results of the logistic estimates of foreign CEOs and home bias 
acquisitions. The dependent variable is a dummy that equals one if the target nation is same 
as CEO country of origin and zero otherwise. Column (1) presents the marginal effect of 
foreign CEO on home bias acquisitions holding all other factors constant. Column (2) 
includes firm controls. Colum (3) controls for CEO characteristics. All models include year 
and 2-digit SIC code industry fixed effects, but coefficients are not reported. The z-statistics 
in parentheses are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and acquirer clustering. The symbols ***, 
**, and * denote significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
 (1) 2 3 
Foreign CEO -0.7544*** -0.7751*** -0.7698*** 
 (-14.1665) (-14.1810) (-14.1370) 
Firm size   -0.0195*** -0.0203*** 
  (-3.8931) (-4.0011) 
Tobin's Q  -0.0080 -0.0077 
  (-0.9965) (-0.9550) 
Free cash flow  0.3688*** 0.3508*** 
  (3.3335) (3.1279) 
Leverage  0.0504 0.0656 
  (0.9481) (1.2264) 
Loss dummy  0.0467 0.0411 
  (1.6292) (1.4248) 
Dividend yield   0.6706 0.6699 
  (1.2559) (1.2579) 
R&D expenditure  0.1467 0.2223 
  (0.7046) (1.0543) 
Capital expenditure  -0.1247 -0.1182 
  (-0.4060) (-0.3800) 
CEO age    0.0462 
   (1.3673) 
CEO tenure    -0.0175* 
   (-1.6587) 
MBA   -0.0010 
   (-0.0596) 
Ivy league    -0.0058 
   (-0.2792) 
Military experience    0.0114 
   (0.4161) 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
Pseudo R-squared 0.349 0.348 0.351 









Foreign CEOs and diversified acquisitions 
The table presents a logit regression of a foreign CEOs’ decision to engage in diversified 
acquisitions. The dependent variable is a dummy variable which takes value of one if both the 
target and the acquirer operate in different 2-digit SIC code industry. Column (1) presents the 
marginal effects of foreign CEO and firm control on diversified acquisitions. Column (2) 
includes CEO characteristics. All models include year and 2-digit SIC code industry fixed 
effects, but coefficients are not reported. All variables are defined in Appendix Table B. The z-
statistics in parentheses are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and acquirer clustering. The symbols 
***, **, and * denote significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 
   
  (1) (2) 
Foreign CEO 0.0504** 0.0502** 
 (2.0177) (1.9671) 
Firm size  0.0371*** 0.0383*** 
 (6.0320) (6.1037) 
Tobin's Q 0.0141 0.0118 
 (1.3774) (1.1723) 
Cash holdings -0.1180 -0.2701* 
 (-1.4163) (-1.8648) 
Leverage -0.0283 -0.0107 
 (-0.4139) (-0.1564) 
Loss dummy -0.0130 -0.0257 
 (-0.3890) (-0.7479) 
Dividend yield  0.7624 0.7396 
 (1.2083) (1.1536) 
R&D expenditure -0.2298 -0.4582* 
 (-0.8544) (-1.7382) 
Capital expenditure  0.0426 0.3343 
 (0.1187) (0.9264) 
CEO age   -0.0195 
  (-0.4628) 
Female CEO  0.0058 
  (0.0793) 
CEO tenure   0.0061 
  (0.4745) 
MBA   0.0450** 
  (2.2883) 
Ivy League  0.0263 
  (0.9810) 
Military experience   -0.0145 
  (-0.4029) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
Pseudo R-squared  0.123 0.124 






Foreign CEOs and high-tech acquisitions 
The table presents a logit regression of a CEO’s decision to engage in high tech acquisitions. 
The dependent variable is a dummy variable which takes value of one if both the target and the 
acquirer operate in technology firms and zero otherwise. Column (1) presents the marginal 
effects of foreign CEOs on high-tech acquisitions holding all other factors constant. Column 
(2) include firm controls. Column (3) include CEO characteristics. We include year and 2-digit 
SIC code industry fixed effects, but coefficients are not reported. All variables are defined in 
Appendix Table B. The z-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and 




    
  (1) (2) (3) 
Foreign CEO 0.1445*** 0.0530*** 0.0670*** 
 (7.5880) (2.6471) (3.2395) 
Firm size   0.0134** 0.0145** 
  (2.2617) (2.4359) 
Tobin's Q  0.0539*** 0.0519*** 
  (6.2651) (5.9268) 
Free cash flow  -0.0355 -0.0093 
  (-0.3011) (-0.0786) 
Leverage  -0.1284** -0.1195* 
  (-2.1341) (-1.9391) 
Loss dummy  0.1144*** 0.1166*** 
  (4.6311) (4.7581) 
Dividend yield  -0.4385 -0.2516 
  (-0.6127) (-0.3726) 
R&D expenditure   0.3144*** 0.3068*** 
  (12.9539) (12.9844) 
Capital expenditure   0.0676 0.1120 
  (0.2108) (0.3467) 
CEO age    -0.1024*** 
   (-2.9055) 
Female CEO   -0.0201 
   (-0.3601) 
CEO tenure   0.0288*** 
   (2.6590) 
MBA   0.0046 
   (0.2646) 
Ivy League   0.0434* 
   (1.7213) 
Military experience   0.0645* 
   (1.8799) 
Year fixed effects No Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects  No Yes Yes 
Observations 2,842 1,686 1,659 






Cross sectional regression analysis (OLS) of acquirer CAR and foreign CEOs 
The table reports results of the cross sectional OLS analysis of acquirer 3-day CAR (-1, 
+1) on foreign CEO dummy and other CEO, firm and deal characteristics for a sample of 
U. S public, private and subsidiary acquisitions for the period 2000-2017. Column (1) 
reports the OLS results for the foreign CEO dummy holding all other factors constant. 
Columns (2) includes deal characteristics. We control for firm characteristics in column 
(3). Colum (4) includes CEO characteristics. We include year and 2-digit SIC code 
industry fixed effects in all models, but coefficients are not reported. All variables are 
defined in Appendix Table B. The t-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for 
heteroscedasticity and acquirer clustering. The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance 
level at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
     
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Foreign CEO -0.0076*** -0.0074** -0.0076** -0.0081** 
 (-2.7229) (-2.1613) (-2.1532) (-2.2938) 
Relative size   0.0245*** 0.0198** 0.0202** 
  (2.6983) (2.0474) (2.0837) 
Diversifying deals  -0.0046* -0.0047* -0.0044* 
  (-1.7223) (-1.7390) (-1.6490) 
Hostile deals  -0.0152 -0.0162 -0.0167 
  (-1.4747) (-1.3657) (-1.4003) 
Tender offers  -0.0045 -0.0035 -0.0033 
  (-0.8388) (-0.6446) (-0.6118) 
Public target*pure cash deals  -0.0002 0.0029 0.0029 
  (-0.0443) (0.6991) (0.6876) 
Private target* pure cash deals  -0.0028 -0.0030 -0.0030 
  (-0.9067) (-0.9397) (-0.9287) 
Public target *Pmt.incl. stock  -0.0431*** -0.0423*** -0.0428*** 
  (-8.1461) (-7.6983) (-7.7398) 
Private target *Pmt.incl. stock  -0.0055 -0.0038 -0.0043 
  (-1.0077) (-0.7077) (-0.7935) 
Firm size    -0.0023*** -0.0021** 
   (-2.6826) (-2.4319) 
Tobin's Q   0.0010 0.0009 
   (0.6806) (0.6141) 
Leverage   0.0274*** 0.0276*** 
   (2.9233) (2.9385) 
Cash holdings    0.0119 0.0107 
   (1.0641) (0.9516) 
Run-up   -0.0068 -0.0068 
   (-1.5891) (-1.5792) 
CEO age     -0.0162 
    (-1.1729) 
CEO tenure     0.0030 
    (1.6403) 
MBA     -0.0009 
    (-0.3122) 
Ivy League    -0.0020 
    (-0.5318) 
Military experience     -0.0013 
    (-0.2745) 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
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Observations 2,659 1,782 1,723 1,723 




Sub-sample analysis of foreign CEOs on acquirer 3-day CAR for acquisition types 
The table reports the results of the cross sectional OLS analysis of acquirer 3- day CAR (-1, +1) on foreign CEO dummy and other controls for a 
sample of US public, private and subsidiary acquisitions for the period 2000-2017. Column (1) reports the OLS results for diversified acquisitions. 
Column (2) reports the results for high -tech acquisitions. Column (3) reports the results for cross border acquisitions. Column (4) reports the 
results for home bias acquisitions. All models include year and industry fixed effects, but coefficients are not reported. All variables are defined 
in Appendix Table B. The t-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and acquirer clustering. The symbols ***, **, and * denote 
significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Diversify acquisitions High-tech acquisitions Cross border acquisition  Home bias acquisitions  
Foreign CEO -0.0105** -0.0072 0.0056 -0.0230* 
 (-2.0429) (-0.9555) (0.6850) (-1.6622) 
Relative size  0.0266 0.0338 0.0661** 0.0109 
 (1.5739) (1.2480) (2.2247) (1.0272) 
hostile deals -0.0206 -0.0154 -0.0017 -0.0136 
 (-1.1906) (-0.6626) (-0.0602) (-0.9517) 
Tender offers  -0.0035 0.0116 0.0015 0.0006 
 (-0.5614) (1.0461) (0.1420) (0.0843) 
Public target*pure cash deals 0.0054 0.0035 -0.0007 -0.0033 
 (0.9846) (0.3993) (-0.0701) (-0.6736) 
Public target*pmt.incl. stock -0.0357*** -0.0512*** -0.0365 -0.0440*** 
 (-3.9812) (-3.5868) (-1.4925) (-6.9102) 
Private target*pure cash deals 0.0044 -0.0001 -0.0091 -0.0032 
 (0.9151) (-0.0080) (-1.1507) (-0.7574) 
Private target*pmt. incl. stock -0.0027 -0.0149 -0.0092 -0.0064 
 (-0.2653) (-1.2824) (-0.5083) (-0.9996) 
Firm size  -0.0006 -0.0010 -0.0033 -0.0031*** 
 (-0.5077) (-0.6184) (-1.5565) (-2.7960) 
Tobin's Q -0.0012 0.0022 -0.0021 0.0014 
 (-0.4683) (0.7762) (-0.5791) (0.7412) 
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Leverage 0.0022 0.0715*** 0.0018 0.0368*** 
 (0.1548) (2.8311) (0.0785) (2.9864) 
Cash holdings  0.0234 0.0447** -0.0115 0.0170 
 (1.3778) (2.0992) (-0.4872) (1.1365) 
Run-up -0.0129*** -0.0046 -0.0087 -0.0086* 
 (-3.4102) (-0.6171) (-1.2565) (-1.6739) 
CEO age -0.0048 -0.0019 0.0023 -0.0215 
 (-0.5447) (-0.1582) (0.1422) (-1.2625) 
CEO tenure  0.0008 -0.0046 -0.0044 0.0042* 
 (0.2790) (-1.2082) (-0.9472) (1.8898) 
Ivy League 0.0040 0.0031 0.0210** -0.0074* 
 (0.7893) (0.3822) (2.4489) (-1.7102) 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 683 482 342 1,155 












Sub-sample analysis of foreign CEOs’ effect on acquirer 3-day CAR for method of payment and target selection 
The table reports the results of cross sectional OLS analysis of acquirer 3- day CAR (-1, +1) on the foreign CEO dummy and other controls for a 
sample of US public, private and subsidiary acquisitions from 2000-2017. Column (1) reports the OLS result for pure cash deals. Column (2) 
reports the results for pure stock deals. Column (3) has the results for private targets. Column (4) is the results for public targets. Column (5) is 
the results for pure cash acquisition of private targets. Column (6) is the results for pure stock acquisition of private targets. Column (7) is the 
results for pure cash acquisition of public targets. Column (8) is the results for pure stock acquisition of public targets. All models include year 
and industry fixed effects, but coefficients are not reported. All variables are defined in Appendix Table B. The t-statistics in parentheses are 
adjusted for heteroscedasticity and acquirer clustering. The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
         
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
















Public target* pure 
stock deals 
Foreign CEO -0.0064 -0.0515 -0.0066 -0.0104 -0.0051 -0.1141 0.0081 -0.0224 
 (-1.5980) (-1.5157) (-1.5356) (-1.1964) (-0.6644) (-0.9545) (0.9151) (-0.5014) 
Relative size 0.0575*** -0.0336 0.0838*** 0.0516*** 0.1306*** -0.6996 0.0446 -0.0267 
 (4.0264) (-0.6034) (5.5094) (-4.1370) (4.1966) (-0.7653) (1.2833) (-0.2862) 
Hostile deals -0.0181 0.0930  0.0121   -0.0059 0.1167 
 (-0.7842) (1.3243)  (0.4995)   (-0.2137) (1.0506) 
Tender offers 0.0009 0.1006*** 0.0319*** 0.0070 0.0340**  -0.0023 -0.1352*** 
 (0.1916) (-2.9363) (3.6154) (1.0604) (2.1357)  (-0.3622) (-2.7148) 
Firm size  -0.0018* -0.0093** 0.0014 -0.0019 0.0014 -0.0044 -0.0025 -0.0107 
 (-1.7304) (-2.0893) (1.3210) (-1.0144) (0.6614) (-0.2313) (-1.1171) (-1.6383) 
Tobin's Q 0.0000 0.0034 -0.0005 0.0060* -0.0019 0.0165* 0.0034 0.0010 
 (0.0260) (0.5058) (-0.3066) (1.8353) (-0.7077) (1.6936) (0.8871) (0.0617) 
Leverage 0.0214* 0.1697** 0.0191* 0.0502** 0.0283 0.3450 0.0434* 0.1604* 
 (1.9394) (2.3623) (1.7446) (2.3089) (1.2790) (1.4933) (1.6712) (1.6823) 
Cash holdings  0.0160 0.0850 0.0200 -0.0222 0.0367* 0.0318 -0.0161 0.0093 
225 
 
 (1.1541) (1.3148) (1.5626) (-0.7559) (1.6969) (0.2589) (-0.4949) (0.0796) 
Run-up 0.0006 -0.0052 -0.0019 -0.0202** 0.0103 -0.0097 -0.0056 -0.0148 
 (0.0949) (-0.7661) (-0.3338) (-1.9816) (1.1639) (-0.8412) (-0.3995) (-0.5000) 
CEO age  -0.0035 -0.0551* -0.0090 0.0122 -0.0338*** -0.2407* 0.0290* -0.0415 
 (-0.4832) (-1.7265) (-1.2860) (0.9351) (-2.6990) (-1.7782) (1.7186) (-0.7694) 
CEO tenure  0.0018 -0.0133 -0.0011 0.0006 0.0018 -0.0207 -0.0001 -0.0150 
 (0.8247) (-1.5381) (-0.5194) (0.1686) (0.4807) (-0.4928) (-0.0206) (-1.1387) 
MBA 0.0002 0.0043 0.0002 0.0077 -0.0009 -0.0729 0.0065 0.0146 
 (0.0486) (0.3522) (0.0755) (1.4993) (-0.1633) (-1.1372) (0.9031) (0.7610) 
Ivy League -0.0032 0.0186 0.0039 -0.0018 0.0018 0.0270 -0.0024 0.0185 
 (-0.6772) (1.1355) (0.8764) (-0.2621) (0.2298) (0.3935) (-0.2681) (0.6113) 
Industry fixed 
effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,034 135 1,039 505 405 37 232 88 











Foreign CEOs and the acquisition premium 
This table reports the OLS results for the impact of foreign CEOs on the takeover premium of 
US public acquisitions from 2000-2017. We measure takeover premium as the ratio of the 
offer price to the target market value one week before the deal announcement. Column (1) 
presents the results of foreign CEOs on the acquisition premium, holding all other factors 
constant. Column (2) includes deal characteristics. Colum (3) controls for firm characteristics. 
Column (4) includes CEO characteristics. We include year and 2-digit SIC code industry fixed 
effects in all models, but coefficients are not reported. All variables are defined in Appendix 
Table B. The t-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and acquirer 
clustering. The symbols ***, *, and * denote significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Foreign CEO 0.1141** 0.1303*** 0.1281** 0.1430*** 
 (2.2507) (2.5927) (2.4768) (2.7255) 
Deal value   -0.0269** -0.0230* -0.0231* 
  (-2.3143) (-1.8790) (-1.7215) 
Relative size   -0.0064 -0.0479 -0.0633 
  (-0.0961) (-0.6660) (-0.8499) 
Tender offer   0.1224** 0.0970* 0.0927* 
  (2.5127) (1.9292) (1.8596) 
Hostile deal   -0.0426 -0.0323 -0.0079 
  (-0.3935) (-0.2965) (-0.0761) 
Diversifying deal  0.0129 0.0189 0.0123 
  (0.3159) (0.4433) (0.2991) 
Pure cash deal  0.0662 0.0615 0.0614 
  (1.2628) (1.1058) (1.0937) 
Pure stock deal  -0.0558 -0.0908* -0.0848* 
  (-1.2352) (-1.8234) (-1.7045) 
Tobin's Q   -0.0281 -0.0337 
   (-1.3049) (-1.4877) 
Leverage   -0.0201 -0.0258 
   (-0.1532) (-0.1909) 
Cash holding    0.0907 0.0983 
   (0.5785) (0.6224) 
Run up   0.0613 0.0623 
   (1.1344) (1.1055) 
CEO tenure     -0.0249 
    (-0.8755) 
CEO age     -0.1272 
    (-0.5622) 
MBA     0.0618* 
    (1.7096) 
Ivy League    0.0145 
    (0.3107) 
Military experience     0.0919 
    (1.3407) 
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Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 536 492 453 453 
R-squared 0.196 0.268 0.272 0.287 




The impact of geographic segment on foreign CEOs and acquirer 3-day CAR 
The table reports results of the cross sectional OLS analysis of acquirer 3-day CAR (-1, 
+1) on the interaction of foreign CEO dummy and geographic segment and other CEO, 
firm and deal characteristics for a sample of US public, private and subsidiary acquisitions 
from 2000-2017. Column (1) reports the OLS results for the interaction term holding all 
other factors constant. Column (2) includes deal characteristics. Colum (3) includes firm 
and CEO characteristics. We include year and 2-digit SIC code industry fixed effects in 
all models, but coefficients are not reported. All variables are defined in Appendix Table 
B. The t-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and acquirer 
clustering. The symbols ***, ** and * denote significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Foreign CEO -0.0250** -0.0272** -0.0292** 
 (-2.4567) (-2.2969) (-2.2260) 
Geographic segment  -0.0007 -0.0038 -0.0028 
 (-0.2917) (-1.2868) (-0.9070) 
Foreign CEO*geographic segment  0.0092* 0.0113* 0.0112* 
 (1.7438) (1.8236) (1.6551) 
Relative size   0.0286*** 0.0279*** 
  (2.9387) (2.7060) 
Diversifying deals  -0.0054* -0.0047 
  (-1.9192) (-1.6071) 
Hostile deal  -0.0186 -0.0145 
  (-1.5095) (-1.1983) 
Tender offer   -0.0041 -0.0046 
  (-0.7483) (-0.8127) 
Public target *Pure cash deal  0.0025 0.0039 
  (0.5839) (0.8500) 
Public target*pmt.incl. stock  -0.0496*** -0.0501*** 
  (-7.2012) (-6.9868) 
Private target*Pure cash deal  -0.0021 -0.0026 
  (-0.6815) (-0.8089) 
Private target*pmt.incl. stock  -0.0029 -0.0055 
  (-0.4615) (-0.8503) 
Firm size    -0.0014 
   (-1.4735) 
Tobin's Q   -0.0003 
   (-0.1810) 
Cash holdings   0.0075 
   (0.6394) 
CEO age   -0.0038 
   (-0.5828) 
Tenure   0.0024 
   (1.1727) 
MBA    -0.0016 
   (-0.3546) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
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Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,443 1,598 1,546 






Propensity score matching  
Panel A reports the determinants of foreign CEOs. The dependent variable is a dummy 
equal to one if a CEO is foreign and zero otherwise. We include year and industry fixed 
effects in all the models, but coefficients are not reported. The z-statistics are in 
parentheses. Panel B presents the impact of foreign CEOs on M&As outcomes based on 
propensity scores. The treated variable is foreign CEO equal to one if a CEO has a 
nationality other than American and zero otherwise. The average treatment effect on the 
treated (ATT) measures the difference in M&A outcomes between the two groups. The 
symbols ***, **, and * denote significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Panel A: Determinants of foreign CEO appointment   
Firm size -0.0089 
 (-0.8345) 




Tobin’s Q -0.0349** 
 (-2.4112) 
R&D expenditure 1.4718*** 
 (3.9643) 
CEO age -0.1541** 
 (-2.3524) 
CEO tenure 0.0284 
 (1.3942) 
Year fixed effects Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes 
Observation 11,031 
Pseudo R-squared 0.1021 
 
 
Panel B: Impact on M&A outcomes             
Variable Sample Treated  Controls  Difference S.E. T-stat 
M&A propensity 
Unmatched 0.260 0.222 0.038 0.011 2.52 
ATT 0.268 0.228 0.040 0.017 2.3 
High-tech acquisitions 
Unmatched 0.380 0.213 0.166 0.022 7.09 
ATT 0.288 0.212 0.076 0.034 2.21 
Cross border acquisitions  
Unmatched 0.295 0.227 0.069 0.022 2.88 
ATT 0.313 0.231 0.082 0.035 2.33 
Home bias acquisitions  
Unmatched 0.016 0.772 -0.756 0.020 -37.02 
ATT 0.022 0.769 -0.747 0.025 -29.69 
Acquisition premium  
Unmatched 0.490 0.371 0.119 0.045 2.32 
ATT 0.534 0.259 0.275 0.103 2.68 
Acquirer 3-day CAR  
Unmatched -0.002 0.003 -0.005 0.003 -2.19 




Two-stage least squares regression for M&As type 
The table presents the results of two-stage least squares estimate for acquisition propensity and M&As type. Column (1) presents the results of the 
first stage of the IV regression of foreign CEOs on geographic proximity and foreign born in the state in which the firm is headquartered. Column 
(2) presents the second stage regression of the foreign CEO instrumented on M&A propensity. Column (3) is the second stage for cross border 
acquisitions. Colum (4) is the second stage for home bias acquisitions. Column (5) is the second stage results for diversify acquisitions. Column (6) 
is the second stage result for high-tech acquisitions. We control for industry and year fixed effects in all regressions, but coefficients are not reported. 
The z-statistic are in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1st stage  2nd stage  2nd stage  2nd stage 2nd stage  2nd stage  
Foreign CEO M&A propensity Cross border acquisitions Home bias acquisitions Diversified acquisition High-tech acquisition 
Geographic distance  0.1125***      
 (986.4)      
Foreign born in the state  0.0007      
 (1.3664)      
Foreign CEO (instrumented)  0.0282** 0.0483** -0.7124*** 0.0353 0.0418** 
  (2.2669) (2.0482) (-33.5894) (1.2210) (2.0762) 
Firm size  -0.0716*** 0.0327*** 0.0378*** -0.0209*** 0.0302*** 0.0130*** 
 (-3.4279) (12.1001) (6.9982) (-4.0972) (5.0736) (3.9260) 
Tobin's Q -0.0156 -0.0039 0.0181** -0.0063 0.0132 0.0270*** 
 (-0.5877) (-1.0484) (2.0505) (-0.7965) (1.3576) (4.9814) 
Free cash flow  0.6828* 0.1438*** -0.3424*** 0.3828*** -0.2491* 0.0046 
 (1.7362) (2.7152) (-2.6588) (3.2839) (-1.7589) (0.0578) 
Leverage 0.1993 0.0183 -0.1142** 0.0619 0.0369 -0.0439 
 (1.0494) (0.7286) (-1.9850) (1.1554) (0.5831) (-1.2449) 
Loss dummy 0.1965** -0.0742*** -0.0282 0.0310 -0.0013 -0.0076 
 (2.1930) (-6.2080) (-0.9620) (1.1776) (-0.0407) (-0.4229) 
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Dividend yield  -2.0054 -0.2519** -1.3453*** 0.5428 1.5904*** 0.3958 
 (-0.7788) (-2.5061) (-2.5841) (1.1204) (2.7776) (1.2401) 
R&D expenditure 2.3838*** 0.2892*** -0.2174 0.2466 -0.9764*** 2.7724*** 
 (3.5555) (2.7283) (-0.9064) (1.2063) (-3.7020) (18.8559) 
Capital expenditure  -3.1932*** -0.5052*** 0.2867 -0.2359 0.5003 -0.1968 
 (-2.7873) (-4.0949) (0.9414) (-0.8138) (1.4935) (-1.0536) 
CEO age  -0.1247 -0.0702*** -0.0138 0.0398 -0.0045 -0.1053*** 
 (-1.0220) (-4.2173) (-0.3819) (1.1953) (-0.1130) (-4.7403) 
Female CEO  -1.3547*** -0.0288 -0.0069 0.0694 -0.0224 -0.0293 
 (-4.2114) (-1.1875) (-0.1114) (1.2257) (-0.3287) (-0.7709) 
CEO tenure  0.0285 0.0090* 0.0205* -0.0180* -0.0010 0.0109 
 (0.7447) (1.7962) (1.8275) (-1.7552) (-0.0810) (1.5873) 
MBA  0.0400 0.0160* 0.0034 -0.0008 0.0164 -0.0143 
 (0.6169) (1.9061) (0.1888) (-0.0487) (0.8359) (-1.3029) 
Ivy League -0.9096*** 0.0390*** -0.0023 -0.0030 0.0616** 0.0032 
 (-7.8149) (3.1228) (-0.0935) (-0.1380) (2.2986) (0.2118) 
Military experience  -2.5816*** 0.0070 -0.0220 0.0207 -0.0575* 0.0479** 
 (-8.8495) (0.5046) (-0.7179) (0.7466) (-1.7036) (2.5436) 
Year fixed effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
First stage Cragg -Donald F statistics   49656.3 98258 96563.47 96563.47 96563.47 
Overidentification p-value  0.2972 0.6935 0.8706 0.2162 0.1627 
10% maximal IV  19.93 19.93 19.93 19.93 19.93 
15% maximal IV   11.59 11.59 11.59 11.59 11.59 
Observations 11,633 11,633 2,637 2,637 2,637 2,637 






Two-stage least squares regression for the acquisition premium and acquirer 3-day CAR 
The table presents the results of two-stage least squares estimate for acquisition premium and acquirer 3-day CAR. Column (1) presents the results 
of the first stage of the IV regression of foreign CEOs on geographic proximity and foreign born in the state in which the firm is headquartered. 
Column (2) presents the second stage regression of the instrumented foreign CEO dummy on acquisition premium. Colum (3) is the results of the 
first stage of the IV regression of foreign CEOs on geographic proximity and foreign born in the state in which the firm is headquartered. Colum (4) 
is the second stage regression of the instrumented foreign CEO dummy on acquirer 3-day CAR. We control for industry and year fixed effects in all 
regressions, but coefficients are not reported. The t-statistics are in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance level at 1%, 5%, 
and 10%, respectively. 
 Acquisition premium    Acquirer 3-day CAR     
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
 Foreign CEO  Acquisition premium   Foreign CEO  3-day CAR 
               1st stage  2nd stage         1st stage  2nd stage  
Foreign born in state  0.0032  Foreign born in state 0.0014   
 (0.8703)    (0.8610)  
Geographic distance  0.1165***  Geographic distance  0.1132***  
 (139.9)    (343.6)  
Foreign CEO (instrumented)  0.1372*** Foreign CEO (instrumented)  -0.0100*** 
  (2.8981)    (-2.8571) 
Deal value  0.0011 -0.0228** Relative size  -0.0037 0.0185*** 
 (0.6843) (-2.0150)   (-0.6643) (2.7372) 
Relative size  -0.0089 -0.0716 Tender offer  -0.0046 -0.0037 
 (-0.7425) (-0.9157)   (-0.9610) (-0.6484) 
Tender offer  -0.009* 0.0971** Hostile deal -0.0084 -0.0068 
 (-1.614) (2.3975)   (-0.3721) (-0.2487) 
Hostile deal (-0.1282) 0.0084 Diversifying deal 0.0052** -0.0040 
 -0.3921 (0.0368)   (2.3243) (-1.5031) 
Diversifying deal (-0.0003) 0.0123 Public *pure cash deal 0.0011 0.0024 
 -0.0610 (0.3463)   (0.2942) (0.5438) 
Pure cash deal (-0.0020) 0.0621 Private target * pure cash deal -0.0063** -0.0026 
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 -0.3321 (1.4522)   (-2.3241) (-0.7918) 
Pure stock deal (-0.0023) -0.0815* Public target*pmt.incl. stock 0.0047 -0.0431*** 
 -0.3130 (-1.6613)   (1.2012) (-9.3687) 
Tobin's Q (0.0002) -0.0362* Private target * pmt.incl. stock 0.0012 -0.0061 
 0.0710 (-1.8241)   (0.2843) (-1.2017) 
Leverage (0.0077) -0.0288 Firm size  0.0012* -0.0026*** 
 0.4132 (-0.2216)   (1.7121) (-3.0378) 
Cash holding  (0.0302) 0.1070 Tobin's Q -0.0003 0.0010 
 -1.3642 (0.6979)   (-0.2942) (0.7818) 
Run-up (-0.0039) 0.0583 Leverage 0.0076 0.0293*** 
 -0.5531 (1.1999)   (0.9901) (3.2142) 
CEO tenure  0.0065** -0.0235 Run-up 0.0005 -0.0063** 
 (2.1044) (-1.0878)   (0.2312) (-2.2612) 
CEO age  -0.0094 -0.1310* CEO tenure  -0.0014 0.0026 
 (-0.8333) (-1.6603)   (-1.0124) (1.5534) 
MBA  0.0081* 0.0612* CEO age  0.0001 -0.0045 
 (1.6923) (1.8272)   (0.0141) (-0.8174) 
Ivy League -0.0062 0.0126 MBA -0.0008 -0.0019 
 (-0.9222) (0.2674)   (-0.3834) (-0.7147) 
Military experience  -0.0019 0.1005* Ivy league -0.0038 -0.0009 
 (-0.2341) (1.7334)   (-1.1802) (-0.2293) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Military experience  -0.0066 -0.0009 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes   (-1.72413) (-0.1878) 
First stage Cragg- Donald F statistics 9839.96 Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  
Overidentification p-value  0.4256 Industry fixed effects Yes  Yes  
10% maximal IV  19.93 First stage Cragg -Donald F statistics   59016.1 
15 % maximal Iv  11.59 Overidentification p-value  0.1722 
Observations 447 447 10% maximal IV  19.93 
R-squared 0.294 0.294 15% maximal IV   11.59 
   Observations 1,699 1,699 









1. Summary of findings 
This study conducts an in-depth analysis of the impact of foreign CEOs on three aspects 
of corporate behaviour of publicly traded US companies from 2000 to 2017. In the study, we 
hypothesize that foreign CEOs’ international experience will impact firms’ risk taking 
behaviour and corporate policies because the literature shows that international experience 
impacts managers’ strategic choices. In addition, we hypothesize that variations in the national 
culture of foreign CEOs will impact their firm’s capital structure decisions because national 
culture has values and preferences that act as a constraint on individual’s decision making. 
Chapter 2 examines the impact of foreign CEOs on firm risk taking behaviour and 
management practices. Chapter 3 investigates how the cultural background of foreign CEOs 
impacts their firms’ capital structure decisions. Chapter 4 examines the impact of foreign CEOs 
on mergers and acquisitions (M&As). Using a sample of S&P 1500 firms from 2000 to 2017, 
this study provides empirical evidence that foreign CEOs have a significant impact on firms’ 
strategic decisions and performance. The main results of the study are as follows. 
First, compared with domestic CEOs, foreign CEOs manage riskier firms. We 
empirically test this evidence using total risk measured using the stock return volatility, 
idiosyncratic risk and systematic risk of firms. The results show that firms managed by foreign 
CEOs have both high stock return volatility and idiosyncratic risk. We find no evidence for 
systematic risk. The results provide evidence of the risk tolerance attitude of foreign CEOs. 
Nevertheless, greater risk taking behaviour of foreign CEOs does not make diversified 
investors worse off because idiosyncratic risk is likely to be diversified away and the impact 
on a firm’s systematic is insignificant. Additional analysis shows that the risk taking behaviour 
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of foreign CEOs is benenficial to shareholders because firms managed by foreign CEOs have 
a higher valuation using both the residual income and market-to-book approaches and a higher 
operating performance. However, the higher valuation and operating performance are found 
only in firms that have multiple geographic segments. The implication of this result suggests 
that not all firms enjoy the benefit of the risk taking behaviour of foreign CEOs and, therefore, 
policy makers should consider the geographic segments of firms when hiriing a foreign CEO. 
Further analysis into the corporate policies of firms managed by foreign CEOs shows 
that firms managed by foreign CEOs invest more in intangaible assets. Specifically, the results 
show that foreign CEOs invest more in R&D and advertising, which have been described as 
risky investments because their outcomes are uncertain and usually have a zero salvage value. 
We show that firms managed by foreign CEOs are more likely to engage in M&As. We 
document that the legal origin of foreign CEOs matters for firm risk and management practices. 
The results show that foreign CEOs who come from common law countries (i.e., countries with 
better creditor rights) manage less risky firms than foreign CEOs from civil law countries. 
Additional analysis provides evidence that foreign CEOs who come from good management 
practice countries improve the productivity of their firms and those from countries with good 
corporate governance manage earnings less. This evidence shows that foreign CEOs transfer 
the knowledge of how foreign organisations operate into their firm, which benefits 
shareholders. 
Second, the cultural background of foreign CEOs impacts the capital structure decisions 
of their firms. The results show that firms managed by foreign CEOs from individualistic 
cultures have higher leverage. These results are robust to the use of alternative measures of 
individualism and leverage. However, the tendency for individualist CEOs to positively impact 
the leverage of their firm is reduced in the presence of large institutional investors. This 
suggests that some form of corporate governance helps to reduce managerial ability to imprint 
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their preferences on corporate policies. We also document that firms managed by individualist 
CEOs are more likely to issue debt than equity and adjust their target leverage faster than 
foreign CEOs from collective cultures. Further analysis shows that individualism does not only 
impact the debt ratio but also the type of debt that firms hold. We find that firms managed by 
individualist CEOs hold shorter debt maturity. Thus, firms managed by individualist CEOs 
have a risky financing policy. This could be explained by the fact that individualism has been 
documented to be related to risky behaviour. We extend the analysis to the state level in the 
US and find that firms managed by American CEOs born in individualist states have higher 
leverage and shorter debt maturity. Overall, individualism explains a portion of the variation 
we observed in capital structure decisions. 
Third, the acquisition propensity for firms managed by foreign CEOs is higher than for 
domestic CEOs. We find that firms managed by foreign CEOs are more likely to acquire targets 
in high-tech industries, foreign targets and targets operating in a different 2-digit SIC code 
industry. We also find that announcement returns are lower for firms managed by foreign CEOs 
in diversified and home bias acquisitions. The results show that foreign CEOs pay a higher 
premium in M&As. In conclusion, our analysis shows that foreign CEOs have a significant 
impact on M&As. 
2. Contribution  
This study makes several contributions to the corporate finance literature by showing that a 
CEO’s background explains variations in corporate decisions. The specific contributions are as 
follows. 
First, this study contributes to the growing strand of literature on CEO attributes and 
corporate policies. Specifically, it contributes to studies that show CEOs’ attributes impacting 
firms’ risk. Existing studies include CEO age, gender, pilot certificate, overconfidence, and 
marital status. This study shows that a CEO’s identity (domestic or foreign) is important for 
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firm risk and that a foreign CEO’s country of origin also impacts firm risk. The study shows 
that the risk taking behaviour of foreign CEOs is beneficial to shareholders of firms operating 
in multiple geographic segments. The study also adds to the literature on CEOs’ characteristics 
and capital structure decisions. Previous studies include CEO personal leverage, ownership, 
compensation, and managerial entrenchment. This study adds to that research by showing that 
the cultural background of foreign CEOs has important implications for a firm’s capital 
structure decisions. The major contribution of this study is that, unlike most CEO attributes 
that impact capital structure decisions, culture is given to individuals throughout their lifetime. 
The study also contributes to the literature on M&A outcomes. This study shows that foreign 
CEOs impact M&A outcomes and that the announcement returns for firms managed by foreign 
CEOs are lower in diversified and home bias acquisitions.  
Second, this study contributes to the literature on the impact of foreign executives on 
corporate policies and firm performance. Though prior studies focus on international 
experience, this thesis shows that, in addition to their international experience, foreign CEOs 
cultural background matters for their firm’s capital structure. This study also shows that foreign 
CEOs experience in a legal origin has a significant impact on management practices. 
Specifically, foreign CEOs from countries with better corporate governance reduce earnings 
management, and foreign CEOs from countries ranked high on management practices improve 
firm productivity. This suggests that foreign experience is not homogenous. 
Third, the study contributes to the literature on the role of country of origin in 
influencing individual outcomes. Previous studies focused on country of origin in shaping 
corporate misconduct, tax evasion, shirking at work, the parking behaviour of United Nations 
officials and savings behaviour. This study’s contribution is that foreign CEOs’ legal origin 
and cultural background are important for corporate behaviour. 
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Fourth, the study contributes to the literature on the impact of different cultural 
backgrounds on financing decisions. While existing studies have focused on the macro level 
(Chui, Kwok & Zhou 2016; Chui, Lloyd & Kwok 2002; Zheng et al. 2012), this study provides 
evidence at the micro level by showing that the cultural background of individual foreign CEOs 
determines the financing decisions of their firms. 
3. Future research  
This study provides empirical evidence that foreign CEOs have a significant impact on 
firms’ strategic choices and performance. We also show that the legal origin and national 
culture of foreign CEOs are important factors to consider when examining the impact of foreign 
CEOs on corporate policies. In what other ways do firms that employ foreign CEOs benefit? 
Corporate litigation can result in significant losses to shareholders. As a result, it would be 
interesting to consider the impact of foreign CEOs’ legal origin on corporate litigation. 
Specifically, future research could examine whether firms managed by foreign CEOs who 
come from high litigation risk countries have a higher or lower probability of being sued than 
firms managed by foreign CEOs from lower litigation risk countries. The findings of Djankov 
et al. (2008) and La Porta, Lopez‐de‐Silanes and Shleifer (2006) show that variations in 
investor protection across countries expose managers to different levels of litigation risk, with 
litigation risk higher in better investor protected countries. Since foreign CEOs have been 
shaped by the formal and informal institutions of their birth countries this could impact their 
firms’ probability of being sued. The results from such a study would provide evidence whether 
firms that employ foreign CEOs benefit from the impact of their legal origin. 
Variations in the national culture of foreign CEOs could be examined for any effect on 
corporate innovation. The values and preferences embedded in some cultures will spur 
innovation in their firms because some cultures have values that increase risk taking because 
such cultures reward individuals for important discoveries and innovation. There are also some 
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cultures that emphasize the importance of trust in economic transactions. Therefore, foreign 
CEOs from cultures with a high level of trust may build a culture of trust in their firms that 
would increase knowledge sharing among its employees and increase firm innovation. Prior 
studies show that trust has important implications for innovative outcomes because trust in 
organizations may increase the flow of knowledge among employees. Therefore, it would be 
interesting to test different cultures’ impact on innovation. Also, trust could reduce the 
information asymmetry of a firm. Such firms are less risky which is beneficial to investors. 
This study examines the impact of foreign CEOs on publicly traded firms in the US that 
have a different ownership structure from firms in other countries. A comparable study of 
foreign CEOs in other countries (i.e., international evidence) would give a general idea of the 
impact of foreign CEOs on corporate behaviour. However, limited time and resources did not 
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